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## **DANGER SPOTS IN WORLD POPULATION**

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DANGER SPOTS  
IN  
WORLD POPULATION

By

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## P R E F A C E

In the course of my study of population questions I have come to believe that the differential pressure of peoples on their resources is one of the important causes of friction between nations. The knowledge that such differentials exist is spreading rapidly in the world today. Furthermore, these differentials are increasing more rapidly today than ever before because changes in the rate of population growth are not the same in all lands. In some parts of the world population growth is declining and will soon cease; in other parts of the world there is a large increase which is likely to continue for some decades; while in still other parts conditions are just shaping to inaugurate an increase. Now it so happens that the peoples who are already feeling keenly the need of new lands and resources are also the ones who are likely to have large increases for the next few decades. I cannot but believe that these differential pressures, which will be more and more keenly felt in the near future will lead to efforts to secure lands and resources which can be used to relieve pressure where it is severe and thus equalize it in some measure.

Will the efforts to equalize pressures result in war or will some other method of adjustment be found? It is the problems arising from unequal pressure which are discussed here.

Warren S. Thompson

*Oxford, Ohio, July 22, 1929*



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## **DANGER SPOTS IN WORLD POPULATION**



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

#### 1. The Causes of War

The causes of war between nations and peoples have been many and diverse. At times dynastic interests have dictated the policies of nations and have been the chief factors leading to war. The mere calling to mind of the leading European dynasties of 1914 and some of their historic policies will suffice to remind us of some of the many ways in which the aggrandizement of dynasty has contributed to armed conflict. But this point needs no labouring, as the history of mediæval and modern Europe is full of instances where the ambitions of ruling families have been an important and at times the decisive factor making for war. This dynastic interest has of course frequently, perhaps generally, been linked with other interests and ends which were not so clearly personal; but often these others were merely a blind used to screen the real motives.

In certain eras religion has vied with dynasty as a disturber of peace. To it must be charged some very destructive and bitter wars. The spread of Islam, the crusades, the attempts to stamp out heresies, the troubles between Church and State, the Reformation, and a great variety of other movements arising chiefly out of religious motives are cases in point. But these more obvious examples of religious wars are few and insignificant compared with the wars in which religious organizations only appear as the aids and abettors

of men and nations who were fighting the battles of these organizations at the same time that they were fighting for personal and national aggrandizement.

In times past no less than today the actual causes of war have generally been so complex that one cannot rightly attribute a given war to any particular cause. So when we speak of this war's being dynastic in origin and that war's being religious, we are describing very inadequately the situation out of which they arose. However useful such a description may be, we should not let it blind us to the fact that there has seldom, if ever, been a war which did not also have economic causes mingled with the others.

Indeed, I am of the opinion that economic factors in the broad sense have generally been pre-eminent in causing war. This is not to imply, however, that they have always, or even generally, been the ostensible cause. Often economic motives seem less worthy than certain others and are hidden from sight as far as possible. This is especially true in recent times, when the taking of human life for gain accruing to the group or the nation is considered more reprehensible than taking it for patriotic or cultural reasons.

In the earlier stages of human culture there was less self-deceit. Savage hordes fought openly for the possession of hunting- and fishing-grounds; nomadic chieftains led their followers to what appeared to be more fertile pastures or to prosperous agricultural settlements, and drove out or enslaved the people already in possession. Rich river valleys, with their thriving and opulent cities, have always attracted barbarians who thought their own fields less fruitful and their own cities less wealthy. Economic gain was the avowed motive in such wars, and this fact was not blinked.

Many times in the course of human history the forces driving men to war, though economic, were not so much the

desire' of booty as grim necessity. For example, a change in climate, rendering an area less fertile than it had been, would necessitate migration to a new land. We have many records of whole peoples moving with all their goods across the face of the earth in search of the necessities of life. This quest for much-needed land may later have degenerated into mere search for booty; but real necessity frequently started the movement and was thus the basic cause of the wars resulting from it. Once a people is forced from its native land in search of necessities the effects of its migration may be very widespread; for it may mark only the beginning of a large number of migrations, all due more or less to the readjustments necessitated by the original movement. This has frequently been so in that period known as the *dawn of history* and in still earlier times.

## 2. Present-day Changes Affecting the Status of Peoples

Today even more than in past ages many and rapid changes are taking place in the relations between men and their environments. These changes often appear to make the acquisition of new and more ample resources necessary if a people is to retain its position in the world or is to expand as it believes it should.

The changes just referred to are chiefly of two kinds: (a) changes in the organization of a people which bring about new needs; and (b) changes in size which bring about increased needs. (Changes in climate are generally too gradual to be taken account of by contemporaries.) In the world of today far more than in past ages these two types of changes — (a) and (b) — are going on simultaneously and are far more rapid. Hence the needs of all

but the most backward peoples are expanding more rapidly than was even dreamed of a few decades ago. Never has any previous civilization shown a rapacity that compares even remotely with our own. As soon as any people comes within the sweep of our modern industrial civilization, its needs for economic resources begin to expand with incredible rapidity; for not only is a flood of new wants being constantly released, but the rate of population growth rises by leaps and bounds. It is perhaps not generally realized that a European population of 175 to 200 millions in 1800 had become almost 600 millions (including European colonists) at the outbreak of the World War. From constituting one-fifth to one-sixth of the human race in 1800, Europeans had become about one-third in a little over a century.

At the same time, standards of living had been changing rapidly, so that individual consumption had increased more rapidly than ever before. Under these conditions the active needs of Europeans for all manner of economic goods increased faster than those of other peoples.

Today, however, some of those peoples who until recently were living quite outside the influences leading to increase in both wants and numbers are beginning to feel impulses altogether new to them. They are developing industries modelled after those of the West, and they are also undergoing the growth of population which comes when a certain measure of modern sanitary practice is first introduced among backward peoples. Thus it is coming to pass that countries and peoples which have heretofore had but little influence in world affairs feel that they are now entitled to more consideration. They are conscious of growing human power, and many of them are becoming painfully aware that they have not the resources to make this power effective and respected in a world where force is dominant.

The reason for the relative weakness of these new-comers is that the more fertile lands and the more valuable resources have been appropriated by a few countries which have preceded them in reaching national maturity.

The acquiring of large blocks of the earth's surface by the more aggressive nations for their use in an indefinite future did not prove a very difficult task. It did not even involve very extensive warfare as long as there was a relative abundance of land in the possession of tribal peoples who were incapable of defending it against nationally and industrially organized peoples. The settlement of our own country is a good example of the ease with which valuable possessions were acquired. Still others, particularly tropical possessions, were acquired with even greater ease, since almost no settlement took place after the acquisition. These are being held today as areas of pure exploitation. This process of imperial expansion was relatively cheap, for only occasionally did nations fairly evenly matched come to grips. When they did, there was, of course, a war of the first magnitude. But one may say that, on the whole, the colonial empires of today were built up with comparatively few and small wars because the competition for new lands had not yet become really acute.

Before the nineteenth century the growth of population was everywhere slow; indeed, it was practically stationary in most countries. The mode of living was even more fixed than the population. There was, therefore, little urge to acquire new lands then as compared with that which has since arisen. But even so, most parts of the earth which were thinly settled by peoples in the tribal stage of organization were already claimed by the more highly organized European powers. With the development of modern industry the scramble to secure more land became intensified. Naturally,

the powers which were more highly organized and which first felt the growing demands of industry were those that expanded their empires most vigorously. Before the end of the nineteenth century the remaining areas of the earth which could not defend themselves or which had no protector — for example, Africa — were parcelled out among a few of the more active European powers. As a consequence a few powers now have great areas of relatively unused lands which they are holding for their own exclusive use in the future, and other powers, which have arrived at maturity only recently or have been unfortunate in their colonial ventures, are pent up within rather narrow limits and have but small resources. These latter powers are now finding that they really need more land either for actual settlement or for its mineral resources, or for both. These real and often urgent needs are, of course, not taken account of by the possessing powers. They are interested only in maintaining the *status quo* of land distribution. Obviously this is to their advantage. As a consequence the heavy differentials in population pressure which exist in various parts of the world are becoming steadily more pronounced and more keenly felt. They are certain to make trouble in the not-distant future if they are not recognized and if means looking towards their equalization are not devised.

At certain stages of development the economic needs of a nation are chiefly for new lands for actual settlement; at a later stage — for example, after factory industry has become fairly well developed within a nation — the dominating need is for access to the raw materials of industry and for markets in which to dispose of the goods made from these materials. It is with the problems arising from the need of more land by nations which have previously been almost self-sufficing and whose populations have only recently be-

gun to grow, that this discussion deals. There is a period of great expansion in the life of nations during the early decades of their passage from an older self-sufficing, traditional economy to the more modern industrialism of the Western world. During these decades there is an enormous urge to expansion in all aspects of national life. It is my contention that the nations which are now experiencing this urge are going to demand a new deal at the hands of those who have passed through this growing stage and now wish only to retain the fruits of their past exploits — exploits which were accomplished under a similar urge to expansion, but which is now outgrown.

### 3. Economic and Biological Expansion of Peoples Sometimes Opposed

It is one of the peculiar and interesting characteristics of our modern civilization that the urge to economic expansion and control persists after the urge to biological expansion ceases. Hence we have the spectacle of nations holding on to vast economic resources (lands) after there ceases to be any reasonable hope of their being able to hold them through actual settlement on the land. This is probably due in part to the fact that the need for resources and markets by highly industrialized peoples is never satisfied; it appears to have no term, while the need for settlement lands soon passes. Indeed, it is not too much to say that as the need for markets and resources increases, the need for settlement lands decreases. They appear to vary inversely. The reasons for this need not concern us here other than to say that industrialization and the city life it involves have a very depressing effect on population growth and they also unfit a people for colonial settlement. With the development of industry a

people gradually ceases to "swarm." It also ceases to be fit to settle and develop new lands, for city life is at the opposite pole of existence from pioneering, and city people cannot *possess* the land. They can exploit certain of its accumulated resources, but without the actual possessor of the soil to fall back upon they are like the people of the fabled isle who lived by taking in one another's washings. The facts seem to show conclusively that only "swarming" agriculturists with rather low standards of living can actually settle a new land. This is a matter of the first importance and should not be forgotten in discussions relating to the future of the unused areas of the earth.

The accompanying map will show that there are greatly differing densities of population in different parts of the world. One might assume offhand from a study of this map that the adjustment between resources and needs is bad throughout the world. Since resources, both agricultural and mineral, are not distributed at all evenly over the earth, such an assumption is wholly justified; and we shall see as the discussion proceeds that at present there is room for vast improvement in the distribution of population over the earth in relation to the resources it needs for its support and comfort.

#### 4. Unequal Division of Resources — "Danger Spots"

In an attempt to give a little more adequate notion of the inequality of resources between some of the different countries Table I has been prepared. Such a table as this is necessarily inaccurate in a number of ways. The statistics of the various lands are gathered in different ways, and the definitions of the units counted vary considerably. Besides,

the reserves of minerals have been very inadequately prospected in some of the countries. Hence this table must be thought of merely as a very rough approximation of the quantitative differences between certain nations in the possession of essential resources available for their use. But in spite of its inaccuracies it shows quite clearly that some countries are far better provided for than others in fuel, in the chief structural material — iron — and in land for agricultural uses. Some of these matters will be referred to in greater detail in later chapters, but this table will serve to introduce us to the problem proposed for study here.

Table I  
Resources of Various Countries Compared

COUNTRY	RESERVES IN TONS PER CAPITA		CULTIVATED Acres per capita	Per cent of total	Meadow and pasture land, acres per capita	Wood, forest, and other land, <sup>1</sup> per cent of total area
	Coal	Iron ore (visible)				
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
BRITAIN	4,296	135	.30	23.8	.72	20.5
FRANCE	795	200	1.01	41.8	.54	37.7
GERMANY	3,857	21	.81	43.7	.31	39.3
ITALY	6	0.2	.80	42.8	.42	35.2
SWEDEN	3,379		1.53	48.6	.53	34.5
Japan	126	1.4	.49	15.5		84.5
CHINA	1,000	2.6	.55	14.1		85.9
INDIA	235	10	1.16	46.0		54.0
AUSTRALIA	28,000	164	3.92	1.2		98.8
NEW ZEALAND	2,511	52	1.37	2.8	12.35	72.1
SOUTH AFRICA	7,464	405	1.41	3.5		96.5
UNITED STATES	22,796	87	2.85	18.0		82.0
CANADA	71,050	458	6.1	2.4		97.6

<sup>1</sup> Where no data are given in column F, the data in this column (G) were obtained by subtracting the data in column E from 100 per cent.

With the development of modern means of communication and transportation and with the steady increase in literacy of the peoples of the world the condition of affairs regarding the distribution of the resources of the world indicated above can no longer be hid from any but the most backward peoples. Furthermore this same ease of communication and growth in literacy tend to break through the "cake of custom" and tradition which have held many peoples in subjection hitherto and to arouse questions in their minds regarding the essential justice of the world system prevailing today. They are asking: Is it right that the discovery of a given area should involve a permanent and exclusive title of exploitation for the nation making the discovery? Is it just that the military occupation of a land thinly settled by rather primitive tribes should entitle the occupying power to its exclusive exploitation for all time? Does title to such lands rest upon anything but might, and if the power to effect a new conquest lies in a new quarter today, will not the new title be just as valid as the old? Indeed, if the conquest is followed by settlement and use, will not the new title be much better than the old? These questions are being asked today by an increasing number of people — particularly by people in nations which have only recently developed a national consciousness. Of course, these nations are also the have-nots among nations because they came of age, politically, too late to get any considerable share of the lands of still more backward peoples. But a good many men in the more favoured nations, those which have managed to establish claims to rather large resources, are also questioning the justice of the present distribution of the resources of the earth among its peoples.

It is not likely that the abstract justice of the matter will exert much influence in effecting a voluntary and peaceful

change in the situation, if one may judge from past events. Nevertheless, a statement of the case may be of some value in calling attention to the facts and making a little clearer what is involved in attempting to maintain indefinitely the *status quo* of land distribution in the world. It is in the hope of contributing a little to the understanding of the dangers involved in the present situation that this book is written.

What is meant here by "danger spots in population" is, then, areas on the earth of greatly different population pressure as measured by the relation of people to resources. The attempt by people either living in low-pressure areas or holding such areas as dependencies for their own exclusive use, to keep the people living in high-pressure areas pent up within their present boundaries indefinitely is what is likely to cause trouble. The peoples holding low-pressure areas unused and without serious attempts at settlement appear like dogs in the manger to those in high-pressure areas. If the dog cannot be *coaxed* from the manger, it can scarcely occasion us great surprise if attempts are made to *drive* him out. It is these attempts to dislodge him that will lead to trouble. That some such attempts will be made within the next few decades seems certain, and the reasons for this belief will be set forth in succeeding chapters. But it should be noted here that the acquisition of new lands today, if effected by force, will involve far more serious conflict than in times past. Indeed, there is good reason to think that world wars will result from the attempted seizure of new lands by the expanding powers. It is for this reason that the most serious consideration should be given to some plan for the redistribution of resources which will avoid war.

There are three regions on the earth where the chief danger spots are located: (1) the western Pacific, (2) the Indian Ocean, and (3) central Europe, with Italy. A chapter

will be added on Great Britain, not because it needs more land for settlement nor because it has even begun to use well the resources of the lands it now controls, but rather because it has a very peculiar population problem, the understanding of which is useful in many ways in planning a better distribution of population in the world; also because Great Britain occupies a unique position in the world today and no important change in world organization can be effected in which it does not play the leading rôle.

It should not be inferred from what has been said that the areas of high population pressure are more dangerous than the relatively unused areas of low pressure. It is the situation created by the existence of these differences and by the widespread knowledge of their existence that makes the danger. The absolute pressure of population on resources may be very great, as it is now in various parts of the world, without creating any serious threat to world peace; but when the differential pressure becomes generally known, a wholly new situation exists. It is obvious that a densely crowded people has little or nothing to gain by taking the territory of an equally crowded people unless the conquered people can be cleared off or enslaved, as was done in former times. Assuming that the conscience of the world will not countenance this today, if population pressures were somewhat equalized or if resources were being fairly well utilized by their present possessors, there would be comparatively little danger of the attempted conquest of new lands. Such is not the case, however, and the fact that the good things which the earth has to offer are very unequally divided is going to make serious trouble for all of us in the future if we do not voluntarily undertake to equalize to some extent the gross injustice of the present distribution. We all know that justice had nothing to do with the establishment of the

*status quo* in the distribution of resources. Force and force alone determined it. It can be maintained, if it can be maintained at all, only by force. The question is whether it is worth while attempting to maintain it under these conditions. Would it not be more sensible and humane to undertake voluntarily to do justice and thus do away with the need of force?

### 5. Blame for International Troubles

In thinking about this problem we should not allow ourselves to become confused with questions of war guilt. It is easy to slide from under responsibility by saying that A or B or C brought on a given war because it was the aggressor. Unfortunately, such easy assumptions are false and do not really help us forward in the attainment of peace. We should realize from our experience of the last ten years in attempting to assess war guilt that it cannot be done with precision. About all that can be said is that guilt must attach to all those who have allowed matters to drift to the point where war becomes inevitable. The more complexly and delicately our international life becomes organized, the truer it is that we must all share in war guilt. Of course some persons and nations have more power to change the course of events than others and they must, therefore, be judged the more guilty. But it cannot be blithely assumed that the so-called aggressor is more guilty than others whose moves in the international game of today are less overt. It may well be that the aggressor actually has less control over the course of events than the conservator of the *status quo*.

The significance of this view of war guilt for us is that we should not rest easy under the assumption that we shall not be to blame, in any way, if some of the densely crowded

peoples go to war to find relief from their suffering. We shall have to bear our share of guilt in the opinion of future generations if we do not do what is in our power to prevent matters from coming to the point where war is the only possible means of correcting injustice. Surely we must begin to perceive that grand villains do not play the important rôle in bringing about war and its attendant suffering that it has been customary to assume that they did. They scarcely amount to more than the match that lights the fuse that leads to the embedded charge. If we are to make any progress in getting world affairs put on a rational basis, we must try to find out how the charge comes to accumulate in such quantity and in such a place that it can be set off by some trivial event or some meddlesome person.

To carry the figure a little further, some very explosive charges are now being allowed to accumulate in different parts of the world and they will explode with great violence and do much damage if no measures are taken to dissipate them in the near future. The charges we are concerned with here are the increasing numbers of people pent up within areas which do not contain the resources to enable them to support these additional numbers even at present standards of living, to say nothing of the improving standards which all peoples desire. If the redistribution of the resources of the world is not carefully planned and undertaken in some way which will take account of the vital needs of those peoples who are still "swarming," it will be effected sooner or later by force. The alternatives are voluntary, peaceful redistribution and war.

If this is the case, then the way to avoid future wars for resources is not to bend every effort to the maintenance of the *status quo*, but rather to search out some plan whereby the really vital needs of crowded peoples can be supplied

with as little injury as possible to those now possessing surplus resources. It would seem the part of common sense for the nations possessing a surplus to canvass the needs of nations with a deficiency and make such adjustments of territory and resources as seem reasonable in the light of all the facts.

When the question of who is to possess the earth is looked at from a long-time point of view, it is perfectly obvious that people who are no longer "swarming," who have low birth-rates steadily becoming lower, and who have lost the power of actually taking possession of new lands cannot expect to hold for any great length of time territories which they are not effectively using. It is not wise or reasonable in them to expect to have their claims to excess resources honoured by nations which are in dire need of them. It seems inevitable, then, that war must be resorted to for the determination of the right to settle on and to use these unexploited lands if the possessing nations are unwilling to make voluntary concessions.

It is the chief purpose of what follows to give the facts which lead to this belief and to make a few suggestions as to ways in which the most urgent needs of the "swarming" peoples can be met without doing any great damage to the standards of living of those who would be called upon to make the concessions.

## CHAPTER II

### JAPAN

In the map preceding this chapter it will be seen that Japan occupies a very small fraction of the area called the western Pacific. Even with its dependencies — Korea, Formosa, and Sakhalin — it has a territory of only 260,707 square miles, divided as follows:

Table II

Area, Population, and Density of Constituent Parts of the Japanese Empire, 1925

	Area	Population October 11, 1925	Density of Population
JAPAN PROPER	147,657	59,736,822	404
FORMOSA (including Pescadores)	13,888	3,994,884	287
KOREA	85,228	19,519,927	229
SAKHALIN	13,934	203,504	14.6
TOTAL	260,707	83,455,137	

By referring to Table III on pages 20 and 21 it will be seen that the total area of the Japanese Empire is somewhat less than that of the island of Borneo, and that Japan proper is but slightly greater than Sumatra in size.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese Empire comprises only 2.56 per cent of the total area of the western Pacific region, but it has 15.52 per cent of the total population. Here we have in its crudest terms Japan's most urgent problem; namely, the pressure of population on the land resources of the nation.

<sup>1</sup> American readers may perhaps better appreciate the smallness of Japan if they realize that Texas alone, with 262,398 square miles, is a little larger than the entire Japanese Empire, with 260,707 square miles.

In order to make clear just how serious the pressure of Japan's population on its resources is, it will be necessary to examine in some detail the resources of the Empire. A density of population of about 404 per square mile in Japan proper by no means gives us an adequate measure of the pressure of population on resources in the area. There are several countries in Europe that have a greater density of population, but none of them perhaps is quite so destitute of natural resources as is Japan.

### 1. Agricultural Resources

In the first place the actual area of Japan proper now being tilled is only 15.5 per cent of the total or about 23,000 square miles. This area can be somewhat extended, but, as will be pointed out later, the tilled area will probably never exceed twenty per cent of the total area. Even such an extension will almost certainly involve finding cultivators who are willing to live on less than is customary among Japanese farmers today. For much of the land that is now reclaimable is mountainous and relatively sterile, so that even when reclaimed and put under crops, it will yield but a meagre return for the labour expended.

The situation in Japan may perhaps be made a little more real if Japanese agriculture is compared with that of one of our more productive agricultural states — for example, Iowa. The total area of Iowa is but 56,147 square miles, or 38.0 per cent of that of Japan proper, yet there was more land planted to cereals in Iowa in 1919 than was tilled in the whole of Japan. The amount of land tilled per farm household in Japan in 1925 was 2.68 acres; Iowa harvested 95.6 acres per farm in 1920. After due allowance is made for the fact that there are somewhat more farm families than

Table III

Area and Population of Countries in the Western Pacific Area					
	Area in square miles	Per cent of total area	Population, 1920	Per cent of total population	Density of population, 1920
Siberia, eastern territory	1,014,672	9.91	1,619,445	0.32	1.700,000
China and dependencies	4,278,352	41.81	321,917,000	64.31	323,000,000
China proper	1,532,800	14.98	300,000,000	59.93	195,72
Manchuria	363,700	3.55	14,917,000	2.98	41.01
Mongolia	1,367,953	13.37	2,000,000	0.40	1.46
Chinese Turkestan	550,579	5.38	2,000,000	0.40	3.63
Tibet	463,320	4.53	3,000,000	0.60	6.47
Hong-Kong	391	0.004	625,166	0.12	900,000
Japan and dependencies	261,963	2.56	77,675,695	15.52	88,245,000
Japan proper	147,657	1.44	55,963,053	11.18	62,000,000
Sakhalin, southern	13,934	0.14	105,899	0.02	760
Korea	85,228	0.83	17,264,119	3.45	202,56
Kwantung	1,304	0.01	919,568	0.14	527,08
Formosa and Pescadores	13,840	0.14	3,655,308	0.73	264,11
Siam	20,148	1.96	9,307,355	1.84	46,00
French Indo-China	270,600	2.64	19,122,353	3.82	70,67
Federated Malay States	27,623	0.27	1,324,890	0.26	47.96

Unfederated Malay States	23,486	0.23	1,123,274	0.22	47.83	1,200,000
Straits Settlements	1,662	0.02	883,769	0.18	532.89	1,050,000
Philippines	107,772	1.05	10,314,310	2.06	95.71	12,500,000
Dutch East Indies	733,642	7.17	49,350,834	9.86	67.27	52,275,000
Sumatra	141,724	1.38	5,852,335	1.17	41.29	6,000,000
Java and Madura	59,762	0.50	349,841,71	6.99	689.18	37,250,000
Borneo	213,585	2.09	1,626,001	0.32	7.61	1,825,000
Celebes	72,679	0.71	3,108,337	0.62	42.77	3,400,000
Others	254,892	2.49	3,780,190	0.76	14.83	3,800,000
North Borneo	75,666	0.74	883,248	0.18	11.68	886,900
British North Borneo	31,106	0.30	257,804	0.05	8.29	260,000
Sarawak	42,000	0.41	600,000	0.12	14.29	600,000
Brunei	2,500	0.02	25,444	0.01	10.18	26,000
Australian Commonwealth	2,974,581	29.07	5435,734	1.09	1.83	6,350,000
British New Guinea	160,000	1.56	500,000	0.10	3.12	500,000
New Zealand	103,861	1.01	1,218,913	0.24	11.74	1,395,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,233,968</b>		<b>500,576,820</b>			<b>521,631,000</b>

there are farms in Iowa, there still remains about thirty-five times as much tilled land per farm family in Iowa as in Japan. Besides, the average Iowa farm has about sixty acres in pastures, wood-lot, and other untilled land, most of which would be tilled if it were in Japan.

The differences between Japanese and American agriculture can scarcely be brought out more clearly than by comparing the numbers of farm animals in Japan and in Iowa. This is done in Table IV.

Table IV

## Farm Animals in Japan and Iowa

	Japan, 1925	Iowa, 1920
HORSES	1,553,308	1,386,522
MULES		81,520
CATTLE	1,525,101	4,557,708
SHEEP	17,359	1,092,095
GOATS	168,265	10,526
SWINE	672,583	7,864,304
POULTRY	37,689,836	28,352,515

If we recall that the population of Iowa was only 2,404,021 in 1920, or but 4.02 per cent of that of Japan, we shall better appreciate the meaning of these figures.

There were almost as many horses in Iowa in 1920 as in the whole of Japan proper in 1925. Since less than two per cent of the horses in Iowa were not on farms, while a considerably larger proportion of those in Japan must have been used for other than farm work, the number of horses available for farm use in Iowa undoubtedly exceeded those in Japan, and in addition there were a number of mules and tractors on farms in Iowa. There were about three times as many cattle in Iowa as in all of Japan, but there were twenty-three times as many dairy cattle in Iowa. There were practically no sheep in Japan, but over one million in Iowa,

which is not a sheep state. Japan surpassed Iowa in goats, but there were only a few in either. Of swine, Iowa had about a dozen times as many as Japan, but of poultry only three-fourths as many, although there can be little doubt that the Iowa poultry laid more eggs and yielded more pounds of meat.

The fact is that in Japan the crops raised are consumed directly by the people; in this country the greater part of the crops are used for power (horses) and for transformation into milk, meat, eggs, butter, and other secondary foods. If Iowa were to raise crops to be consumed directly by man, there is little doubt that it could support at least half as many people as Japan at a Japanese standard of living. This figure is placed at half of Japan's because the climate of Japan is such that an appreciable part of the tilled land produces two crops per year and some of it even three, while only one field crop annually is possible in Iowa. Through intensive cultivation and the direct utilization of practically all crops for human food, Iowa could probably support about a dozen times its present population at the equivalent of a Japanese standard, even when due allowance is made for the large consumption of fish in Japan. An equivalent of the fish food of Japan could very easily be produced in Iowa on land not now used for harvested crops, which would be tilled under an intensive system of cultivation somewhat similar to that practised in Japan.

This brief comparison of Japan with Iowa will give a fairly adequate notion of the relative poverty of agricultural resources in Japan. Even the forest resources of Japan are not large. The result is that only very intensive cultivation and the most careful economy make possible the standard of living now prevailing in Japan. Even now Japan finds it necessary to import considerable quantities of food to supply

the needs of its people. Enough cannot be produced at home; and with a natural increase, which averaged about 750,000 a year from 1920 to 1925, population in Japan is increasing more rapidly than the food grown at home.

As was said above, the possibilities of increasing the area of tilled land in Japan are not very great. As a consequence, if Japan is to support its increasing population, it must look to sources outside itself. In this situation much is being said about Japan's following the course of Great Britain and becoming the workshop and trading centre of the Far East. It is thought that in this way a very large increase of population could be supported because manufactured goods could be traded for the food and raw materials needed to support such a position.

At the present time the position of Great Britain makes it seem of doubtful wisdom for any nation to come to rely so exclusively as Great Britain has during the last fifty to seventy-five years upon outside sources of food and raw materials. As will be shown in some detail later, the precarious situation of Great Britain arises from the fact that a nation given largely to manufacturing the raw materials it secures from other sources and to selling these to the world at large becomes so susceptible to disturbance by every little change in the *status quo* that its position is anything but enviable. In a world where there is likely to be war at almost any time and where rumours of war are frequent; where the balance of power is shifting and where formerly subservient populations are refusing to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water, the manufacturing and middleman nation has troubles peculiarly its own. Without going into this matter further here, it can readily be seen that the more far-sighted of Japanese statesmen will be reluctant in the extreme to follow Great Britain's example, even if it were in

their power to do so. Whether it is within Japan's power to become a great manufacturing and trading nation is a matter of great importance and will be worth looking into rather closely.

## 2. Mineral Resources

Two types of raw materials lie at the base of industrial and commercial power today—fuel and iron. There are many others of very great importance, but all are undoubtedly of less importance than these two. Copper, bauxite, manganese, tungsten, molybdenum, tin, and many others are essential, but without abundant fuel and iron they cannot support a highly industrialized nation. Unfortunately, Japan is relatively poor in fuel and in iron ores. The estimated reserves of coal in Japan proper are about 8,000,000,000 tons, but of this amount only about one-sixth to one-seventh is readily workable. Perhaps the significance of this can best be apprehended if we recall that every year we use 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 tons of coal in the United States. Great Britain uses 160,000,000 to 170,000,000 tons annually, with a population about three-fourths that of Japan. In order for Japan to become an industrial nation comparable with Great Britain, Japan would need to use about 200,000,000 tons of coal each year. This would consume its reasonably good reserves in about eight to ten years and force it to fall back on relatively poor reserves, which would be very expensive to mine and would in many instances be of poor grade also. But even if these could be used in the competitive industry and trade of today, they would last but thirty to forty years. The coal reserves of Great Britain, in contrast to those of Japan, are estimated at about 189,000,000,000 tons.

In iron Japan is far poorer than in coal. The reserves of iron ore do not exceed 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 tons (including that in Korea). Much of this is not usable at the present time in competition with better ores readily available elsewhere. In contrast to Japan's 70,000,000 to 80,000,000 tons of iron ore, reserves which would last the United States scarcely a year, it will be interesting to note that Great Britain has 11,700,000,000 tons, probably about a hundred and fifty times as much as Japan, and we have several times as much as Great Britain.

It may not be amiss to point out here that Japan's whole policy towards China at the present time is unquestionably an outgrowth of the poverty of the coal and iron resources of the Japanese Empire and hinges upon Manchuria. Manchuria is one of the richest areas of China in coal and iron.<sup>1</sup> The coal reserves of Manchuria are estimated to contain about 1,000,000,000 tons. Most of this is of excellent quality<sup>2</sup> and easily mined. Although this is only about one-seventh to one-eighth of the reserves of Japan, it is probably almost equal in amount to that readily workable there. The iron-ore reserves of Manchuria are even richer in proportion than those of Japan. They contain not less than 100,000,000 tons of iron — more than the total reserves of Japan — and they, too, are comparatively easy to mine. The transportation system for the development of these mines is well organized<sup>3</sup> and quite adequate. These Manchurian resources are so vital to the welfare of Japan that their continued exploitation furnishes the corner-stone of Japanese policy in China. Their loss would undoubtedly lead to serious unemployment and probably precipitate a dangerous crisis in Japan.

Under these circumstances any situation arising in China which seems to carry a threat of disturbance to the *status quo* in Manchuria will undoubtedly be "viewed with

alarm" by Japanese statesmen and might easily become the occasion for war between the two countries.

In fuel oil, also, Japan is relatively poor. Some estimates place the reserves at about 500,000,000 barrels. This is probably rather high, but in any event it seems doubtful whether the reserves of Japan proper, Formosa, and Sakhalin are much in excess of those in California, and amount to but little more than the annual production of oil in the United States. If Japan were to consume its reserves at the same rate Great Britain now consumes fuel oils, its reserves would probably last fifteen to eighteen years. Japan cannot, then, supply its deficiency in coal by the use of home-produced oils. Like Great Britain, Japan must import most of its fuel oil. Since the maintenance of its sea-power is a vital matter to Japan under present conditions, the supply of fuel oil for shipping, and particularly for the navy, is of grave concern to the authorities.

### 3. Can Japan Become a Great Manufacturing Nation?

Even this very brief and inadequate survey of Japan's fuel and iron resources will make it clear that Japan cannot reasonably expect to become a great manufacturing and commercial nation, playing a rôle in the Pacific similar to that played by Great Britain from 1825 to 1900. Not only does Japan not possess the fuel and iron to enable it to take a position of commanding importance, but the world situation confronting Japan today is totally different from that in which Great Britain found itself at the close of the Napoleonic wars. One need only mention the almost complete monopoly of steam-power applied to industry, and of the technical workers competent to make use of steam-driven machinery, possessed by Great Britain a hundred years ago,

the very rapidly expanding foreign markets of that time—for example, the United States—and the small population of Great Britain at that time, to see that Japan has a totally different problem to meet. The economic position of Great Britain during the greater part of the nineteenth century was unique and can probably never be duplicated.

Everywhere today there is a strong urge for nations to develop their own manufactures. Those which have not already attained a considerable measure of self-sufficiency are determined to do so with the aid of protective tariffs. All over the world this building of tariff walls goes on apace and it is proving effective in establishing home industry.

In the face of these new conditions Great Britain is finding it impossible to maintain its position in world trade. How much more difficult will it be for another nation, without natural resources of its own, to make a place for itself as a great manufacturing and trading nation! It is true that Japan has an abundance of relatively cheap labour, but this is not likely to overcome the other difficulties to which attention has been called. The wiser course for Japan would appear to be the maintenance of a balance between agriculture, manufacturing, and trade which will never allow the nation to become the prey of all the disturbing changes that occur in the political and economic currents of the world. To depend on outside resources and trade as Great Britain has come to do develops such a supersensitiveness to external conditions that the national economic machinery is very easily and frequently thrown out of gear, and any fundamental change in the economic organization of the world is certain to produce prolonged agony before a readjustment can be made, if indeed it can ever be made except at a new and lower level.

If, then, there is no likelihood that Japan can become a

nation subsisting on manufacturing and trade, what is the probable destiny of this people of nearly sixty millions (1925), increasing at the rate of 700,000 to 800,000 per year? We have already pointed out that each tilled acre in Japan is supporting about four persons (perhaps three and one-fourth to three and one-half when allowance is made for imported food). This would appear to be approaching the limit even for a country where two crops a year are possible on a considerable proportion of the tilled land.

Lest it be inferred that Japan is not already well launched on an industrial revolution, it should be pointed out that there were 305,648 persons engaged in mining in 1924, and 1,789,618 were working in factories. The increase in the proportion of the population found in towns of over 5,000 also gives evidence of the growing industrialization of Japan. In 1920, 51.57 per cent of the population was found in these towns; by 1925 this had increased to 55.78 per cent. This is certainly a very rapid increase and shows clearly the difficulty of more people making a living from agriculture in Japan. But we must not mistake this rapid movement towards industry for ability to expand indefinitely along this line. It is absolutely certain that Japan cannot compete in many lines of industry with countries which are more favourably situated as regards access to the basic resources of modern industry. Japan's development in this direction is definitely and narrowly limited.

In this connexion it may be well to examine in somewhat more detail the prospects for the continuance and the increase of Japan's foreign trade.

Silk is Japan's largest single export. But, instead of being sent out chiefly in finished form, it is actually exported largely as raw silk. The value of the raw silk exported exceeded that of the finished goods more than five times in

1926. This particular situation arises largely from our tariff on manufactured silk. But there is no country which is not moving to protect its home market where any considerable interest is involved or where the possibility of profit under protection appears good. This is a world condition with which Japan, like all other countries, must reckon. To show how this may affect Japan's industrial development, it may not be amiss to examine in some detail Japan's trade in cotton goods.

In 1926 Japan exported somewhat over 250,000,000 dollars' worth of cotton goods. The raw material was practically all imported, the imports of raw cotton amounting to over 360,000,000 dollars. The two best customers of Japan are China and India; together they take about two-thirds of her exports of this kind. It so happens that in both of these countries the development of the cotton industry is going on apace. Unlike Japan, they both produce their cotton at home, India even having a large exportable surplus. Since labour is also cheaper in them than in Japan and since coal is more abundant and cheaper to mine, it is easy to see that the Japanese cotton trade is on a very insecure basis. To add to this insecurity there is the political friction between Japan and China, resulting in occasional boycotts, and in India there is the revival of hand spinning and weaving. That China is likely in the near future to supply its own needs for cotton goods seems to be felt by many Japanese business men, for they are investing rather heavily in Chinese cotton-mills and today control more spindles than the British. It appears that they are preparing for the time when the earlier development of mills in Japan will no longer avail against the cheaper labour and more abundant resources of China. Then, too, the new Nationalist government in China is likely to raise the tariff on cottons, which will hasten the

day of her self-sufficiency in this respect. This is a prospect that cannot but disturb Japanese statesmen.

What has just been said of the Japanese cotton trade is true of most of her other trade in finished (manufactured) goods. Its very continuance is uncertain, to say nothing of the large increase which is necessary if Japan is to care for its growing population even at present standards. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that present standards will remain fixed. The history of the growth of industrialization shows us that this process excites new wants and larger demands on the part of the people who participate in it. There is not the least reason to suppose that the Japanese people will be more disposed to accept in a docile manner mere subsistence wages than other peoples who are or have been subject to the same influences. The desire to enjoy more of the goods of this world is probably as keen in Japan as elsewhere and needs only the stimulus of modern urbanized industry to develop in the same way as in the West.

Already Japanese standards of living are beginning to rise and the realization of their lack of the resources needed to supply the demands of a rapidly growing population is leading many to wonder what the outcome will be.

#### 4. The Way Out

Four chief means of relief appear. They are: (1) to accept a lower standard of living; (2) to adopt the practice of birth control so rapidly and so generally that the growth of population will soon be checked; (3) to colonize and use more intensively the present possessions of the Empire—Korea, Formosa, Sakhalin, and the northern large island, Hokkaido; (4) to acquire new territories in which colonies can be planted and which will give her ready access to fuel and

iron supplies and other mineral resources through which industry might be built up to help to provide for the needs of a rapidly growing population.

i. Perhaps no possession of man is more tenaciously held — at least, held against attempts to lower its level — than his standard of living. It is comparatively easy to gain the acceptance of an improvement in the standard of living. Everyone is not only willing but glad to have a better house, finer clothing, a more varied and costly diet, more leisure, more expensive amusements, and a thousand and one other things which are additions to one's traditional mode of living. To be compelled to give up some article of diet which has come to be regarded as necessary, to move to poorer quarters, to wear coarser or less adequate clothing, however, is felt as a real hardship. When it is a large and compact group which is called upon to accept these changes for the worse, then the resistance becomes stubborn, and considerable temporary hardship will be endured in defence of the customary standards. The tenacity with which wage reductions are resisted, and the enormous amount of hard work endured by members of unfortunate families to prevent the lowering of their mode of life are cases in point. But this matter need not be laboured, as we all know how stubbornly we should resist an attempt to deprive us of goods and leisure to which we have become accustomed and which we regard as our right.

As has been said, there is no reason to suppose that the Japanese people will submit to a lowering of their standards of living with greater docility than the rest of us. During the last few decades they, too, have begun to taste the blessings of greater abundance than in former times, and no doubt by this time not only feel that there should be no lowering of their present status, but that a steady, if slow, im-

provement in this status is due them. If, then, in the not distant future, it becomes a question of accepting a lower standard of living or of attempting to force a passage to more abundant resources, there can be little doubt as to where the choice will lie. Certainly it is not in Anglo-Saxon tradition to admire those who tamely submit to what they believe to be injustice and bullying. If, then, the Japanese should show a disposition to take what they need to maintain and improve their way of life rather than to submit to its being more and more depressed because of the greed of other powers, we Americans surely cannot but admire the spirit they manifest.

A docile submission by the Japanese to a lower standard of living and to a large increase in the death-rate, due to want, is not to be looked for as long as there is some other way out which appears both more honourable and more likely to lead to some desirable end. It would seem, then, that we may dismiss as among readily probable solutions of Japan's population problem the tame acceptance of constantly greater daily hardship. If the choice is between death from steady hard work and underfeeding, and death from battle, with its chance of successful expansion, most people of spirit would choose the latter and we certainly have no reason to believe that the Japanese lack spirit.

2. The second means of relief from population pressure in Japan is birth control. There is a well-conducted movement for the propagation of birth control already in existence in Japan, and, judging from what has happened in the Western world, this movement will grow and will be recognized in time as the only satisfactory method of offsetting the effects of the saving of life by modern sanitation and medicine. This seems inevitable. Not for long can we have both uncontrolled births and controlled deaths. The two

things cannot exist together for many decades in any particular country or in the world at large. This proposition is axiomatic.

But even if birth control is the ultimate solution of the problem of population pressure in Japan, it does not follow that it will become sufficiently general to relieve this pressure in time to prevent an expansive movement on the part of Japan. There is a very strong traditional opposition to birth control in Japan. We are not speaking here of authoritarian opposition; this exists also, as in many other countries, but in Japan the whole social organization centres in the family to a degree that is difficult for us in the West to realize. Consequently such a movement meets a passive resistance in the attitude of mind of the people at large which it has never encountered in the West. Among us the development of industrialism has led to the breaking down of family ties to a very great extent. Each individual has come to be looked upon as a separate unit in the social organization, responsible, not to the family, but only to the nation or state. Almost inevitably this produces a state of mind in which the pleasure and welfare of the individual become the chief concern of each. There is now with us but little feeling of belonging so intimately to a family group that our first and paramount duty is to this group. This strong feeling of family allegiance had been thoroughly dissipated among us before birth control became generally known or before there was any urgent need of its practice. Hence its practice among us never involved any feeling of disloyalty to the welfare of the family or of the nation.

In Japan, on the other hand, the practice of birth control cannot be expected to make rapid headway. There is no doubt that this movement is under way now, but it will not

attain the development it has among us for some decades, perhaps several generations.

Furthermore, judging from the experience of Western nations even after birth control becomes general, the rate of population increase will continue high for some time. One of the first effects of birth control is to reduce infant mortality very greatly. It also reduces to some extent the hardship of life at all ages and so is conducive to a decline in the general death-rate, which for a time may equal or even exceed the decline in the birth-rate. The result is that birth control does not relieve the pressure of population as quickly as might be supposed, in a country where hitherto both birth-rates and death-rates have been largely uncontrolled by man's voluntary interference with the course of his life.

We cannot, therefore, reasonably expect birth control to furnish the needed relief to Japan's population within the time when such relief will become imperative if war is to be avoided.

3. The third of the suggested means for relieving Japan's population pressure is the more intensive use of land and resources within the Empire itself. The main islands of Japan proper, with the exception of Hokkaido, are already intensively used, as can be seen from the fact that the density of population in Japan was 379 per square mile in 1920, and 404 in 1925. It is estimated by the Department of Agriculture, however, that the present tilled area in Japan can be increased by four to five million acres, or a little less than one-third, in the next thirty years. This extension is thought to be the absolute maximum, and it can be achieved only at a heavy cost. Furthermore, after it is reclaimed, much of it will be second- and third-rate land. But if and when an additional five million acres is in use, it cannot possibly support

an additional population of more than twenty million at a maximum, and that only by the lowering of the existing standards, unless the ratio of food imports to consumption can be considerably increased. This would mean that Japan might support a population of seventy-five to eighty million when its tillable lands are fully used. At the current rate of increase Japan will have reached eighty million in 1947.

At the present time Japan imports annually about thirty to fifty million bushels of rice or ten to twenty per cent of the amount produced at home, and about fifteen to twenty-five million bushels of wheat, or about as much as is produced at home. Together these cost about seventy-five million dollars annually and account for a large share of the excess of imports over exports in Japan's foreign trade. In other words, if Japan were self-sufficing in food production, its imports and exports would just about balance, although there would still be a small excess of imports. This is clearly a reflection of the general lack of resources already discussed, for Japan, unlike Great Britain, is not a large capital-exporting country, nor does it furnish any large amount of shipping service to other countries.

Granting that Japan proper is likely to be completely filled within the next twenty years, there will be those who believe that there is room for its overflow population in Korea and Formosa, which in 1925 had densities of only 229 and 289 per square mile respectively, as compared with 404 in Japan. In the first place, there is no proof that they will support as dense populations as Japan, particularly Korea. In the second place, they are both increasing in population at the present time more rapidly than Japan. The rate of increase in Korea shown by the censuses of 1920 and 1925 was 2.61 per cent per annum, and in Formosa it was 1.86 per cent, while in Japan proper it was only 1.34 per cent.

As places for colonial settlement neither Korea nor Formosa has as yet proved attractive to the Japanese. The total number of Japanese in Korea in 1924, nineteen years after the Russo-Japanese War, was 411,595, and of these, 188,421, or 45.8 per cent, are found in the eight largest cities. Clearly the Japanese are making almost no headway as colonizers in Korea. Just how insignificant Japanese migration to Korea really is may be made clear by stating that the total number now in Korea is less than fifty per cent of the increase in Japan in the single year 1925. No doubt Japan can supply Korea with most of its manufactured goods and get in return a certain amount of food, but a people increasing as the Koreans are — they will double their 1925 population by 1952 if the present rate is maintained — will not long have a surplus to export. The maintenance of peace and the improvement in sanitation which Japan has effected in Korea are now having the effects on population growth they always have among a people with available land and a relatively stationary standard of living and not practising birth control — namely, they are causing, or assisting to bring about, a very rapid increase, which will soon make the export of food-stuffs and raw materials practically negligible.

It may be wondered why, if the Koreans have the means to support such a rapid increase, the Japanese do not migrate thither and relieve the situation in Japan. The answer is not far to seek. The Koreans have a lower standard of living than the Japanese, and with free competition between them the Japanese will succumb while the Koreans thrive. In this connexion it is interesting and important to know that the very poorest parts of Osaka, Kobe, and other large industrial cities contain a number of colonies of Koreans who have been brought in by the industrialists for "cheap" labour, to break strikes, etc. It is but natural that there

should be bad blood manifested between the Japanese and the Koreans under these conditions. The latter undercut wages, work longer hours, and do various other things which the Japanese consider unfair competitive practices. One is reminded of the situation in this country, where the Polish, the Italian, and various other immigrant groups are blamed for exactly the same practices.

In no kind of work does a willingness to labour long hours for small returns make competition more difficult than in agriculture. Here we probably have the real reason why the Japanese are not colonizing Korea. The Koreans outwork the Japanese and live more cheaply. Hence the Japanese have little chance in competition with them.

This matter of competition between peoples having different standards of living for the possession of land is deserving of our careful consideration because it is one of the decisive facts of which account must be taken in any scheme to distribute the lands of the world more justly between the different races and peoples. Japan finds colonization within the Empire very difficult because of this fact. The situation in Korea has just been mentioned. But the same situation prevents colonization to any great extent in Formosa, even apart from the question of the adaptability of the Japanese to tropical climate.

The natives of Formosa are largely of Chinese blood, often mixed, no doubt, with Malay. Their agriculture is generally similar to that of southern China (Formosa and Canton are in the same latitude). Rice is the chief crop and the staple article of diet, with sugar-cane, tea, and yams as important crops. The natives have a very low standard of living. The Japanese cannot compete with them for the possession of the land, as is shown by the fact that after about thirty years of possession there were only 183,317 Japanese,

on the island. Judging from what has happened in Korea, there is little doubt that most of these are found in the cities and in official positions. The actual cultivation of the land by the Japanese is negligible. They have thus far shown no disposition to enter into competition with the natives of Formosa for the actual possession of the land. Up to the present it would appear that the rôle of the Japanese in Formosa is much the same as that of the white man in the tropical colonies of Great Britain or Holland — namely, that of administrator and exploiter — a superior organizing class.

It may be profitable both individually and nationally for a time to have colonies which can be thus exploited but as an outlet for the relief of population pressure these lands can be of little value. They are not suitable for actual settlement from the mother country because of differences in standards of living, already referred to. Of course it is quite possible, for a time, to get a considerable quantity of food-stuffs and raw materials from exploited colonies in the tropics, but the experience of the Dutch in Java would seem to indicate that exploited colonies cannot be counted on for any great amount of exports of food over long periods of time. In Java the increase of population following on the establishment of peace between the tribes and the better economic organization of the country has been exceedingly rapid. Java is today one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with more than seven hundred persons per square mile (1925). A careful study of the food values of exports and imports (see chapter v) shows that there is very little excess of exports from a population of over thirty-six million. Only a little over a century ago Java's population was about the same as that of Formosa today, or only about one-tenth of its present size.

The effects of the maintenance of peace and better sanitation on population growth in Formosa, as in Korea, are clearly evident today in the rates of natural increase. The birth-rate in Formosa today averages about forty-one or forty-two and the death-rate twenty-three or twenty-four, thus leaving a high rate of increase, as has already been mentioned.

It is obvious that natives in tropical countries with very low standards of living and very low productive capacity cannot be large purchasers of manufactured goods from northern countries. This being so, but very little trade can be expected between these regions. The common expectation that the northern lands can get great quantities of food from the tropics in exchange for manufactured goods is not likely to be fulfilled. The very conditions necessary to increase considerably the productive capacity of natives in the tropics also make inevitable a rapid increase in their numbers. These grow very rapidly until they are again up to the limits of the means of subsistence, and the surplus available for the exploiters is but little. At least, the surplus they can export is not large. If the number of exploiters is not too large, as for example, with the Dutch in Java and the British in India, these exploiters may make a very good living, but they cannot send out food and other things that are needed to maintain the native population.

There can be no doubt that Japan will find this to be true in Formosa just as the Dutch have found it in Java. Furthermore, in Formosa the Japanese are not dealing with so docile and inefficient a people as the Dutch in Java. Hence the length of time they can continue their exploitation may be shortened as compared with the Dutch, for Formosa is only about one-fourth the size of Java, and at its present rate of increase its population will double in about thirty-seven

years. In view of these facts, it seems unlikely that Japan can reasonably expect to secure approximately twenty-five million bushels of rice from Formosa twenty-five years hence.

It is very easy to forget that the first returns from policies of improvement in irrigation, in tillage, in transportation, etc., such as Japan has pursued in Korea and Formosa, are relatively great and leave a fairly large surplus of product, because temporarily production increases faster than the standard of living and the growth of population. But this cannot go on long. Soon the standards of living will rise a little, and the population will catch up with the food-supply because the sanitary improvements which must be introduced by the dominant race to enable it to increase the vigour of the workers—for example, the clearing-up of malaria—will result in a sudden growth of numbers which will not be checked until necessity intervenes. This assumes, of course, that abortion and infanticide are not general practices and that birth control is practically unknown; and these assumptions are fully justified today regarding the Orientals as a whole, even though there are some groups, particularly in Japanese cities, where birth control is beginning to be practised.

In addition to the factors discussed above, which will inevitably tend to make the present Japanese dependencies less valuable from the standpoint of supplying the needs of the home population, Japan has to learn the further lesson regarding the economics of colonies which Great Britain is learning today with much pain and bitterness of heart; namely, that dependencies or colonies never feel such a warmth of affection for their protector or mother country that they are willing to trade with it on any but strictly economic terms. Even preferential tariffs prove a mockery

when they are sufficiently high to permit of the development of home industry. The day of the profitable exploitation of colonies and other dependencies is rapidly passing. Another fifty years may see its end. Japan should realize this and govern its conduct accordingly.

In view of the probabilities of population growth in different parts of the Japanese Empire which we have pointed out above and of the increases in production of food-stuffs that can reasonably be expected, even the maintenance of present standards of consumption in Japan proper will become increasingly dependent on her ability to import food. These increasing imports, whether drawn from its dependencies or from foreign countries, must be paid for by goods, chiefly manufactured, sent out from Japan. This is true also, of course, of the goods imported for manufacture. Now we have shown above that Japan does not possess the resources which would give it a natural advantage in many lines of manufacturing for competing readily in world markets; nor do its people possess any special fund of technical skill in the managerial class or among the workers which will enable it to put the types of manufactured goods demanded today on the world markets more cheaply than other countries. Therefore the prospect of providing the necessities of life for its people two or three decades hence with its present resources is anything but bright.

4. The fourth of the possible means of relieving the growing pressure of population in Japan is to see that it has ready access to the resources it needs, both for colonization and for the development of its industrial life. Unlike the three possibilities already discussed, the granting to Japan of new lands, with larger resources, seems to furnish the only reasonable way out of its inevitable difficulties, and thus to present the only real alternative to a war for Japanese expansion.

sion. If this is clearly understood, then the costs of these two methods of settlement — war and the cession of unused lands — will stand some chance of being computed with considerable care. In this way a fairly rational decision might be arrived at.

Since the Japanese seem destined to expand, and to expand by the acquisition of more territory, we must now ask where Japan can find the new colonies which will furnish an outlet for its surplus population until such time as birth control will furnish permanent relief from overcrowding. Before this question can be answered even in general terms, we must consider the capacity of the Japanese to use the possible areas open to them.

### 5. Who Are the Japanese?

The racial composition of the Japanese is by no means so obscure now as formerly. There is very good reason to believe that there is a predominant strain of Malay blood in them. The reasons why many anthropologists hold this view cannot be detailed here; but the stature, the colour, and many of the facial features certainly suggest the Malay. Still stronger evidence of Malay origin is found in the houses, the boats, and various other articles in daily use, in many customs and traditions, and in the type of agriculture and the diet. If, then, the Japanese have a large element of Malay blood in them, we may be permitted to doubt whether they will ever succeed well in northern lands. The Malays are a tropical people and have been so for ages. They have become adapted to warm climates and know how to live in them. With a very little sanitary care and with peace, as in Java, they prove their adaptation to such a climate by their very rapid growth.

So far the Japanese have made little headway in colonizing even their own northern territory—Hokkaido. This island had a density per square mile of only 73 in 1925 as compared with about 505 in the rest of Japan proper. Hokkaido is generally described by the Japanese as a cold inhospitable land of little value. The Japanese do not like it and do not seem to thrive there, even though it seems to us to offer better economic opportunities than most other parts of Japan. Northern Korea and Manchuria are also described as cold and inhospitable lands. They are at about the same latitude as the Great Lakes region of the United States and Canada. The dislike of the Japanese for a freezing winter of considerable duration is probably one of the chief reasons for their evacuation of eastern Siberia.

This will also explain in part why the Japanese have not made any appreciable headway in the colonization of Manchuria. In 1925 there were only 184,628 Japanese in Manchuria, including the leased territory of Kwantung. In Manchuria, outside the leased territory, there were only 97,178 Japanese. It is safe to say that there are almost no Japanese farmers in this area. The Japanese living there are almost wholly tradesmen, administrators, and skilled workers in mines and on the railways. In other words, they are in occupations where the climate does not particularly handicap them. In such sheltered occupations they do very well, but it is quite clear that they do not like and do not seem to thrive particularly well in this rather rigorous climate.

It must not be inferred, however, that climate is the only reason why the Japanese have not settled in Korea and Manchuria. They cannot compete with the Koreans and Chinese in an open field, and this alone would render their colonization in these areas impossible; but when it is coupled with a climate to which they are not well adapted, the

combination constitutes an insuperable obstacle. This matter of competition will be considered further later.

In contrast to the lack of success in colonizing Asia north of latitude forty degrees, the Japanese have made a very conspicuous success in tropical Hawaii, where the white man appears to be entirely unable to do field work. Not only the Japanese men, but even the women and children work in the fields and appear to thrive. As proof that they thrive may be cited the fact that in 1920 in Hawaii each thousand Japanese women aged twenty to forty-four had 964 children under five years of age; while in Japan (1918) each thousand women aged twenty to forty-four had only 754 children of this age. Clearly the Japanese thrive well in these tropical islands where competition with races having lower standards is not very severe. Of course, health conditions were generally favourable in Hawaii, as were also economic conditions, but an increase of 26.0 per cent in the ~~number~~ of children under five per thousand women indicates a very healthy condition in the population. It could scarcely come about if they were not well adapted to the new climate. This rapid growth of the Japanese in Hawaii is exactly the result we should expect under the conditions of life there if the Japanese have in them a large strain of Malay blood. It seems to prove conclusively that the Japanese are well adapted to life in the tropics.

There is, then, very good reason to believe that the Japanese are quite capable of colonizing tropical areas where they would not have to meet the competition of the Chinese. Now, if we scan the population map facing page 18, we shall see that there are considerable tropical areas in the western Pacific which are practically unpeopled. It is to such areas that the Japanese should look for relief from over-population at home. In these areas they would avoid

competition with the Chinese and also with native races which might make Japanese settlement difficult. Furthermore, it would seem that the present possessors of these areas, since they know that they themselves can never exploit them with their own labour, might be more willing to yield them to Japan than other areas which they can exploit unaided.

Of course, one cannot really expect that any country will, under present conditions, voluntarily yield any of its possessions to another country merely because the latter needs them and would use them to better advantage. This is not the way of the world. But it may not be entirely fantastic to hope that in time the way of the world will change if the consequences of present policies are clearly understood. If it is once realized that Japan's expansion is one of the inevitable movements of the next three or four decades and that this expansion will naturally be in the direction of the larger unused islands of the western Pacific, it may also become obvious that the voluntary cession of some of these islands to Japan is the alternative to war.

At this point it may be urged that Japan will hardly risk war for so uncertain a prize, particularly with the experience of Germany fresh in mind. This would probably be true if Japan's needs were to remain stationary, if all the nations interested in maintaining the *status quo* in the western Pacific were to stand together, and if it were certain that they would be free to concentrate against Japan if she should attempt such a seizure. But these are large ifs. Japan's need will not remain stationary. We have seen that it is certain to increase. I shall have in following chapters occasion to point out some of the circumstances under which the powers interested in maintaining the *status quo* are likely to find themselves on bad terms with one another and may not, therefore, find it advantageous to co-operate to this end.

Suffice it here to point out that the stakes the different powers are playing for are very unequal and not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, there are a large number of contingencies in which any considerable concentration of forces against Japan would be impossible, even if all the interested parties were agreed that it was desirable. The opportunity that Japan needs to strike successfully, if it must go to war to secure its expansion, will come sooner or later and Japan can afford to wait for it. Events are shaping in its favour in this respect. The reasons for believing that this is so cannot be stated here without undue repetition. They will appear as the discussion proceeds. But in order not to leave this matter in too great obscurity, one may point out that the differential rate of increase of population and the ease with which many types of industry can be transplanted are working towards a change in the balance of power in the world. To fail to recognize this may easily prove fatal to the pretensions of some of the powers which would prefer to have things remain as they are. On the other hand, to recognize it and to make the necessary adjustments to the changed conditions will be the clear proof of their vitality and of their fitness to play a new rôle in the reorganized world.

Lest I should be misunderstood, I wish to state very explicitly that I have no intention of impugning the sincerity of Japanese statesmen when they say that they have no designs on territory held by other nations and that they look to the growth of industry to furnish the support for their increasing millions. As stated above, I do not believe that Japanese industry can furnish this support, and hence I hold that necessity for larger resources will within the next half-century force Japanese statesmen to look for new outlets for settlement and new sources of materials needed in industry. The need of Japan for expansion within the next few

decades is not within the control of the government authorities. Forces beyond their power of curbing are being released by the peculiar conjuncture now taking place in Japan, and they will have to be reckoned with. It is the height of absurdity to suppose that as the Japanese people become conversant with the actual situation as regards the utilization of land in different parts of the world, they will not demand a share of that not now in use, on which they can settle and enjoy greater comfort and prosperity than at home. Their statesmen of the future, even if they should desire it, will not be able to confine the Japanese people to their present territory. But of course these leaders will not try to prevent the realization of what will then have come to be regarded as an obvious destiny.

### CHAPTER III

## CHINA

It is generally believed that China suffers more from over-population than Japan, or, perhaps, more than any other country. This belief probably arises from the fact that parts of China are frequently subject to famines which affect millions of people. Such catastrophes naturally attract a great deal of attention. The havoc wrought by famines is not sudden and violent, but protracted and cumulative, and there is time to exploit fully their news value and to impress upon the public the terrible suffering and hardship arising from prolonged want of food. It is not my intention to deny or to minimize the hardship arising from famine in China or to suggest that China does not need all the help it can secure both for direct famine relief and for public works calculated to prevent the almost periodic recurrence of food shortage in certain regions.

I hold, however, that it will be impossible to prevent famines in China so long as the population of the country comes as nearly using to the limit the average production of crops in normal years as it now does. The very nature of the Chinese climate is such that there are certain to be considerable variations in rainfall from year to year, particularly in the northern and western regions. Nothing man can do can remedy this situation, for the rainfall of China is of the monsoon type, being borne from the Pacific on easterly winds, which at times fail, with a consequent lack of rain.

The best possible irrigation and flood-prevention works cannot alter this basic character of the Chinese climate, although they will help materially in equalizing crop production from year to year. At present, however, famine relief in its usual forms merely means more people kept alive for the moment and hence more people to perish when the inevitable shortage arrives. This aspect of China's population problem will be discussed more fully later.

Serious and distressing as China's population problem is from the standpoint of the suffering it causes in China, it is not, in my opinion, nearly so dangerous from the standpoint of world peace as that of several other nations, and particularly that of Japan.

### 1. Population

There is much popular misapprehension regarding the size of China's population. The figure 400,000,000, so often used, seems to have a strange fascination for most people. So much has been said about the "teeming millions" of China that most persons imagine that China is a land literally crowded with people; a land where it would be quite impossible to have more people without crowding out some of those already there. Then, too, there is a recent estimate of the population of China, called the "post-office estimate," which places the population of China proper and Manchuria at 436,000,000. This figure is being used a great deal at the present time. The figure adopted here (Table III) is much smaller. I have never been able to feel that any of the estimates of China's population had as good a claim to general acceptance as that made by Mr. W. W. Rockhill in 1904. Mr. Rockhill was at that time our minister to China and was a shrewd and careful observer as well as a thorough student

of Chinese affairs. His work gives an impression of carefulness and thoroughness not discernible in other estimates. He believed that at that time (1904) the population of China proper did not exceed 270,000,000. Allowing for about a ten per cent increase since then, which certainly appears ample in view of the internal disorders which have been almost continuous during the last fifteen years, I have adopted the round number of 300,000,000 for the population of China proper. By all accounts, Manchuria has been developing rapidly of late years, and its population may approximate 15,000,000. These figures seem to me the most reasonable that can be arrived at until a census is taken. They are only estimates, to be sure, just as the "post-office estimate," the so-called "Minchengpu census" of 1910, and other so-called censuses are estimates. But during the last ten years I have given considerable attention to these estimates, and, in my opinion, the work of Mr. Rockhill has not been superseded. It is also gratifying to find that, in a recent article on China's population, Professor Walter F. Willcox comes to the same conclusion.<sup>1</sup>

It is important that the best information available be followed in this matter because many conclusions regarding the problems of population in the Far East are based on the size of China's population and will manifestly be wrong if its size is exaggerated by forty to fifty per cent.

How such an exaggerated estimate may get started is seen in a recent note in *Foreign Affairs*<sup>2</sup> by H. Foster Bain, who has done some very good work on mineral resources in the Far East. He makes the following statement regarding China's population: "At present, with a population four

<sup>1</sup> Walter F. Willcox: "China's Population — 400,000,000 or 300,000,000," *Chinese Student Monthly*, Vol. xxiii, No. 1. (November 1926), pp. 23-9.

<sup>2</sup> H. Foster Bain. "China's Coal Reserves," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1928, pp. 498-9.

times as great as that of the United States. . . ." Now, the Bureau of the Census estimate of the July 1, 1928 population of the United States is slightly over 120,000,000. We may, therefore, expect to find someone saying, on the basis of the above statement, that China has 480,000,000 to 500,000,000 people, and so five hundred millions, rather than four hundred millions, may become current.

It is not sufficient excuse for the use of the largest figure available that only estimates of China's population are available. Some estimates rest on a much better basis than others and are far more worthy of credence. This is the reason for my acceptance of Rockhill's work until something better appears.

## 2. Mineral Resources

China is much more fortunate than Japan in the matter of mineral resources. The coal reserves of China are estimated at greatly varying amounts, from 40,000,000,000 tons, or less, to almost 1,000,000,000,000 tons. A reasonable estimate, in view of recent statements by the Chinese Geological Survey, would seem to be 250,000,000,000 to 300,000,000,000 tons. If this is somewhere near the truth, China has adequate supplies for some generations, at any rate of use that is at all likely to occur. This may be made concrete by supposing that China would use a total annual amount equal to that of the United States. In this case, these reserves would last approximately five hundred years. At the present rate of consumption they would last nearly thirty times as long, or fifteen thousand years.

The coal resources of China are, then, quite ample for some generations to come and should enable it to develop such industry as may be otherwise suited to its genius and

resources. Coal will not be a limiting factor in the near future as it will be in Japan. Of other fuel, however, China has little. Much has been said about oil, but little has been found. The Standard Oil Company has already abandoned its prospecting and drilling. At present it appears doubtful whether there is any oil in China worth exploiting on a commercial basis. This is probably not a serious matter for China in the long run, for by the time China will be ready to use oil in industry and transportation, the oil-supplies of the world will be pretty well exhausted and the products of coal will be generally used in its stead. It is already clear that a country which has coal need not worry about the lack of oil. For the "oil age" seems likely to prove a very brief episode in the life of the world, while the uses of coal are steadily growing more numerous and coal is coming to be regarded as the world's most precious mineral possession.

But if China's fuel resources have often been exaggerated, her iron resources have been even more inflated in the accounts of travellers. The estimates of the Chinese Geological Survey place the reserves of iron ore at approximately 1,000,000,000 tons, with an iron content of 365,000,000 tons. This is equal to only a little over one ton of iron per head of population. The annual production of iron in the United States is about one-third of a ton per head; if used at the same per capita rate, China's supply of ore would last only three to four years. Furthermore, an appreciable proportion of the iron ore of China is found in Manchuria. These deposits are largely controlled by, and are being exploited by, the Japanese. Though they are legally Chinese property, they can scarcely be considered freely available for Chinese industrial development.

### 3. Industrialization

The lack of iron in China will be a great handicap in the development of her industry. Indeed, it altogether precludes the development of many types of industry which are large consumers of iron. It would seem that China's industrial development must take quite a different direction from ours or that of Great Britain and Germany. China will probably succeed best at those industries which depend more upon labour and fuel and less upon steel. In these industries China might soon become self-sufficing; but in the heavier industries it can scarcely hope to supply even home needs. There is no prospect that China will ever become a factor of importance in the world trade in most types of goods.

There are, of course, many industries where heavy machinery is not required, but where power and labour are the essential factors in economic production. The textile industry is one example, and it is interesting to note that China is forging ahead rapidly in this industry. The number of spindles and looms driven by steam or electric power grows apace, and at the same time the industry is spreading from Shanghai and a few other ports to many smaller, inland cities. Furthermore, this industry is passing into the hands of the Chinese themselves, and it is estimated that over fifty per cent of the capital invested is owned by Chinese. If the present growth continues, it will not be long before China will supply its own needs for textiles made by modern machinery.

There are many other types of modern industry where labour, power, and heat rather than steel and iron are the important factors in cost. In most such industries China may be expected to become self-sufficing in the course of time. It may even be that China can import some of the non-

ferrous metals basic to modern industry — copper, tin, zinc, etc. — and work them up to supply its own needs; for it has a labour force which is unexcelled in many respects. It is patient, careful, abundant, and cheap. With the aid of increased tariffs, which the new Nationalist government seems likely to erect, there should be little difficulty in preserving the Chinese market for the Chinese in most of the lighter industries. It will, of course, take time, and a considerable time at that, for the industrial revolution in China to proceed to the point where any large amount of machine-made goods, except textiles, can be produced. There are a number of reasons for believing this to be so, and it will be well to state the more important of them, since I find myself at variance with many people on this point and hence also on the amount of relief from population pressure which China may expect through industrialization.

In addition to the lack of iron, copper, and other important minerals, China also lacks the capital and the technical skill without which industrialism in its modern form cannot be made effective. It also has a form of social organization in which modern industry cannot spread rapidly. It will be well to enlarge somewhat on all these points except the lack of basic resources, which have already been dwelt upon sufficiently.

The lack of capital to build the economic structure on which modern industry rests is a very serious matter to China. At present there is very little railway communication in China and there are no good roads. Furthermore, the water communications are entirely inadequate and reach a few places only. The first and greatest need of China, then, is more adequate transportation. Until this is forthcoming, industrial development must be slow. Factories, if built, can count only on supplying a more or less localized market

until better and cheaper transportation is available. The capital to develop a modern transportation system can probably be found without a great deal of difficulty when China becomes settled again and confidence in her financial stability is restored; but this will take some years at best, and it may be two or three decades before foreign capital flows freely into China.

One other way in which this lack of transportation will retard industrial development may be mentioned here, because it is very important. It so happens that the best supplies of coal in China are found in the north-western provinces, which at present have absolutely no outlet to the more populous coastal regions and river valleys, where factories would naturally be located. Thus industry waits upon transportation, and until industry can guarantee a reasonable revenue to transportation, money to provide it will not be forthcoming. It will come, but it will not come overnight.

Capital is also lacking for the building and equipping of factories. The cost of launching new industries is large, and there must be reasonable assurance that they will pay before foreigners will be interested in them as investments. There are many obstacles to making factories pay in China. One of these is the lack of experience with the corporate form of organization on the part of the Chinese. The strength of family ties is so great in China that it often interferes seriously with the profitable operation of the corporate form of business enterprise. This condition will no doubt pass away, but it will take time, and a few failures widely advertised will retard the whole movement. The success of the textile industry in China should not blind us to the fact that few machine products have the natural advantages factory textiles possess in comparison with the goods they are expected to displace. Cotton goods are almost universally used in

China, and the great majority of the people purchase what they need, rather than make them at home either wholly or in part. Hence any cheapening of them leads to the very rapid adoption of the cheaper product. Besides, the machinery to make the cheaper grades of cotton goods is relatively inexpensive and can be operated (under direction) by unskilled labour. It is not without reason that the industrialization of all countries begins with the cheaper textiles.

There is no other product of the factory system which can count on so sure a market as cotton goods can. Consequently other factory industries will be harder to establish and will not call forth capital so readily as the textile industry.

The lack of capital is, then, bound to exercise a retarding influence on China's industrial development in a variety of ways and for at least three or four decades. For in a poor country, like China, capital accumulates rather slowly and foreign capital will not flow in rapidly until it is assured both safety and profit.

Again, China lacks the technically trained men needed to operate a modern industrial system. There is not the least doubt about the ability of the Chinese to acquire this skill, but it cannot be called forth at a moment's notice. Engineers of all kinds are needed, as are also skilled workmen. On these two classes of workers the productive efficiency of modern industry depends, and until they are sufficiently numerous to direct operations and have acquired a sense of responsibility for the proper conduct of the technical side of the industry, little progress can be made. It will undoubtedly require several decades for the shift from the technique of hand industry to that of machine industry. During this time China's industrialization must therefore proceed slowly.

For yet another cause the development of machine industry must proceed slowly. The consumption habits of the

Chinese, which are an outgrowth of their entire social system, will change but slowly. All but a small fraction of the people are illiterate. They have no contact with life outside their local community; and because of the all-pervading influence of the family, they have a very strong attachment to traditional modes of living. These attitudes of mind, together with their great poverty, will make the introduction of new goods both slow and uncertain. Naturally, if the market is sluggish and shows great resistance to novelties, the development of industry must be slow. This is especially true when each article brought into the community from the outside means less work for some craftsman already plying his trade there. We are all familiar with the resistance of artisans in Western lands to the introduction of labour-saving machinery, but it is as nothing compared with the resistance of the Oriental if we may judge from what is happening in China and India today. In a land already overcrowded it is by no means certain that an artisan displaced by a machine will soon find a better job. He may be doomed to a life of slow starvation. It is little wonder, then, that we find many liberal Chinese who view the introduction of machine industry into their country with much misgiving.

But the point I want to drive home here is that the industrialization of China must be a comparatively slow process, and that because it will be slow, it cannot reasonably be expected to do much to relieve the pressure of population in the country. The rural people of China, who probably constitute eighty to eighty-five per cent of the total population, could easily send some millions of young men and women into industry each year without reducing the pressure on the land. But it must be remembered that these millions who would go into industry would have to draw their support, in large measure, from goods sold to their relatives back home,

and there is not the least possibility that the purchasing power of the Chinese peasant will increase much within the next few decades.

The smallness of the Chinese market for machine-made goods, and the slowness of its expansion, preclude the possibility either of a rapid improvement in the standard of living or of much increase in numbers as a result of the industrialization of the country, unless great foreign markets can be quickly opened up to China. What has been said on this point in the discussion of Japan's situation applies equally here. In a later chapter (chapter xii) Great Britain's difficulties with foreign trade will be discussed. But here it may be said that China will find it extremely difficult to gain much trade in machine-made goods in world markets; so difficult that, in my opinion, this may be ruled out as a possibility. More and more every country is striving for a high degree of self-sufficiency in manufactured goods. With the aid of tariff walls, most of them are making progress in this direction, but of course this means that world trade in these goods is lessened by each artificial restriction imposed. Surely it is fantastic to expect that foreign trade in machine-made goods can do much to improve the lot of three hundred million people in China, or can furnish the basis for the support of any considerable additional number. At present China's annual exports are two dollars per capita and consist largely of agricultural products. It would require an enormous development of machine industry so to increase China's exports of factory goods that any large number of people could be given employment in these new industries, and the profit would have to be huge to contribute much to the welfare of the masses. Even an export of ten dollars per capita of machine-made goods could not do much to improve the lot of the Chinese, and it will be a good many

decades before such a figure is attained, if, indeed, it is ever attained.

In my judgment, then, the development of industry in China cannot possibly go forward fast enough to affect materially the welfare of the masses until there is such a change in the attitude of the people towards raising children that the birth-rate is very markedly lowered. As is pointed out elsewhere, there is good reason to believe that industrialization will lead to a decline in the birth-rate more quickly than any other change in the social organization of a people, but such a change cannot come about very quickly among a people having the historical background of the Chinese. Indeed, among the first effects of industrialization will be a speeding up of the rate of natural increase, such as has taken place in Japan, and for the same general reason — namely, that is it easier to change the death-rate through improved sanitation and better food than to change the traditional attitude of the people towards the rearing of children.

Lest I be misunderstood, I wish to make it clear that I believe China will become increasingly industrialized, but that this industrialization cannot proceed fast enough to offer any real relief to overcrowding until it breaks up traditional attitudes towards the family and thus prepares the way for birth control. This, I believe, will take some time, several decades at the very least, and perhaps several generations. In the mean time the gradual industrialization of China is likely to have one effect which is not often reckoned with — supplying the home market with much of the manufactured goods now imported. With total imports averaging a little less than three dollars per capita, it will not require a very large development of machine industry to supply the home market. But as China grows more self-sufficient in manufactures, the exporting countries now sup-

plying these goods will probably suffer some shrinkage in their trade with China.

Since there does not seem to be any reasonable expectation of China's finding relief from overcrowding through the development of industry, I shall next examine the possibility of its finding some relief in better use of its agricultural resources.

#### 4. Agricultural Resources

China proper — the eighteen provinces — and Manchuria comprise an area about two-thirds the size of the United States. Since very little is known about the other parts of the Chinese Republic, they will not be referred to in this discussion. Within China proper and Manchuria are found a great variety of climates, soils, and topography. In this respect China is similar to the United States, and some comparisons between the two countries may help us to visualize China's agricultural situation more clearly. Many regions in this country have their counterpart in China.

South China, meaning by this the immediate Yangtze basin and south, has many characteristics in common with our south-eastern and gulf states. Extending farther into the warm latitudes, about four degrees (three hundred miles) farther than the southern point of Florida, it has an even longer growing-season and more abundant rainfall. Indeed, on the coast and in some of the more sheltered valleys crops grow the year round. Even in this highly favoured area, however, rain is lacking in most places during the fall and winter months, so that crops, if grown at all, are not very abundant. The chief reason for this lack of moisture during the fall and winter, even close to the coast, is the fact that the prevailing winds during this season blow from the north-west and, instead of coming from water, come from

desert country and are cold and dry. Thus frost not infrequently occurs in China almost within the tropics even at moderately low altitudes. But if this coastal region is fertile and well-favoured, its *Hinterland*, with the exception of a few valleys of moderate size, is a rough and uneven country. In some of the larger valleys there is abundant rainfall and good soil, and here the population is very dense. Many of the valleys are small, however, and the mountains are high enough in many places to render the precipitation of rain uneven. The consequence is that much of this *Hinterland* is not thickly settled and there is good reason to believe that it will not support a very dense population, for as industrious a people as the Chinese would terrace the mountains if they were not too steep and if the soil was fertile and well watered. The capacity of the Chinese to squeeze a living out of the land probably exceeds that of any other people in the world, and when land is not cropped in China, it is pretty good proof that under their system of agriculture they cannot produce enough on it to keep body and soul together.

If we turn to north China, there is little difficulty in finding fairly comparable areas in our own country. Shantung and north are much like the area west of the Missouri River and north of Oklahoma and Arkansas. Near the coast, just as near the Missouri River, the rainfall is fairly certain and abundant during the growing-season. As one proceeds westward from the coast, as from the Missouri River, the rainfall becomes less, the altitude mounts, and the soil is less fertile. There are great areas in China similar to our western plains, where soil is variable in quality, and rainfall is uncertain. Here also the winters are severe and the summers are hot. On the whole, a large part of north China is an area of rather low production compared with south-eastern China and the valleys referred to above. The rainfall in much of

this region may be judged from that of Tientsin, where, in the thirty years 1894 to 1923, there were eighteen years with less than twenty inches annually. This is about the average for the western half of Nebraska. Tientsin is less than one hundred miles from the Gulf of Pechili, and there are no mountains to intercept the rain. Perhaps it might be said by way of general comparison that Chihli (the province in which Tientsin and Peking are situated) and Manchuria are fairly comparable with Kansas, Nebraska, and North and South Dakota, while the western provinces are somewhat like our mountain states.

In summing up in general terms the *natural* conditions affecting China's agricultural productivity, one may say that temperature nowhere prevents the raising of at least one crop annually, and that from the Yangtze valley southward, two and three crops are not uncommon on the coast and in the more favoured valleys. Rainfall, on the other hand, is a limiting factor in many parts of China, particularly in the western and northern provinces, but also in parts of the south on account of the location of the mountain ranges.

Topography, even apart from its effects upon rainfall and temperature, is also a limiting factor in many areas. China has several mountainous regions, where the land is too broken and rough for tillage, where only small patches in valleys and on the hillsides are tillable even by the spade.

Finally, China, like the United States, has many regions of poor soil, where crops will always be small even with generous fertilization.

What, then, is the area in China, including Manchuria, that is being tilled, and how much can this be extended? Dr. O. E. Baker<sup>8</sup> has undertaken to answer this question.

<sup>8</sup> O. E. Baker: "Agriculture and the Future of China," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1928, pp. 482-97.

He finds that about 180,000,000 acres were tilled in 1918. Manchuria has been developing very rapidly in these latter years and it probably would not be amiss to suppose that about 200,000,000 acres are now being tilled. The total land area of China proper and Manchuria is about 1,200,000,000 acres. Dr. Baker estimates that 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 acres of this are tillable so far as temperature, rainfall, topography, and soil are concerned. This is about fifty per cent of the entire area, or practically the same proportion of tillable land to total land as in the United States. This seems a rather generous estimate, but it may be accepted in lieu of anything better. Thus it appears that only about one-third of China's tillable land is actually tilled. Why is this so?

Dr. Baker's answer to this question is simple and convincing. There is comparatively little animal power used in Chinese agriculture. It is largely a spade and hoe culture. A large proportion of the tilled land must be turned over by hand, using either a spade or a mattock. Even the water needed for irrigation is frequently raised from the ditch or pool by hand- or foot-power. Now, anyone who has spaded gardens and tended them with a hoe knows that the area which can be tilled in this way is very small. Even the patient and diligent Chinese is limited to tiny farms by hand tillage. And obviously he must till the best land, for it requires only a little less labour to prepare and tend land that will yield only ten bushels of wheat than it does to tend land that will raise thirty bushels of rice and then perhaps a second crop later in the season.

Dr. Baker is unquestionably right when he says that most of the tillable land in China is beyond the margin of cultivation under the present methods employed in their agriculture. Only power farming (animal or tractor) on a rather extensive scale would be possible on land which may be

compared in many respects with the poorer parts of our winter-wheat belt. Spade farming on such lands will not yield enough to keep the spader and his family alive. In the hilly regions terracing and spade farming can be carried on only if soil is very fertile and rain is abundant, and these conditions are lacking in much of the hill country. Uncertain rain and easily eroded soils which cannot be terraced make hills unusable.

The hope of relief from the pressure of population in China lies chiefly in the extensive cultivation of the more level submarginal lands. Reclamation by irrigation and drainage of certain other lands, and settling on lands which are not now occupied, as in Manchuria, will also help. But the future development of Chinese agriculture would seem more promising in extending cultivation than in increasing the area under intensive cultivation. Of course, the improvement of the varieties of plants now raised and the introduction of new varieties will help, as will also better fertilization and the control of plant diseases and pests; but these promise much less than the use of power on areas now untilled. Furthermore, as Dr. Baker points out, the use of power on these areas will not displace any of the labour now employed on lands already tilled. The use of this new land would give employment to more people and it is unlikely that it would be brought into cultivation so fast that its products would bring about a glut in the market. But even if they did, it would not be a particularly serious matter, as most of the village population in China lives an almost self-sufficing existence.

We should not suppose, however, because only about one-third of the tillable land in China is now used, that when all this land is in use, China can support two and one-half to three times its present population at the standards now

prevailing. The new land is not so fertile as that being used and it is not located so conveniently to the great markets. On the whole, it seems doubtful whether, if fully utilized, the soil of China can support twice its present population at present standards of living.

### 5. Relief of Population Pressure

The development of extensive agriculture on areas where this is feasible would, of course, lead to the production of a larger surplus of food, above the needs of the agriculturists. This would in turn make possible a larger city-population. Through the development of agriculture in this direction and continued industrialization it might seem that China could reasonably expect some relief from the pressure of population. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether this will be the case. Let us examine the supposed facts regarding the birth- and death-rate in China. At present in China proper they appear to be about equal and at a high level — forty to fifty per thousand. The release of pressure on food, which would follow the extension of the agricultural area, and the general improvement of health which would accompany this, might easily bring China's death-rate down to twenty or twenty-five per thousand without affecting the birth-rate. If this should happen — and it is the most probable consequence — China's population would double in about thirty-five years and the pressure would be as great as it is now, or even greater. Such calculations are not mere fantasies. Witness what is happening in Korea, as was shown in the preceding chapter. And though it is impossible to say exactly what is happening in Manchuria now because immigration is very large, there is no doubt that under the favourable conditions there, population is increasing very rapidly by an

excess of births over deaths. There is every reason to believe that the same rapid increase will occur in China wherever the pressure is released, as long as the attitude towards rearing children remains what it is at present.

Is there, then, no reasonable hope of reducing permanently the pressure of population among the Chinese? There is not until, in the course of time, birth control becomes general. The extension of agriculture and the development of manufacturing will give a certain amount of temporary relief to some groups; the settlement of Manchuria will help for a while, but it will soon be full if immigration continues as at present. The Straits Settlements and the Malay States are absorbing a good many thousands of Chinese annually, but, with three hundred millions at home, the potential expansion is enormous. China might send forth six million emigrants each year and still increase in population at home as long as present traditions and habits of family life prevail. Where could such numbers go? Nowhere! There is no relief by migration unless it is accompanied by a change in attitude towards the number of births desired. Birth control alone seems to furnish a solution of China's population problem and this will certainly not become a general practice for several generations. Family ties are probably more closely knit in China than in Japan; industrialization will be slower in its growth; contacts with outside ideas, for the masses of the Chinese people, will come very slowly, and as a consequence the spread of birth control will be slow.

But if there is this pressure of population in China and if the potential increase is as stated here, why is it that China's population problem is so much less urgent than Japan's? The answer is relatively simple. The difference between Japan and China in this respect is the difference between a nation highly self-conscious, well unified and organized,

with leaders who have learned the game of politics in the West and who are in a position to make demands with the full force of the nation behind them; and a people not yet nationally conscious (only slowly becoming so), quite unorganized, and without any unity and hence without recognized leaders. Then, too, Japan has already developed sufficient industrial organization to enable it to make considerable quantities of war materials, while China has but few industrial plants suited to the manufacture of such goods. Japan also has a strong navy and merchant marine, while China is destitute of both. In brief, Japan is a modern nation equipped to deal with other nations in ways they will understand and appreciate; China is still in a pre-national and pre-industrial stage and is not in a position to force its will on any external adversary.

Furthermore, China has yet to develop the general attitude among its people which will sanction the use of national power for aggression in behalf of her citizens. This change will take several decades in a country like China, where the appeal cannot be directed to national tradition and pride. There is simply no basis in the experience of the Chinese people for the rapid development of an aggressive nationalism. In this respect they differ markedly from the Japanese, who possess a social organization upon which Western ideas of nationalism could be readily grafted.

When, in the course of time, China becomes unified and develops national leaders, these leaders will undoubtedly do as the Japanese are now doing in their endeavour to care for surplus population. They will first undertake to develop the resources at home before even admitting to themselves the need for additional territory. Only when it is fully apparent that these efforts are inadequate and that birth control is not proceeding rapidly enough to relieve the situation

will they begin to regard the occupation of other lands as necessary.

For several decades, at least, China will not reach the point where external aggression appears necessary. By that time, if there are still unused areas in the world, our grandchildren or their grandchildren may have learned how to make these available to people who will use them, without resort to war. For the near future, however, there is no danger of aggression from China to secure larger resources. The consideration of China's needs can, then, be safely ignored for the present. It is well that this is so, because, so far as we can see, there is no possibility of accommodating possible Chinese immigrants in other areas until birth control puts a stop to their "swarming." There is a vast difference between three hundred and fifteen millions and sixty millions (China and Japan), and besides, the Japanese have three or four decades' start of the Chinese in industrialization and urbanization, which renders them that much closer to the time when they will cease to "swarm" as at present.

From the standpoint of world politics, the population problems of Japan and China are quite different and must be handled differently. What is feasible and necessary in one case will not suffice at all in the other. The two countries are in different stages of development, and their relations to other lands and to the world at large are determined by this fact. Japan has reached the stage where its people are rapidly becoming literate and where they are coming to feel new needs and are conscious of their strength and their ability. They know what is going on in the world and they are aware of the discriminations against them. The Chinese, on the other hand, are illiterate; they do not know of a world beyond their community boundaries; they do not feel the injustice of their economic inferiority; and they do

not feel conscious of a power which will enable them to demand and secure redress of grievances. In time they will come to resent their economic subjection just as the Japanese do, but it will be at least two or three generations before this resentment can be organized to force concessions from the powers holding the resources and lands they may need. This is the justification for our rather cursory treatment of the Chinese population problem here. The Chinese population problem is not serious from the standpoint of world peace in the same way that the problem of Japan is. Not *absolute*, but *felt* pressure is what leads to explosions of peoples, and China does not yet feel the pressure as Japan does.

## CHAPTER IV

### AUSTRALIA

Australia, unlike Japan and China, is a very sparsely settled land. At the time of the census of 1921 (April 4) the population was 5,435,734. At the end of 1924 it had increased to 5,873,503, or at the rate of approximately 120,000 each year. At the close of 1928 its population was probably about 6,350,000. Since Australia contains 2,974,581 square miles, including Tasmania, the density per square mile in 1924 was just under two (see map preceding Chapter II).

This vast country, having practically the same area as the United States, lies in the tropical and temperate zones of the Southern hemisphere. It extends from about twelve degrees south of the equator to about thirty-nine degrees for the mainland, and to about forty-four degrees with Tasmania. Of the total area, 1,149,320 square miles lie within the tropical zone and the remainder, 1,825,261 square miles, within the temperate zone. Inasmuch as the white man has not yet proved his capacity to live and work in tropical areas *as a colonist*, the temperate part of the continent, where nearly all of the Australians actually live, will be mostly considered here.

#### 1. White Men and Tropical Settlement

It may not be out of place, however, to make here a brief statement regarding the settlement of the tropics by white men. I am not prepared to say that the question of the white

man's ability to colonize the tropics is settled; but I do believe that up to the present he has not made sufficient headway in actual colonization to make it clear that he can live and work in the tropics as he does in the temperate zones. My opinion is that a fairly dense population of white people could live on good tropical lands *if* they would make the necessary adaptations. So far the white man has shown little disposition to do so. These adaptations would involve radical changes in the basic habits of life — eating and drinking, clothing and housing, work and leisure — and a great simplification of standards of living in respect to general consumption. It would also be necessary for him to develop a sanitation service far more adequate than any yet developed in any tropical area.

Few white men have actually settled in tropical Australia (about 185,000 in 1921). Australians are given to speaking and writing as though the settlement of Queensland proved the white man's ability to live and work in the tropics. As a matter of fact, slightly more than three-fourths of Queensland's population is found south of the tropic of Capricorn; while almost one-third is in the Brisbane area, which has a latitude of about twenty-seven degrees, thirty minutes, south, and thus lies four degrees outside of the tropics. This is two degrees farther outside the tropics than Miami, Florida, and only two degrees closer than Houston and San Antonio, Texas. If account is taken of the further fact that about sixty-five per cent of the tropical population of Queensland lives on the coast, mostly in the ports, and is a commercial rather than a labouring population, and that a few are engaged in mining, it becomes quite clear that there are very few white men who are actually engaged in field work in tropical Australia. It will further be found that a goodly proportion of those actually engaged in manual work are in localities where the tropical climate is greatly mitigated by

the altitude or by the ocean breezes. Furthermore, the proportion of the population of Queensland found in the tropics today is smaller than at any time since 1881 and has been declining steadily since 1901. Thus the experience of Queensland does not *prove* the ability of the Anglo-Saxon to live and work in the tropics.

But we need not stop to argue the possibility of the white man's living and working in the tropics and thus actually possessing them in the same way as he possesses temperate lands, for it is clear that he has not the least intention of settling the land and doing his own work as long as temperate lands are available. The white man in the tropics is, and intends to remain, an exploiter of other peoples. It will be on the basis of this fact that I shall discuss this question when it arises from time to time as we proceed.

## 2. Arable Land in Temperate Australia

Although having an area about the same size as the United States, Australia is unfortunate in having about 1,105,000 square miles of territory which receives less than ten inches of rainfall annually. Somewhat over one million square miles of this lie within the temperate zone. This leaves only 800,000 square miles within the temperate zone having over ten inches of rainfall annually. But this is not all. About 475,000 square miles of this 800,000 have a rainfall of only ten to twenty inches annually. Owing to the fact that this area lies chiefly between the latitude of thirty-five degrees south and the tropic of Capricorn, the evaporation is rapid, and a considerable proportion of it may be considered useless for crops except under irrigation.

That these lands having less than twenty inches of rainfall cannot generally be relied upon to produce good crops does not mean, however, that they are entirely useless. They

are often good grazing-lands and sometimes are good wheat-lands, but they will not support a very dense population unless they are irrigated, as we in the United States well know. If we suppose that the crops that can be grown on them will make up for the crops that cannot be grown on the rough and mountainous land included in the 325,000 square miles having more than twenty inches of rainfall annually, we shall probably be making ample allowance for their yields. At the most, then, we have an area of 325,000 square miles which may be considered reasonably good agricultural land situated in the temperate zone of Australia.

In order to give some conception of the capacity of this land to support people an area of about this size (341,572 square miles) in the United States has been blocked out. It includes the following states: Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi; and had an estimated population of 19,169,618 in 1928. There is, of course, no part of this area in the United States which lies next to the tropics, but even so they are probably fairly comparable areas.

There is no doubt that Australia can support a population considerably in excess of this number, even at the high standards of living now prevailing there. Considering that the total tilled area in Australia is only about 26,000 square miles, it would seem reasonable to estimate that Australia can support with food from its own soil in the temperate zone four to six times its present population, let us say from twenty-five to thirty-five millions of people.

This involves a rather low estimate of the productive capacity of the land yet to be brought into cultivation, but it must be borne in mind that much of this land is certainly of inferior quality and will not yield as good crops as that now being tilled. Furthermore, it must be remembered that cat-

tle- and sheep-raising on an extensive scale has about reached its limit and will proportionally become of less importance as the crop area expands. This necessarily means that there will be a reduction in the returns per worker now engaged in agriculture, as pastoral agriculture undoubtedly yields the largest returns per person of any kind of agriculture practised in Australia.

Whether temperate Australia can really support a population of twenty-five to thirty-five millions, at present or better standards, depends, of course, on the mineral resources present, as well as on the agricultural possibilities.

### 3. Mineral Resources

In general, it may be said that Australia is well endowed with the basic mineral resources as compared with other countries in the western Pacific. The estimated coal reserves amount to 165,000,000,000 tons. This is perhaps two-thirds of the reserves of China and about twenty times those of Japan. It amounts to about 28,000 tons per head of population. At any probable rate of consumption, Australia has ample coal for all needs for some generations. Coal is not and will not be a limiting factor in Australia's development.

Australia is also well supplied with iron ore. The total reserves are estimated at about 900,000,000 tons. This is almost as much as China's and perhaps a dozen times as much as Japan's. It should supply Australia's needs for a considerable period in the future. It would last over twelve hundred years at the present rate of use. Of course the rate of use is steadily increasing, but, even so, the lack of iron ore will not be a seriously limiting factor in Australia in the near future. Australia's reserves of iron are, however, much less adequate than its reserves of coal.

Australia is also well supplied with other important minerals. One thinks of gold at once when one thinks of Australia, but this is of much less importance than copper, tin, lead, zinc, or silver. Australia appears to have fairly abundant supplies of all of these. There is, then, apparently no dearth in the natural resources of Australia that should impede her growth of population for some generations in the future. Indeed, it would appear that temperate Australia should be one of the areas of rapid expansion of the white race in the immediate future, if it is to continue to expand.

#### 4. Population Growth

The following table shows, however, that Australia is not growing very rapidly in population. Even when due allowance is made for the war, Australia is not now increasing as fast as might be expected. Not since 1890 has Australia had a rate of total increase equal to that of the United States prior to the Civil War. Up to that time our rate of increase averaged about thirty-five per cent each decade. Since 1890 Australia has had about the same rate as the United States. Why is it that a country as young as Australia and as favourably situated does not maintain a higher rate of increase?

Table V

Population of Australia, 1870-1924, and Per Cent of Increase for Australia and the United States by Decades

Year	Number	Per cent of increase of Australia during decade	Per cent of increase of United States during decade
1870	1,647,756		
1880	2,231,531	35.43	26.0
1890	3,151,355	41.22	25.5
1900	3,765,339	19.48	20.7
1910	4,425,083	17.52	21.0
1920	5,411,297	22.29	14.9
1924	5,873,503	21.3 (estimated)	18.0 (estimated)

The answer to this question is not difficult to find. Australia, like the United States, has two chief sources of increase: (a) the excess of births over deaths, and (b) the excess of immigrants over emigrants.

The first of these sources — the excess of births over deaths — has been growing less of late years in Australia, just as in western Europe and in this country. Thus in 1881 the excess of births over deaths was 20.6 per thousand; in 1891 it was 19.7; in 1911 it was 16; and in 1924 it was only 13.77. In the ten years preceding 1924 the birth-rate had fallen four points, and since it has fallen faster than the death-rate the margin available for increase is steadily becoming smaller. Birth control appears to be very generally practised in Australia, with the result that it has a rather low rate of natural increase for a comparatively unsettled country.

But this is not all. In an endeavour to foretell with reasonable accuracy the rate of natural increase in Australia in the not distant future, I have made calculations showing the natural increase if present specific birth- and death-rates continue until a stable age composition is reached. The result of these is to show that at that time, which is not far distant, Australia will have a natural increase of only 6.8 per thousand instead of the present rate of 13.77. If this rate (6.8) had applied to the 1923 population, the natural increase would have been only 39,099 instead of 79,947, as it actually was in 1924. Since it seems almost certain that specific birth-rates (rates per thousand women at different ages) will decline still further and will decline faster than specific death-rates, it may safely be said that in two or three decades Australia will have a natural increase of only four or five per thousand.

The chief difference in the development of Australia and the United States, leading to this low birth-rate in Australia

so early in its national development, is undoubtedly the more rapid urban growth there as compared with the United States. In 1921 sixty-two per cent of the total population of Australia lived in incorporated places. Thus Australia, although considerably younger in its development, had about the same proportion of non-rural population as the United States had. Since it is in the cities that birth control first makes itself felt and is practised most drastically, it is but natural that Australia should show a comparatively low birth-rate at even this early stage of its national life. Perhaps it will be even easier to understand the low birth-rate of Australia if we know that the six capitals (metropolitan areas) of the states contained 45.44 per cent of the total population of the country.

In urban development Australia has been precocious, and without the shadow of a doubt this is one of the chief reasons for such a low rate of natural increase in a comparatively new country having such large possibilities of growth as Australia has. This precocious urban development is a very important matter and deserves our further attention. It is chiefly because of this that Australia seems likely to remain a relatively small country, in numbers, for some time to come, if it depends on Anglo-Saxon people to settle it. It will be easier to make this matter clear if we contrast, very briefly, the development of Australia with that of the United States.

##### 5. Settlement of Australia and of the United States Contrasted

The settlement of the United States began almost a hundred and fifty years before the industrial revolution got under way in England. At that time the population of Eng-

land was largely agricultural. The great majority of the people looked to the land as the source of their living. Not only was this necessary economically, but among the upper classes it was scarcely respectable to derive one's income from other sources. People very generally thought of land when they thought of opportunities for making a living and improving their condition. During the whole of our colonial existence this general attitude towards land prevailed, not only in the native-born, but also among the immigrants. Indeed, it was not until 1860 that New York City (including Brooklyn) had more than one million inhabitants. At that time the second city was Philadelphia, with 565,529 people, and the entire United States had a population of 27,489,000. Our early settlers, then, fully expected to make their living off the land directly. It was not until after the Civil War (1860-4) that there was a definite trend towards the city, and manufacturing and commerce became important as means of livelihood. Even then, for another thirty years, this movement was less important than the westward movement. It was only after the better land was occupied, about 1890, that the present strong cityward movement set in. Thus, it was about two hundred and fifty years after settlement on the eastern seaboard was well established, and only after the actual settlement on the land was completed, that the cityward movement became pronounced. As late as 1890 our rural population amounted to 40,600,000 and constituted 64.6 per cent of the whole. Up to that time we had been distinctly an agricultural people, except for a few small areas along the eastern seaboard. Not only was this true of the pioneering descendants of the colonial settlers, but also of the larger part of all our immigrant groups. The Irish constitute the single conspicuous exception. They never went to the land in very great numbers, but rather remained

in the cities. During the nineteenth century our British immigrants also showed an increasing tendency to remain in the cities and engage in manufacturing and commerce. But up to 1890 considerable numbers of them, as well as a large majority of the Scandinavians and Germans, went directly to the land. Since that time (1890) a great change has taken place, and we no longer think of land and immigrants as closely related. The related factors in the last thirty to forty years have been industrial opportunity and immigrants, so that even the most backward peasants of Europe come to us seeking, not land, but a job in mine or factory. Since the actual settlement of the land was accomplished, there has been a decided decline in the rate of increase of our population, in spite of our great numbers of peasant immigrants.

Contrast this general development of our population with what has taken place in Australia. No very large movement of settlers into Australia took place until about 1820 to 1830, a century ago. In the next thirty years, 1830 to 1860, the population of Australia increased very rapidly, from 70,000 to 1,145,000. By this time the gold-rush was over, but its effects are plainly visible in the fact that in 1860 there was just barely over one acre per capita in crops. Australia was unfortunate in not getting a start as an agricultural colony, based on tillage of the land. Pastoral agriculture and mining led to a type of development not favourable to close agricultural settlement and actual tillage of the land. By the time Australia might have settled down to a steady development of its agricultural possibilities (about 1860 to 1880), there were but few farmers left in Great Britain to migrate to the colonies or elsewhere, and for these few Australia had to compete with Canada and the United States. Besides, during most of the second half of the nineteenth century British industry was progressing quite satisfactorily,

so that, even though there was a large natural increase in Great Britain's population, most of it could be accommodated at home and at better standards of living. But the larger part of the migrating British during this period were industrialists, and the number of these that Australia could absorb was limited.

The simple fact is that Australia came on the stage too late to develop into a great agricultural country based on Anglo-Saxon settlement alone. By the middle of the nineteenth century the British had ceased to be an agricultural people, and the last quarter saw the end of their "swarming." Industrialism and urban life were making it increasingly desirable from the standpoint of the individual's interests to raise only a small family, and the development of methods of contraception had rendered the control of the size of the family feasible. The United States was the only one of the great Anglo-Saxon settlements that developed its agricultural resources before the "swarming" stage of its own people and of other western European peoples was past. Australia, Canada, and South Africa came too late. It appears unlikely that they will ever be able to develop their agricultural resources with Anglo-Saxon settlers, as they so clearly desire.

#### 6. Present Prospects for Australian Settlement

As a consequence of these industrial and social changes in the West, Australia is finding it more and more difficult—indeed, almost impossible—to secure the kind of immigrants desired. Anglo-Saxon people who will enter pioneering agriculture, even pioneering *de luxe*, as it is in Australia today, are apparently few and far between.

Various schemes are being tried, but progress is slow; and

to an outsider looking on and considering the source from which these settlers must come, if the "white Australia" policy is adhered to, it seems unlikely that any great progress will be made in this direction. With all the aid being rendered by Great Britain, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the several states, the net immigration has amounted to only about forty thousand a year since 1920. This is a very small number and will not make up for the further decline in the number of births that will take place in the near future as the birth-rate adjusts itself to a more slowly growing population.

The reason why Australia has such a small immigration, in spite of the agricultural and mineral resources it possesses and its evident desire for their development, is to be found in its "white Australia" policy. As at present interpreted, this policy means that: (1) for all practical purposes Australia excludes any but Anglo-Saxons; (2) Australia wants only choice physical specimens, and a large percentage of these must have the intention of entering agriculture. Now, as we have said, Great Britain has but few agriculturists, and but few of these care to migrate; and people who have been raised in the cities are not likely to become successful farmers unless their training begins by the time they are between twelve and fifteen years old, perhaps even earlier. It may be that there is also a dearth of the good physical specimens demanded by Australia among the industrial populations of the cities of Great Britain.

It seems fairly clear, then, that as long as Australia insists on an Anglo-Saxon population which will settle on the land, there is little likelihood that it will grow in numbers very rapidly. It would not be in the least surprising if the present annual increase of about 120,000, from natural increase and immigration combined, would prove to be about as large an

increase as Australia will ever have, unless its present immigration policy is radically changed.

From the standpoint of increase in numbers, therefore, Australia seems in no danger of becoming over-populated. It seems likely, rather, to remain greatly under-populated as compared with any other large area in the western Pacific.

All this would seem to be to the good and should encourage Australians to develop new standards and modes of living, better than those existing elsewhere. The only difficulty in such a situation is that a low-pressure country like Australia is certain to prove attractive to peoples in high-pressure areas.

### 7. New Zealand

What has been said above regarding the temperate zone in Australia applies with but little alteration to New Zealand as well. The area of New Zealand is about 104,000 square miles, all in the temperate zone and well watered, and its population is about 1,400,000. It is rather mountainous and has some rough waste lands, but, on the whole, is capable of supporting a considerably larger population than it does at its present standards, which are very high. Most of this population will probably always be engaged in agriculture, for New Zealand is not particularly well endowed with mineral resources. It has considerable water-power, however, and industries fitted to apply this power to agricultural products will undoubtedly grow, but it is not likely that New Zealand will ever be able to support as dense a population as though it were more liberally endowed with good grades of coal, iron ore, copper, and other minerals needed in modern industry. In climate New Zealand is much like Japan and if tilled intensively like Japan, would support a

very large population (perhaps as many as twenty-five millions) at customary Japanese standards.

New Zealand is better settled than temperate Australia and is increasing somewhat more rapidly in population because of its relatively larger immigration, but it is still very thinly settled and will remain so for some time. Its destiny is very closely bound up with that of Australia, and in what follows it need not be discussed separately.

#### 8. Can Australia Remain White?

In view of the actual situation as regards population growth and the utilization of resources in temperate Australia and New Zealand, is it inherently likely that nations which are badly over-populated will always respect the territorial integrity of these lands? Will they always recognize the right of Australians to hold large areas which they are not using and which they do not seem likely to use in the predictable future?

It appears to us that Australia is in a more or less precarious position. The rate of natural increase of population is slowing up rather rapidly. The real rate now is but half of the crude rate. Judging by the trends of population growth in western Europe and our own country, it will not be many decades until there will be no natural increase worth mentioning. The restrictions upon immigration are so stringent that only Anglo-Saxons can get in and but few of them. Under these conditions the chances of Australia's increasing beyond a population of twelve millions by the end of the century are rather remote. In the meantime Japan at her present rate of increase will double in numbers in about forty-two years. Before that time Japanese statesmen will be forced, by pressure at home, to look for new lands and re-

sources just as they are now being forced to ensure to Japan the use of the resources of Manchuria. Whether Japan will look to Australia for relief, or will look in some other direction, will, of course, be determined by the circumstances of the time, but surely only the blindness of ignorance can fail to see a real danger to Australia in the continuance of present tendencies.

If Australia wants to ensure her future as a "white man's land" even in her temperate areas, she must take measures to see that they are settled and used with reasonable rapidity; and I do not see any prospect of the maintenance of the present rate of population growth in Australia, to say nothing of its increase, as long as Australians hold to their present conviction that only Anglo-Saxon agriculturists are wanted as immigrants.

There cannot be the least doubt that Australia's future would have been much more clearly assured according to the liking of her present population if it had remained an agricultural country up until now. But its development followed other lines, and today Australia is a fairly highly industrialized land. Recognizing this fact, the Australians should develop an immigration policy which will meet their needs, if they are to hold their lands for any great length of time.

Under present methods of extensive agricultural production such as prevail in the United States, Australia, and Canada, where good land is abundant, it appears probable that less than twenty per cent of the population of a country can provide the agricultural products it needs. In the United States twenty-three per cent of our population now live on farms, and in Australia twenty-three per cent of the bread-winners are engaged in agriculture. These facts should be taken account of by Australians in determining their

immigration policy if they want to build up a population which can develop their resources and can defend the country under all probable eventualities.

Instead of insisting on a majority of agriculturists among immigrants, it would appear that Australia could absorb about four town labourers for each farmer without disturbing its economic equilibrium, if the movement were carefully planned and skilfully handled. But even if there should be an occasional period of depression due to lack of exact balance of workers in different occupations, the dangers to the life of the country thus arising would seem to be far less than those incurred in remaining greatly under-populated in an area where one's neighbours are becoming too numerous to find work and a decent living in their homelands.

To secure the number of immigrants necessary to make fairly good use of the temperate lands of Australia within a century, Australia will also find it necessary to modify its attitude towards physical quality and nationality among its immigrants. It will undoubtedly have to modify its standards of selection of Anglo-Saxons in order to meet the actual conditions resulting from a rather intense development of industry and commerce in Great Britain, and it will have to look elsewhere than to Great Britain for farmers. The physique of the descendants of two or three generations of factory workers oftentimes leaves much to be desired. But there is no good reason to suppose that the poor physical condition of most of those who would be rejected now is of a hereditary nature. It is rather a result of poor living-conditions. If these were remedied, as they probably would be in Australia, most of these people would show a decided improvement in their own persons, and their children would very likely be as sturdy as other native sons.

It would seem that under careful guidance there would be comparatively little trouble in securing a large number of industrial workers from Great Britain, as many as Australia could take care of; but the agricultural workers, as has been shown above, must largely come from other countries. Germany and Italy, in particular, should each be able to supply considerable numbers. The Scandinavian lands, Belgium, and Holland, should also be able to supply a few thousands each year for the next decade or two. And lastly, but not least, the Slavs (except in Russia) should have a considerable surplus to spare.

The peasants from most of these European countries are accustomed to many privations similar to those necessarily endured by agricultural pioneers in a new country. Once they were started towards Australia, there is little doubt that as many could be had as were needed, and most of them would make good farmers. Of course, there are many problems arising from uncontrolled immigration which it would be wise to avoid if possible. But the benefits of having a thoroughly homogeneous population may easily be exaggerated, while we fail to appreciate the advantages of having diverse elements in the same body politic. To one looking on from the outside and trying to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action on the part of Australia, it appears that the dangers to national unity and standards of living arising from having several diverse European elements in the population are far less than those arising from having a population too small to use and therefore to defend a large territory well endowed with natural resources; and these seem to us to be the alternatives of the population dilemma which Australia is facing. Temperate Australia must either fill up with reasonable rapidity or run the risk of being compelled to share its lands with other

peoples whose standards of living will be much lower and whose position will not be that of immigrants eager to become Australians, but rather of conquerors making themselves "a place in the sun."

### 9. Tropical Australia

Even if Australia should adopt a more liberal and practical immigration policy as regards Europeans and thus settle the temperate lands, there remains the question as to what should be done with tropical Australia.

There are about 500,000 square miles in tropical Australia having a rainfall of over twenty inches per year. Some of this land, particularly along the coast, is very fertile and has a heavy rainfall. Such land is suited to intense tropical culture and will yield two and sometimes three crops annually, and will support a dense population. Other parts, though less favourably endowed, will yield good crops and support a moderately dense population. But the greater part of this area has too light a rainfall, in view of the very high rate of evaporation, to be of much value agriculturally.

As was indicated above, the likelihood of the white man's actually colonizing the tropics is negligible. It would involve numerous adaptations which thus far he has shown himself unwilling to make and the acceptance of standards which he feels are not in accordance with his dignity. At least this is true of the northern European, whether he be Englishman, German, or Dutchman. Because of the difficulties of its colonization, it is quite unlikely that tropical Australia will attract Anglo-Saxon settlers as long as there are fairly good opportunities in temperate Australia. Since, as has already been shown, even a very conservative estimate of the capacity of temperate Australia to support people is much in ex-

cess of the population likely to develop there under present conditions for a long time to come, it does not appear at all probable that there will be any surplus to spare for tropical settlement. There is, then, not even a remote probability that tropical Australia will be developed by Anglo-Saxon labour for a long time to come, if at all. This will hold in spite of the fact that the altitude of considerable areas in tropical Australia gives them only a semi-tropical climate. The Anglo-Saxon may be able to live there and do his own work, but he has yet to prove that he will do it. What we know of the Anglo-Saxon in the tropics does not justify any faith in his ability or willingness to become an agricultural pioneer and worker. He has thus far shown ability only as an exploiter, and even at that he is inferior to the Chinese.

If this seems a rash statement, I suggest to the doubter that for a few days he loaf round Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and Batavia, or any other fair-sized tropical city, and watch its commerce. Let him further inquire into the ownership of the large and more thriving enterprises in these cities and he will be greatly surprised, perhaps shocked, to find that the white men, though in control politically, are commercially steadily losing ground to the Chinese. The white man apparently lacks the qualities (whether physically or culturally makes no difference) to enable him to compete successfully with the Chinese, even as an exploiter, when he gets into the low latitudes. It is not too much to say that, without political backing, which gives him an edge commercially, the white man cannot expect to succeed in business in the tropics of the western Pacific. Of course, if he has the capital to begin with, he may build up paying enterprises in a short time; but once real competition sets in, he has very little chance. He is in a world where he does not

seem able to adapt himself to the types of competition necessary to his survival.

Australia, then, in addition to being under-populated in its temperate parts and likely to remain so for a long time, has a vast tropical area which is practically uninhabited. Without doubt it will remain uninhabited indefinitely if the settlement is restricted to white men from northern Europe. It is also doubtful whether Italians can work in the tropics; for southern Italy is vastly different from the tropics, even though it does seem to be a hot country to many northern Europeans. This tropical area might possibly support twenty-five to fifty millions of Japanese, or even more Chinese, at better standards than they are now accustomed to. It is all but useless to the white man, and will remain so unless Japanese, Chinese, or Indians are brought in to do the actual work of the fields.

Again, one cannot but ask: What will be the attitude of these peoples two or three decades hence towards a nation fairly near in which much of the land is not being used and is not likely to be used by the people living there? To be more concrete: Will the Japanese be disposed to remain docile victims of what cannot but appear to them a very unjust division of the earth's resources? Will they view without coveting the retention by Australia of great areas of land practically unused and apparently not likely to be used? It does not seem that this is likely, with population pressure in Japan steadily becoming more severe and its own natural resources, as well as those of Manchuria, practically exhausted.

It seems probable, then, that tropical Australia is likely to prove a bone of contention in the western Pacific before many decades have passed if some steps are not taken by the Australians to make its resources available to those who need

them and who can use them. Two courses to bring this about suggest themselves: (1) to turn this area over voluntarily to some people fitted to develop its agriculture and other resources in the hope of thus making an ally if trouble should ever arise regarding the retention of the temperate area; or (2) to admit the coloured labour necessary to exploit this region under the direction of Australians as a dominant landowning class.

The first of these courses seems so foreign to the present policies of Australia that it need scarcely be considered. The Australians, until some great change takes place in their attitude towards the coloured races, will never cede them any part of the continent save as the result of losing a war. Though it would seem to the onlooker that it would be better to give up land which cannot be used than to risk losing that which is needed, there is not a remote probability that Australians will see the matter in that light for some time to come, if they ever do.

The second course mentioned — that is, the development of tropical Australia under the direction of Australians by coloured labour — would seem much more feasible. The conditions of admission could be so regulated that large permanent settlements of coloured people could be avoided. This could be done through the use of labour contracts, as in the tin-mines and on the rubber plantations of Malaya. If once the Australians become convinced that white men cannot or will not do the actual manual labour necessary to develop their tropics, then they may be willing to work out some plan whereby they will allow temporary settlement of Chinese, Japanese, or Indians and gradually bring them in for the actual work of exploitation of the tropical area of the continent. This could be done without relinquishing political or economic control and without

permitting economic competition between the whites and the coloured people until the standards of the latter are so greatly changed that such competition would not be fatal to the whites.

The details of any such plan will necessarily have to be worked out as experience accumulates and practices prove their value in actual operation. It would seem, however, that such a plan of exploitation would probably work best if only one people were brought in—for example, the Chinese—and the conditions were fully understood by them in advance. It could be started in a small way and allowed to grow naturally as the economic need determined. That Chinese immigrants would be forthcoming can scarcely be doubted in view of the movement into the Straits Settlements (Singapore) and the Malay Peninsula.

But, it may be asked, why broach such a plan at all in view of the settled policy of a "white Australia"? A white Australia, as has been shown, is going to be extremely difficult to maintain even in the temperate zone. It simply cannot be maintained in the tropical zone, except through the exercise of superior force.

The Australians are probably quite right in believing that to allow coloured labour to settle *permanently* in the tropics means eventually handing this area over to another race. But the policy proposed here does not necessarily mean relinquishing control of the area. The importation of contract labour on a large scale is entirely feasible. Profiting by the knowledge of abuses which have been customary in contract-labour schemes in the past, the Australians could evolve a more just and satisfactory plan which would retain for them the control they demand and which at the same time would be fair to the contracting coolies. By doing this the land could be put to use as fast as a market could be found for the

product, and it could thus be made to contribute to the support of some of the crowded peoples without actually passing into their control. Of course, the question of how long such a policy could be maintained, how long the Chinese or Indians would be willing to be thus exploited, is bound to arise sooner or later. No doubt the people who actually work the land will come to feel that they should be allowed to own it and settle permanently on it. But this is only another form of the same question, which is going to arise in any event. As the Oriental peoples become more crowded and need more resources, they are going to look to Australia to furnish some of these whether they are allowed there as labourers or not. Australia's problem of who is to live in the tropical part of the continent and control it will be much the same fifty years from now whether or not contract coloured labour is admitted. In the meantime, if they admit such labour, they may be learning some valuable facts about the contact of races and be developing a mode of living together which will contribute much to a permanent solution of racial problems.

#### 10. Assumptions Involved in the Foregoing

All that has been said here and all that will be said later is based upon two chief assumptions. One is that the white peoples of western Europe and of parts of central Europe (Germany and Austria), as well as the people in the settlements established by these Europeans, have largely ceased to be a "swarming" people interested in agriculture, and because of this will do little in the future towards the actual occupation of unused land, even outside the tropics. The second assumption is that the time is not far distant when other peoples who are still in the "swarming" agricultural state

of existence will demand access to unused areas suited to their needs.

In the western Pacific the peoples who are going to make these demands are the Japanese and the Chinese, and one of the peoples they are going to make such demands on are the Australians. The Australians might quite easily render such demands of no consequence as far as the temperate lands of the continent are concerned by admitting enough of the southern and eastern Europeans who are still "swarming," to occupy the land and assist in developing its natural riches.

But as regards the tropics, the situation is different. No European nationality is at all likely to succeed in their conquest. Hence it seems that it would be much wiser for the Australians to recognize this fact and begin to accommodate themselves to it, rather than pursue a dog-in-the-manger attitude until an explosion occurs. The perils incurred by tenaciously holding to their present policy will be greater than those involved in altering it and searching honestly for some settlement in which the actual needs of the different peoples will be taken into account.

I do not believe that a thinly settled land with rich resources can long maintain its advantageous position in a world which is steadily becoming more crowded and in which a knowledge of what is going on is becoming the common property of all peoples. As a consequence, I believe that the position of Australia will become increasingly precarious in a world where force is the sole arbiter.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ISLANDS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC

The islands of the western Pacific are exceedingly numerous (they number many thousands) and their total area is very great, considerably in excess of one million square miles, not including Australia and New Zealand. For our purposes these islands may be divided into three groups, as they are controlled chiefly by three powers: (1) the Dutch East Indies; (2) the British possessions, chiefly in Borneo and New Guinea; and (3) the Philippines, under the control of the United States. Several other powers have island possessions in this general area, but they are relatively unimportant in their relations to the population problem of this region and need not be considered here. These groups of islands will be considered in the order named.

#### 1. The Dutch East Indies

By far the most important of these groups in every respect is the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch possessions contain approximately 750,000 square miles and had a population of almost fifty millions in 1920. This population has been growing rapidly during somewhat more than a century, chiefly due to the unusual situation in Java. In consequence of this, Java is the most interesting of these islands from the stand-point of the growth of population. In 1920 Java had a population of about thirty-five millions or seventy per cent of the

total population of the Dutch East Indies. Considering that Java contains only 50,762 square miles (including Madura), this gave Java the very great density of 689 persons per square mile. By the present time the density has probably increased to over 750, and about seventy-five per cent of the total population of this tropical empire of the Netherlands is to be found in this one small island.

The comparison of Java with some of the other islands in population and area will serve to make clear how population is concentrated in this small area. Java is about one-third the size of Sumatra, a close neighbour, but it has over six times as many people. The Dutch part of Borneo, with more than four times the area of Java, has only about four to five per cent as many people, and Dutch New Guinea, with over three times the area of Java, has probably not more than one to two per cent of its population.

Java is unique among tropical islands and is worthy of some attention for what it may teach us regarding probable population growth in this region. The inhabitants are of Malay race except for a few Europeans (about 110,000) and Chinese (about 390,000). It is a mountainous country with only fifty-four per cent of its area under cultivation. It is supporting (1928) a population of two persons to each acre of tilled land or about 1,300 people to each square mile of such land. (In Japan, as we have seen, there are nearly 2,400 per square mile of tilled land.) This is all the more significant because practically the entire population of Java is an agricultural population. It has no large cities. Batavia, with 231,464 (1917), is the largest and there are but three others with more than a hundred thousand inhabitants. Only two of these four have over a hundred thousand natives. It is the Europeans and the "foreign Orientals" (Chinese) who keep to the larger cities.

Much of the tilled area of Java is terraced land on the mountain sides and can be cultivated only with great labour. These terraces must necessarily be tilled almost entirely by hand labour. Only in some of the European-managed plantations on the lowlands are power and machinery used to any extent. Consequently the product of each labourer is very small, even in such a fertile land, and the standards of consumption are low from our point of view. Of course, in a warm country like Java, people can live more comfortably on small incomes than in a temperate climate, but, even so, their product per labourer is so small that many of the necessities of life, according to our standards, cannot possibly be provided. It is true there is no demand for them, but even if there were, they could not be secured. This must await a larger surplus per worker.

Why is it that Java has so much denser a population than the rest of these islands? There are several reasons for this difference. In the first place, the soil of Java is very fertile. It is composed of young volcanic rocks, which disintegrate very rapidly in the warm, humid climate. Thus there is constant fertilization without labour. In the second place, Java is so situated that it receives more constant moisture than many other tropical islands. It has no really dry season as many of the others do. Thirdly, though its people are Malays and are very shiftless and lazy according to our way of thinking, they are more industrious than many tropical peoples. This is probably due in part to the fact that for some centuries they have served one master after another and have been compelled to work more regularly than most tropical peoples. Thus, in time, they have developed a somewhat more industrious habit of living than is customary in these latitudes. They have also been taught terracing and irrigation and thorough rice-culture by their masters in past ages. As a

consequence they have learned to use land more efficiently than most of their kindred in the neighbouring islands. The rice terraces of Java are probably the most extensive and the best cared for to be found in the world. In the fourth place, being subject peoples, they have been kept from intertribal warfare, particularly since the entire island came under the sway of the Dutch — that is, since about 1800. Thus one of the great *positive* checks to population growth among tribal peoples has been eliminated. In the fifth place, general sanitary conditions have been much improved during the last few decades, although from our standpoint they are still exceedingly bad.

In addition to these rather definite and tangible factors in the situation one must recognize that the general civilizing influence of masters having more highly organized social systems is conducive in many ways to population growth among subject peoples of relatively low culture. The situation that has resulted in Java from the mitigation of the positive checks to population growth (disease, hunger, war) is very instructive as regards the possibilities of exploitation of the tropics by mastering races which do not amalgamate with the natives.

In the last century and one-third, Java's population has increased from about three and one-half millions to over thirty-seven millions, almost elevenfold. It has doubled, on the average, every forty years. That such a growth in numbers should take place under a frankly exploiting regime throws grave doubts on the ability of any governing race, at any time, to secure large amounts of surplus food from tropical dependencies worked by native labour or by imported labourers of inferior status.

On the face of things it appears that the very conditions which must be imposed in order to exploit inferior labourers

result in such a rapid growth in their numbers that they very quickly come to consume practically all the food they are capable of producing. In the early period of exploitation if the exploited population is small, the surplus will necessarily be small. As population grows, if it grows rapidly, as seems to be the natural process, and if better agricultural methods can be quickly introduced, it may produce a somewhat larger surplus; but soon, as time counts in the life of nations, population begins to press on resources, and the surplus per worker begins to decrease.

In Java at the present time the surplus food, as shown by the data for exports and imports, is just about sufficient, in terms of calories, to support a population of three and seven-tenths millions; that is, the Javanese raise about one-tenth more food than is needed at home. This is certainly not a large surplus in view of the fact that probably ninety per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture. A comparison of Java with the United States will be interesting in this connexion. In the United States today about twenty-three per cent of our population lives on farms. Since our exports and imports of food just about balance, it appears that one farmer produces food and other agricultural produce for about four non-farmers. Furthermore, we use far more agricultural products, other than food, than the Javanese. Since our agricultural workers are clearly many times as productive as the Javanese, it might appear that by increasing the efficiency of the latter and keeping them practically all on the land, it would be possible to draw almost unlimited supplies of agricultural products from Java. Many people who are not familiar with what is happening in tropical dependencies speak and write as though they believed this could be done quite easily.

It would be a great mistake, however, to suppose that the

surplus product of the Javanese or any other tropical worker will ever even remotely approach that of the American farmer. As long as tropical peoples live in their customary manner and breed almost up to the limit of their food-supply, their surplus production will be but little, as it now is in Java. As soon as they are induced to work harder to produce a larger surplus above actual needs, they cease to be exploitable, as happens in the case of the Chinese in many quarters today.

It is not difficult to understand that when a people, not actually enslaved, is furnished a motive for producing a fairly large surplus above actual needs, they will shortly come to object to having this surplus taken by someone else. For, in order to get backward peoples to work more steadily, where forced labour cannot be resorted to, it is necessary to increase their wants; in other words, to increase the number and the quality of the things they are willing to work for. Once the desire for more and better things is aroused, there is no limit to its extension, and in almost no time there arises opposition to the system which takes the surplus for the master class. In its very nature, therefore, modern exploitation is suicidal and promises but a brief period of plenty to the exploiter; since either population increases to the point where there is practically no surplus, or wants increase to the extent of arousing opposition to the surplus's being taken from the producer.

In Java, it appears that the former of these obstacles to exploitation is actively operative and that even the present small surplus may not be long available. The population is increasing rapidly and the tillable land area is almost exhausted. It seems certain that the death-rate must increase in the near future, unless relief is found in some other direction. Even now there is some migration from Java to islands near

by; but if this movement does not increase considerably, the death-rate will certainly rise.

If the meaning of what is happening in Java has been read aright, it should impress upon us the futility of the white man's holding large unused tropical areas for future exploitation by cheap labour. His tenure of profit-taking must necessarily be brief when he does come to use them, and in the meantime he is laying up for himself a fund of ill will which is likely to cost his descendants dearly. This is not to say that at times and for particular purposes the white man's intervention in the life of tropical peoples may not be justified; but to regard the exploitation of all unused, or poorly used, tropical land and all backward peoples as his special prerogative is wholly unjustified.

The futility of tropical exploitation may still further be shown by the fact that the annual imports into Java amounted to only four dollars per capita before the war, and at post-war values to only about eight dollars per capita. Since much of this is rice for the native population, and most of the rest is luxuries for the governing class, the actual imports of manufactured goods for the native population are very small. It appears, then, that no considerable manufacturing population in the temperate zone can possibly be supported by trade with tropical peoples in the ordinary course of events.

The justification for this digression regarding the exploitation of Java in particular is that it should enable us to understand a little better what is actually happening in the tropics and thus help us in our decision as to what would be a wise course in considering the population problems of the western Pacific.

Aside from Java, the Dutch tropical empire is very sparsely settled. The relative areas and populations of the larger

islands have already been mentioned. Sumatra and Celebes are the only ones on which settlement can be said to have even begun. Dutch Borneo has about seven persons per square mile; New Guinea has only about two. The lack of the conditions described above as contributing to the development of Java, retards the development of these other islands and in part explains their sparse settlement. None of them is as fertile as Java, being composed of older rocks which disintegrate less rapidly; in most of them the rainfall is not so favourable; the people are of different stock on some of them, particularly New Guinea; they have never been given the hard training of subject races; finally, their exploitation under modern conditions has never been undertaken on an extensive scale. There is no doubt, however, that, from the standpoint of agriculture alone, all of these islands will support relatively dense populations at the Javanese standards. It probably would be underestimating the capacity of these lands to support population to say that, at Javanese standards, they could maintain 400 persons per square mile (about one-half the density of Java). But even on this basis they could support not less than 280,000,000 people.

But the agricultural riches of these lands are not their only claim to interest in studying their possibilities for the support of population. Several of them have large oil reserves, and at present their wells are producing 22,500,000 barrels annually. They are now fourth in point of production in the world. Much territory has not yet been prospected and it is not at all unlikely that other rich oil-fields will be discovered.

In coal these islands are also rich. Estimated reserves run as high as 1,400,000,000,000 tons — about five times those of China. Much of this is apparently of fair quality and quite readily accessible. The Dutch East Indies are by far the best endowed of any of the lands in this western Pacific area in

respect to fuel supplies. As yet these supplies are almost wholly undeveloped, but in any rearrangement of population in this area they are certain to play a rather important rôle.

Iron ore is also found in these islands in relative abundance. The prospecting for iron has been very inadequately done and little is really known about the amount of reserves and their quality. But it appears not improbable that the iron reserves of the Dutch East Indies are greater than in all the rest of this western Pacific region. They are certainly considerably greater than the combined reserves of Japan, China, and Australia.

The Dutch East Indies also have some of the most important deposits of tin in the world. The tin-mines of Banka and Billiton are among the most productive to be found anywhere, and the total output of the Dutch East Indies was about twenty-two per cent of the world's production in 1925. Of other minerals this area seems to contain its full share. Copper, lead, zinc, nickel, and many others are found in considerable quantities and are being recovered in many places.

From this very brief review of the resources of the Dutch tropical empire it is obvious that this is a rich area—rich in agricultural possibilities and in minerals. It can certainly support a very large population at much higher standards than those now prevailing throughout the Orient. The 280,000,000 for the islands apart from Java, suggested above, would seem to be a minimum. Since the population in this outlying area is now only fifteen to seventeen millions, the future possibilities are very large. It would seem quite natural for crowded countries in this area to look to the Dutch East Indies for some of the territory needed for their expansion and for some of the resources needed for industrial

development. This aspect of the matter will be discussed in the following chapter.

## 2. British Possessions

The areas included among the British possessions in which we are interested here are chiefly those in Borneo and New Guinea. Hongkong (with Kowloon), Singapore (with the Straits Settlements), and the Malay States are British and are important from many standpoints; but as areas of settlement their fates are already decided and need not occupy us long in this discussion. Hongkong and Singapore are Chinese, economically and racially, and the Malay Peninsula is rapidly becoming so.

In fact, it appears that wherever in this area the Chinese are allowed reasonably free opportunity, they quickly become dominant racially and economically. The white man is slowly beginning to realize that he cannot compete with them in these respects, and it seems scarcely more certain that any Oriental race can compete with them. Areas to which they are freely admitted may therefore be eliminated as occupied or as having their future settlement determined when making a survey of possibilities for racial and national expansion in this area.

The British also possess a number of small islands in different parts of this region, but their total area is not very great and they do not need separate attention here, except that the Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago have an area of about 22,000 square miles and will be considered as part of British New Guinea, as will also that part of New Guinea held by Australia.

In Borneo and New Guinea the British possessions as thus defined contain about 235,000 square miles — an area almost

one-third larger than Germany. They are very sparsely inhabited at the present time. New Guinea, with about 180,000 square miles, is estimated to have 500,000 people. Borneo (British North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei) has an area of 75,000 square miles and an estimated population of 850,000 to 900,000. Thus it may be considered among the areas available for settlement in any scheme of racial expansion in the western Pacific.

The resources of these areas are but little known. In Borneo there are a number of workable coal seams and there are abundant evidences of oil. At present the amount of coal mined is small and there are no producing oil-wells. But, judging by what has been found in the Dutch part of the island, there seems little doubt that both coal and oil are abundant. Even less is known about the mineral resources of New Guinea. Gold and copper are being mined at present and there are indications of the presence of coal and oil. The almost complete lack of transportation, however, renders the actual exploitation of its mineral resources very difficult.

In agriculture these areas are almost untouched. Native agriculture amounts to almost nothing, and there are but few European plantations. It seems doubtful whether one acre for each square mile of surface is in plantations. It is chiefly in those parts of Borneo where Chinese have been brought in that some headway is being made in agricultural development. Where only native labour is available, almost no land is being brought into use.

The only peoples who actually practise agriculture in the tropics in this region are the Malays and the Chinese. The success of plantations depends upon getting sufficient labour from one of these two sources. In general it may be said that while the Dutch, and men getting concessions from the

Dutch, employ Malays (often brought from Java), the British prefer the Chinese and import considerable numbers of them into some areas. As yet, however, but few have been introduced into Borneo and none into New Guinea. As between the Malays and the Chinese the latter are the better workers and the more dependable. The British tin-mines and rubber plantations of the Malay Peninsula largely depend upon the Chinese. Unlike the Malay, the Chinese is ambitious and, when given a chance, forges ahead economically and soon surpasses the white man. The admission of Chinese into the colonies of Europeans creates difficulties for the white man, the only practical solution of which seems to be to abandon the economic field to the Chinese and make what profit he can out of political control. As yet the white man is unwilling to admit the practical consequences of this situation. Once he does, it will help greatly in taking a really human (as opposed to a racial) view of population problems in this region.

Borneo and New Guinea together, including both Dutch and British possessions, have an area of approximately 620,000 square miles (about two and one-third times the area of Texas) and, as we have seen, are very sparsely settled. They are being exploited but slowly, for neither of these peoples has a strong incentive to proceed rapidly in their use. Racially and economically, therefore, they may be looked upon as being open to settlement by any people that has need of them. We are fully aware of the political difficulties in the way of their settlement by the Chinese or the Japanese. There is no native population there, however, which could not be easily absorbed by either of these peoples, and there is no economic development that would make transfer of control difficult. These are the facts and they should be kept in mind, as there is not the least doubt that before long the

question whether political control entitles the holder to prevent economic exploitation by people who have need of new resources will be asked with increasing frequency. If a satisfactory answer can be agreed upon between the "haves" and the "have-nots," war can be avoided; if not, force will supply the answer as to who has a right to exploit these areas.

### 3. The Philippine Islands

The Philippine Islands have an area of approximately 114,000 square miles. The two largest islands contain about 78,000 square miles, or sixty-eight per cent of the total area. Nine other islands, having more than a thousand square miles each, contain a total area of about 30,000 square miles. The remaining 6,000 square miles are divided between more than 7,000 other islands. The total population in 1918 was 10,300,000. Assuming that the rate of growth prevailing between the last two censuses (1903 and 1918) has continued until the present, the population in 1928 would be about 12,500,000, and it will double in about thirty years.

We see here the same phenomenon as in Java. There was abundant unused land available to people accustomed to live by agriculture; a ruling race has stopped intertribal warfare, has improved sanitation to some extent, and has provided fairly good government. The result is a very rapid increase of population. The Filipinos belong to the same race as the Javanese, and under similar conditions they increase in numbers at much the same rate. Here, again, is proof of the general principle that in the absence of rigorously active positive checks among peoples not employing birth control population tends to double in a very short time.

The density of population in the Philippines was about ninety per square mile in 1918. Judged according to Javanese

standards, this is low. This density is by no means uniform, however. In Luzon, the largest island, it was 121, while in Mindanao, the second island in size, it was only 24. On some of the smaller islands the density is much greater, reaching 458 in Cebu. Not all the islands are equally fertile, but there can be little doubt that, with prevailing standards of consumption, these islands will support four times their present population — say, fifty millions of people. This would give the Philippines a density approximately one-half that of Java; and, as in Java, this population would be almost wholly agricultural, using but little of the other resources of the islands.

The Philippines are not so fertile as Java, but the visitor certainly gets the impression that, as compared with the latter, these islands are not well tilled. There is much land that is not used at all, and much of that under tillage is not well cared for. If the land were well used, there can be no reasonable doubt that an estimate of fifty millions of people supported by agriculture alone is not excessive. Since, however, the Philippines must rely largely upon agriculture for the support of their people, this estimate should not be greatly increased. It is true there are other resources in the islands, but they are not large. The known fuel resources are small, coal being estimated at only 65,000,000 tons and oil being a very uncertain quantity, although it is believed to be present. The iron ore reserves, however, are extensive and probably amount to no less than 450,000,000 tons. The presence of iron ore is certain to be a factor in determining the future of these islands, or at least of Mindanao, on which most of it is to be found.

Other minerals, too, are present, but in undetermined quantities. On the whole, however, these islands are not very well endowed with mineral resources as compared with the

Dutch East Indies. But, even so, they can maintain a population of fifty millions at higher standards than are customary today.

If the Philippines can support fifty millions and have but twelve and one-half millions today, there is obviously room for considerable expansion. As was pointed out above, the population is doubling about every thirty years at present. At this rate, it will approximate a density of 400 per square mile by the end of the century. It is not at all fantastic to suppose that this increase will actually take place. Of course, the condition which makes possible the present rate of increase must continue if the population is to increase in this manner. It is simply the removing or holding in abeyance some of the more common and easily controlled causes of a high death-rate. These can be held in control as long as there is a fairly benevolent and strong government, and as long as there is new land which can be brought into cultivation by the increased population. Of course, any one of several changes might readily result in the re-emergence, in force, of the causes of death now somewhat under control and might result in a stationary or even a declining population.

Although the end of this century may find the Philippine Islands rather densely populated with the descendants of the people now living there, it is by no means certain that some of these islands should not be included in any area which might be allotted to the expansion of peoples already crowded. For example, Mindanao, having about 37,000 square miles, has only about 950,000 inhabitants. It had a density of 24.5 in 1918. The people living there are mostly Mohammedan in religion and there is bad feeling between them and the Christians on most of the other islands. It might easily happen that if Japan were in control of this island, the religious problem would die naturally and the

people would be better satisfied than they are now. In any plan for readjusting land allotments in the western Pacific this possibility should be taken into account. It should also be remembered that Mindanao contains the most important iron ore deposits of the islands. Japan stands in great need of iron ore, and the possession of or access to these reserves would be of great value to it. At present, they are not being used by the Filipinos and there seems little likelihood that they will be used by them in the near future. The possibility of affording Japan some relief by making these deposits available to it should certainly be taken into account in the consideration of this whole situation.

#### 4. French Indo-China

To the south of China, within the tropics, lies a territory of some 270,000 square miles controlled by France. It is composed of several more or less separate governments, collectively known as French Indo-China. The inhabitants are largely of the same stock as the southern Chinese. This area is not an island, but it will be included with the islands in this discussion as from our standpoint it does not merit a special chapter. In fact, a very brief treatment will suffice for our needs.

French Indo-China is a fertile country. Its chief crop and leading export is rice, but considerable quantities of sugar, tobacco, lumber, and other agricultural products are exported as well. It is as yet comparatively little developed and can easily support a population of several times the present size so far as agricultural production is concerned. One finds the statement rather frequently made by French officials in their reports that the production of a certain area is low because of the lack of labour. The fact that there are also various

schemes to encourage the acquiring of land and on easy terms for plantation development is proof of the existence of much unused land. From the standpoint of its agricultural possibilities, French Indo-China is much like the tropical islands discussed above. Even when due allowance is made for mountains and waste lands, it should support four hundred persons per square mile at the customary standards without needing to exploit its mineral resources.

The mineral resources of this area are but little known. One deposit of anthracite coal of fair quality is known to contain 20,000,000,000 tons. Other coal deposits are known, but no estimates of their volume are available. It is also known that iron, copper, tin, zinc, and many other minerals are present, but they are not prospected and worked sufficiently to permit of estimates of their economic value. There can be little doubt, however, that useful minerals are present here in sufficient quantities to assist materially in improving the customary modes of living of the population.

In so far as the racial and economic future of this land is concerned, it undoubtedly belongs to the Chinese (including in this group the closely allied stocks now living there, as well as Chinese immigrants, who have been rather numerous of recent years). It has at present a population of about twenty millions, and a density of seventy to seventy-five per square mile. Since it can undoubtedly support one hundred millions or more, there is room for considerable expansion here. As yet, the conditions favouring population growth are not as propitious as in Java and the Philippines, and population is not growing so rapidly, having increased from 16,990,000 in 1911 to 19,122,000 in 1921. This is at the rate of 12.5 per cent in ten years and it would require about fifty-six years to double in numbers. There is no doubt that the rate of increase will become more rapid as the actual influence

of French rule is extended, bringing better sanitation, stopping intertribal conflict, and rendering the possession of property more secure. At present a part of this increase is due to immigration from China — about 560,000 Chinese being counted in the 1921 "census." This immigration may be expected to continue as long as it is allowed and is likely to increase rather than decrease for some time to come, as the French are anxious to build up this colony as rapidly as possible. It is, of course, highly hazardous to guess at the future rate of growth of such a country, but, judging from what has happened in Java and is happening in the Philippines, another century may see French Indo-China rather fully settled, with five or six times its present numbers.

It may not be out of place to mention here, in passing, that a large immigration into French Indo-China from China would materially help to fill up the former, but would do nothing to decrease the numbers of the latter. China could send out several millions annually and still grow at home. The point for us to bear in mind is that French Indo-China, though offering possibilities of expansion, offers them only to its own people and the Chinese. It is not an "open" land in the sense that many of the larger islands in this region are. It is already pre-empted and its full use in the not distant future is assured.

The same may be said of the Straits Settlements, the Malay Peninsula, and Siam. For a time they may be exploited by the white plantation-owners, but their racial and economic future is already clear. They are being taken by the Chinese, and their future is not open to speculation; nor can they be allotted to other peoples, even if there should be any disposition to do so. It has been said: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." The quiet, almost unobserved, expansion of the Chinese seems to attest the truth of Christ's statement.

## CHAPTER VI

### CAN WAR IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC BE AVOIDED?

Any comprehensive answer to the question whether war in the western Pacific can be avoided must needs take account of a host of factors that are not even touched upon by implication in the preceding survey. Nor can they even be enumerated here, not because they are unimportant, but because, as was stated in the introduction, most of the political causes of war really have their origin and gain their importance from underlying economic conditions. Of the underlying economic conditions those most likely to lead to a general or world war in the near future (within the next twenty-five to fifty years) are the very real and urgent needs of certain peoples for lands in which they can establish settlements with some of their surplus numbers and from which they can draw resources for further industrialization at home.

The generally accepted view that the way to avoid war is to fortify the *status quo* is rejected because it is a very short-sighted view and because it has again and again been shown to be false. The *status quo* can be maintained only so long as the force at the disposal of those interested in maintaining it is very obviously greater than that at the disposal of those who wish to upset it. This regime of force is so inherently unstable that war is inevitable as long as it is relied upon. Hence, to avoid war, some means of changing the

*status quo* by agreement must be found. The reliance on force to maintain a position invites the use of force to dislodge one from this position. This seems so obvious that it need not be enlarged upon here.

### 1. Japan's Position in the Western Pacific

In the western Pacific area by far the most urgent needs are those of the Japanese. As was shown in chapter ii, Japan is decidedly overpopulated now as compared with most other countries. It needs more territory for agricultural expansion and it needs larger mineral resources for the development of its industry. Japan's policies with regard to China are today being determined by this really urgent economic need. For in Manchuria the Japanese have found coal and iron of great value to them and have developed important commercial relations. They control also the larger part of the transportation system. The future use of these resources and trade connexions is of vital concern to the Japanese. Their policy towards China is being and will be determined by their estimation of the best way to exploit Manchuria as well as certain resources in other parts of China. Since this is the customary method of procedure in international relations today, it does not in any way reflect discredit upon Japan.

By way of illustrating the fact that these economic interests of the Japanese in Manchuria are the determining factor in their relations to China today, the present situation may be cited. After considerable blundering the Japanese have evidently decided that they will profit most by securing the goodwill of the Chinese and insisting upon only that amount of control in Manchuria necessary to ensure the successful operation of their enterprises in that quarter. As for the rest

of China, they rightly believe that its trade will be worth more if it is left alone than if they attempt to exercise any political control over it. Events have shown them very clearly that passive resistance (boycott and non-co-operation) can be an exceedingly effective weapon in the hands of the Chinese. The present policy of Japan towards China may be described as one of conciliation so far as this is consistent with making the Chinese respect their power and retaining the advantages of their economic hold on Manchuria. If in the near future (perhaps two or three decades) Manchuria ceases to be a real economic asset through the exhaustion of its readily exploitable resources, then Japanese policy is likely to change. When there is no longer anything of much value to be got from Manchuria, the Japanese will probably quite willingly relinquish control, liquidate their investments, and make a great show of magnanimity in withdrawing — all in the most approved Western manner. If, on the other hand, the Nationalists, having unified China proper, attempt to deprive the Japanese of the resources of Manchuria while they still need them as badly as they now do, there is certain to be trouble. For to lose the coal, iron, and trade of Manchuria at present would probably precipitate a serious economic crisis in Japan, and Japanese statesmen will avoid this even at the risk of war with China.

Under these circumstances it would be comparatively easy for the dominant economic groups in Japan to carry their policy and establish an even more secure hold over Manchuria. But if they were once compelled to go to war to do this, it might also seem the part of wisdom to Japanese statesmen to carry war into other quarters, not merely where rights of exploitation of resources are involved, but where success would mean enlarged territory for actual settlement and access to still larger resources needed for future industrial

expansion. As was pointed out above, the Japanese are fully aware that they cannot expand as a people in lands where the Chinese are already established or are allowed free access. All they hope to do in Manchuria is to skim off the cream of the trade and of the resources for a few years, while the Chinese are becoming established.

But even if the Japanese have as free a hand in Manchuria and China for the next twenty-five or thirty years as they have had in the recent past, this will only postpone a little while the time when they must seek new resources and new lands. In the meantime they will be growing stronger and will be preparing to take what they need if it is not freely given them. Furthermore, as economic pressure comes to be more and more keenly felt by the working population, the securing of more land will become truly a *national*, rather than merely a *class cause*, and a movement of expansion will receive full popular support.

The facts being what they are, the direction which such a movement will take is already fixed. In saying this I do not mean to impute any definite plans to the Japanese, but the logic of the circumstances points to their expansion in a certain direction. North America may be considered closed to Japanese immigration; South America, particularly Brazil, admits them, but it is not certain that it will admit more than a very limited number, not enough to relieve effectively the situation in Japan; Asia offers no foothold, save in Siberia, which is too cold. The natural direction of expansion for the Japanese is to the south and east. They would probably prefer the temperate regions of Australia and New Zealand, which are much like Japan; but without doubt if tropical lands were available, they would much prefer them without war to the chances of gaining temperate lands through war. If no grants of territory are made to the Japanese, how-

ever, and they are compelled to resort to war for new lands, they are less likely to take chances on the climate when they do strike. They will be more disposed to go directly to those climates where they know they can succeed and where labour competition will be easy.

For reasons already given (pp. 43, 44), I believe that the Japanese are quite capable of settling in the tropics, but many Japanese are not fully convinced of this, and in their doubt they may not care to risk war for a prize that may possibly prove unusable. If, however, they are given a chance in the near future to show what they can do in settling tropical possessions, there is excellent reason to believe that they will make good and that they will be quite content to expand within the tropics.

While the Japanese are busy with their tropical expansion, Australia would have a further chance to show whether its temperate areas can be filled up with white men, as would New Zealand also. If they cannot settle these areas with reasonable rapidity, they are almost certain, within a century, to cease to be white men's lands in a world where the white man has ceased to be a colonizer. The drawing near of potential settlers of a different race might, however, prove to be just the stimulus needed to induce in the Australians a greater willingness to consider practicable plans for white immigration on a fairly large scale. Otherwise Australia cannot always remain a white man's land.

Since the expansion of Japan is one of the inevitable population movements of the future, and since this expansion can only reasonably be expected to take place within this western Pacific area, it would seem the part of wisdom for the powers concerned to face the facts and undertake to develop some plan by which this expansion may take place with the least possible disturbance and injury to all parties

involved. Counting Australia and New Zealand as one power, four powers other than Japan are deeply interested in any plan offering a practicable means for Japanese expansion: (1) Australia, which probably has most at stake and should be prepared to make large concessions, except in its temperate areas; (2) the Netherlands, which has by far the largest and richest colonial empire in this region; (3) the British Empire, which has parts of two large islands that must figure prominently in any scheme for reallocation of territory in this region; and (4) the United States, in control of the Philippines.

## 2. National Power in the Western Pacific

It is obvious at once that Australia and New Zealand by themselves are unable to prevent the Japanese from taking certain of the islands in this region — say, Borneo and New Guinea — at any time they may decide to do so. Australia has no navy and no merchant marine worth considering, and such army as it has cannot operate at all effectively away from home without naval supports. It is even doubtful whether Australia and New Zealand could protect their own territory against a well-planned attack from Japan without the aid of the British Navy. Of course these dominions are relying on the full support of the British Navy in the event of trouble. They do not feel that they need rely solely or even chiefly on their own strength as long as the British Navy is free to come to their aid. The building of the Singapore naval base is intended to make it possible to concentrate a larger part of the British fleet in the western Pacific than has been feasible hitherto. In the face of the British power in this region, and especially after the completion of the Singapore base, the Japanese will be slow to move

against any of the British possessions until such a situation arises as seems likely to render the concentration of the British fleet at Singapore quite impossible.

There is no immediate danger, then, that Japan will attempt to expand at Britain's expense. There are, however, a great number of contingent circumstances that might quickly change the attitude of Japanese statesmen in favour of an aggressive policy at almost any time.

In the first place, the pressure of population in Japan is becoming greater each year. In a few years it may become so great that it will be easy to suggest to the mass of the people that it would be as well to die fighting as to sit at home and starve. The Japanese are a people with fighting traditions, and when a good case can be made for "Fight or starve," they will undoubtedly choose the former, and certainly Americans cannot but commend the spirit shown in such a choice. Patient resignation to "fate" is not one of the qualities we particularly admire.

In the second place, a number of events might arise that would make it extremely embarrassing for Great Britain to move any considerable part of its fleet into the western Pacific area. Furthermore, it may well be within the power of Japan to help in producing some of these embarrassments.

It will be shown later that Italy is in much the same situation as Japan. They both feel greatly wronged by the maintenance of the *status quo* of post-war territorial adjustments. An understanding between Japan and Italy might render Britain's Suez communications so uncertain that it would be very dangerous to withdraw any large part of its fleet from the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. If an understanding between Japan and Italy were accompanied by an understanding with Russia, and Russia, in turn, were to maintain its present friendly relations with Turkey, all of which is

well within the bounds of probability, Britain's position would become such that Japan could practically count on no effective intervention from this source if it decided to seek new lands in the western Pacific.

In addition to all this, India is a constant thorn in Britain's flesh in these days, and it is certainly within the realm of probability that this thorn will become so irritating at some time in the near future that Britain would hesitate a long time before sending much of its fleet east of Singapore.

Furthermore, a power with such wide-flung interests as Great Britain is certain to be injuring the *amour propre* of several other powers at all times. Naturally, these powers are always looking for an opportunity to redress their grievances, and under such conditions even stranger *ententes* than those suggested above are not only possible, but probable. If it should ever become a choice for Great Britain between protecting the Suez route to retain India and its other interests around the Indian Ocean and aiding its colonies and dominions in the Far East, there can be little doubt where the choice will lie. The loss of Suez means the loss of all lying east of there; the loss of all east of Singapore would still leave Britain with a very sizable empire, larger, indeed, than it is likely to be able to retain through the next century.

For Australia and Great Britain to ignore such possibilities and adopt an intransigent attitude towards any change in the *status quo* in the western Pacific seems very short-sighted indeed; and the Australians would seem to be ignoring very probable complications if they are relying absolutely on the assistance of the entire British fleet, or even the larger part of it, either in the event of being attacked themselves or of an attack upon British and Australian possessions in Borneo and New Guinea.

They are failing to realize actualities still more if they have even a remote hope of succour from the United States in the event of Japanese expansion in the western Pacific. The United States, of course, does not have the same interest in preventing the expansion of the Japanese in that region that it has in preventing their settlement in North America. Whereas Canada can undoubtedly count on the support of the United States in an Asiatic exclusion policy, Australia cannot count on anything more than expressions of sympathy, which will not sink any ships or turn back any armies.

The contemplation of Japanese expansion into some of the thinly settled areas of the western Pacific and of the political understandings that might most easily prevent it may throw some light on the meaning of pronouncements often made by British statesmen to the effect that the maintenance of peace in the world today depends upon close co-operation between Great Britain and the United States. It is obvious that Japan might well hesitate to go to war for new lands, even though internal peace were endangered by lack of them, if it were reasonably certain that the United States would stand by Great Britain; whereas Japan might risk getting them if it had to encounter only the power of Great Britain and Australia. But it should also be obvious, not only to Americans, but to Australians and British as well, that we have very little to gain by helping to maintain the *status quo* in the western Pacific. Great Britain has many chestnuts in the fire, while we have so few that we are not at all likely to go to much trouble to remove them unless some more tangible gain is offered than now appears probable. Great Britain is, of course, only interested in an understanding with us, or with any other nation, which offers it some palpable gain. Now the guarantee of the *status quo* is the most substantial of all guarantees for Great Britain. Nothing else

will contribute so much to the maintenance of its hegemony in world affairs. It is "on top of the heap" and can desire nothing more than to remain there. Consequently if, under the guise of maintaining peace, it could secure our assistance in maintaining the *status quo*, it would be a diplomatic achievement of the highest order. One cannot much wonder if British statesmen have hopes that we may in some way be brought to guarantee the *status quo* after what happened at the Washington Naval Conference; but we are more wary now and are not likely to be caught so easily again. It is altogether improbable that we shall make any commitments which will be of the least use to Australia or Great Britain in the western Pacific.

As regards our ability to protect the Philippines if Japan should decide to include them in its program of expansion into unused parts of the western Pacific, we could do very little, inasmuch as we have no naval base of any importance west of Honolulu (another consequence of our victory at the Washington Conference). Only in the event of close alliance with Great Britain and after the Singapore base is completed could our fleet be of much value in the western Pacific as against Japan, for Manila is five thousand miles from Honolulu. But the advantage of using British bases in the Pacific for our fleet is scarcely great enough to lead to any "entangling alliance" with Great Britain for the maintenance of its position in this quarter.

### 3. Australia's Vulnerability

It thus appears that Australia cannot count certainly on the full support of any outside powers if Japan should undertake to expand in the western Pacific. Great Britain is not at all unlikely to be occupied elsewhere and we are not

sufficiently interested to intervene effectively even if we could, which is doubtful. Consequently Australia must look to its own resources to protect itself if attacked. Now, it so happens that in some respects Australia is more than ordinarily vulnerable to attack by sea. As has been shown above, Australia's urban development has been precocious. Almost half of its entire population is living within gun range of an attacking fleet, once it has gained access to the harbours; and most of its industry is located within these same areas. There is very little in the way of developed resources in the *Hinter-land* on which to base military operations against an invader in possession of the coast cities. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the Singapore naval base.

I do not mean to imply that it would be an easy matter for the Japanese fleet to enter the harbours and capture the capitals of the Australian states, but it would not be an impossible accomplishment, if, for some reason or other, the British fleet were needed in the Indian Ocean and in European waters. This is a contingency with which Australia must reckon and it should have its influence upon the attitude of Australia towards the expansion of the Japanese in this area. Indeed, it would seem, in view of the helplessness of Australia if Great Britain were embroiled elsewhere, that the Australians would be extremely eager to search out some plan by which the really urgent needs of Japan could be met. For, if by giving Japan some of the unused lands in this area Australia could avert the possibility of attack by Japan, it would seem the part of common sense for Australia to help Japan secure these lands. Certainly, if Japan is compelled to fight to secure new lands and additional resources, it will do like other nations and seize all the territory it possibly can; whereas if it is allowed to expand without hindrance, it will no doubt be quite willing to get along with much less than

it really thinks it needs. Thus it appears to us that it would be good politics on the part of Australia to work for an enlarged Japan. The Australians, however, do not see things in this light and seem quite likely to oppose the expansion of the Japanese in every way possible. They would much like to see a close alliance of all the European peoples who have an interest in the western Pacific, for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo*. If such an alliance could be formed and could be stabilized, it would no doubt be able to hold Japan in check for the next half-century; but I do not believe that it can be formed, in the first place, or maintained long even if it can once be formed. British, Australians, Dutch, and Americans — what have they in common that will hold them steadily *vis-à-vis* Japan for the next half-century? A brief consideration of some of the interests of these different peoples in this area may help us to appreciate why the only reasonable answer to this question must be that they have not enough in common to be at all likely to hold together against Japan for any great length of time.

#### 4. American Interests in the Western Pacific

The United States, for example, does not have any great interest in preventing Japan's expansion in the western Pacific. Our interest in this quarter is largely a trade interest, for we expect before long to liquidate what territorial interest we do have by giving the Filipinos their independence. Our imperialists have not yet convinced us that we should insist on carrying the "white man's burden" in the Philippines when it is so clearly a constant irritation to the Filipinos to have us do so. But if we should still be holding the Philippines when the time comes for Japan to expand, it is more than doubtful whether we can be made to feel that we

have any stake worth fighting for in this area, even if Japan menaces the Philippines directly, for the Philippines do not mean much to us economically. The total exports from this country to the Philippines amounted to only 69,522,000 dollars in 1927; the imports were larger, amounting to 115,180,000 dollars. This is 1.4 per cent of our total exports, and 2.7 per cent of our total imports. There is considerable private property held by Americans in the Philippines, but this is not at all likely to be disturbed if the islands are given their independence or even if they should pass into the hands of some other power. Consequently, it is going to be extremely difficult to convince Americans that we have much interest in maintaining the territorial *status quo* in this area if it is likely to involve us in a war of major importance.

Then, too, China and Japan are much better customers than the Philippines. Our trade with them averages about five times as much as with the Philippines. From a purely economic point of view, it is far more to our interest to have China and Japan prosperous than to keep the Philippines. This particularly applies to Japan, for our trade with Japan is about two and one-half times as great as that with China. If Japan expands and becomes more prosperous, we shall undoubtedly derive some benefit therefrom. It seems obvious that, with some millions of prosperous Japanese in New Guinea and Borneo, our trade with the Far East should be far more profitable than at present. Why, then, should we have the same interest in keeping things as they are that Australia and New Zealand, Great Britain, and Holland have? We stand to gain far more than we lose by being friendly to the expansion of Japan and China in the western Pacific.

Furthermore, the Philippines are so much less desirable from the standpoint of Japan than some of the other islands

in this region that Japan is quite likely to pass them by in the movement of expansion. By so doing it will avoid the possibility of war with the United States and thus render the success of its other ventures considerably more certain. An area that is not very well endowed with mineral resources and that is rather rapidly filling up with a population having low standards of living is not nearly so attractive to the Japanese, or any other people, as a land rich in resources and but thinly peopled.

If it is thought that the reasons just adduced for our probable inactivity when Japan begins to expand are purely mercenary and are quite unworthy of an idealistic people, we may point out that such motives actually govern the conduct of nations in most cases of similar nature. But in this particular case it happens that a high regard for justice would also dictate inactivity on our part when Japan undertakes to expand into some of the unused lands now held by the British, the Australians, or the Dutch. Let us ask ourselves whether abstract justice is with those peoples who are holding resources out of use or with those who seek to secure new resources because they really need them in order to make a moderately comfortable living. Is not the more equal distribution of the natural resources of the world among those who need them a fine ideal? Is it not a finer ideal than maintaining the present unequal distribution, which has arisen out of the regime of force?

In addition to our small territorial stake in the western Pacific, and to the fact that Japan's claims to new lands may appear quite just, and to the fact that Japanese and Chinese trade is worth far more to us than that of the Philippines and other lands in the western Pacific, there is one other consideration which may well render us unwilling to co-operate with Great Britain to stop Japanese expansion. It is

that the economic interests of the United States and Great Britain are more and more coming into conflict, and as a consequence there are going to be numerous occasions in the future when our relations with Great Britain will not be so cordial as we should like them to be. We believe that we have come of age economically and that we can no longer allow Great Britain to dictate the commercial policies of the world as it has done in the past. John Bull naturally resents this interference with his long-established prerogatives. Under the actual conditions we are facing, then, it requires no prophet or son of a prophet to foresee periods of strained relations between ourselves and Great Britain in the not distant future. Examples of questions productive of friction which will probably occur to everyone are the different interpretations put upon "the freedom of the seas" by the two governments and the present controversy over naval parity. There are also many others and there will be new ones from time to time.

### 5. When Japan's Hour Strikes

If Japan is forced to go to war to attain new territory, it will bide its time. Probably it will also lend its aid in producing the strained relations that will favour its enterprises. If at the same time there should be differences between Holland and Great Britain (over restriction of rubber production, for example), Japan's enterprises would be even easier to carry through. All these contingencies and many others of similar nature will be carefully weighed by the Japanese, and their movements will be governed by them. It seems very probable, then, that when the Japanese decide to strike for more land, they will succeed.

We should further recognize that the urge towards

expansion is just as legitimate in the Japanese as in the Anglo-Saxon. Why not acknowledge this fact and see if some plan cannot be devised whereby Japan may expand without resort to war? Such a plan does not need to be worked out in all its details at the start. If the Japanese find a willingness in the other Pacific powers to consider their problems in a sympathetic manner, they will without doubt feel disposed to make the best possible use of the concessions granted before resorting to force.

#### 6. How Can Japan's Needs Be Met?

The survey of the islands of the western Pacific has shown us that there are several of these which are almost entirely undeveloped. If the Japanese were given one of these large islands to begin with, they could undertake its development in their own way and they would have a chance to show what they could do with a tropical colony. New Guinea would appear to be, in several ways, the island best suited for this experiment. It is large enough (330,000 square miles, including some of the small neighbouring islands) to support a very considerable immigration for a number of years (at 400 per square mile, it would support over 125,000,000 people); it belongs to Great Britain, Australia, and Holland, so that each of the European powers having the greatest stake in this region would be called upon to make some concession. It is a fertile country and is supposed to contain considerable mineral wealth, although not a great deal is known regarding the quantities present, as but little mining is actually being carried on; the area in plantations is very small (probably less than a hundred thousand acres) and native agriculture occupies a negligible area; lastly, the population probably does not exceed one million and could

readily be placed on reserves not exceeding a few thousand square miles if race amalgamation did not prove feasible.

Because of the very slight economic development in New Guinea the questions arising in connexion with the compensation of governments and private owners for actual improvements would be relatively easy to settle. The amounts involved in paying for them would not be large and would not cripple the Japanese in a program of development.

If, after Japanese settlement is well under way and prospecting for mineral resources has been thoroughly done, it appears that New Guinea does not contain the mineral resources the Japanese are in need of, then other arrangements would need to be made. It has already been shown, for example, that Mindanao, in the Philippines, has but a small population and very considerable amounts of iron ore. This island, or at least parts of it, might be given to the Japanese for exploitation, or might be exploited jointly by the Filipinos and the Japanese. Still other resources on other islands might be made available to the Japanese through joint exploitation (Japanese, Dutch, and British) if the Japanese can show that they clearly stand in need of them. In this way Japan's very urgent economic needs might be met without any serious interference with the development of any other power. There is room for all, for several generations at least, if the possessing powers are willing to make concessions by recognizing need as the basis on which resources should be made available to the powers now entering the expansive stage.

The conditions on which new lands and resources are allotted to any people should, of course, be such that the welfare of the people making concessions is not placed in jeopardy. With an honest effort to meet the actual situation the attainment of essential justice between civilized peoples

should not be impossible. It certainly does not speak well for either our intelligence or our moral candour if we are unable or unwilling to face the facts and find a reasonable solution of our difficulties. It would seem as though perhaps we had reached a period in the development of our modern world when we could use a moderate amount of common sense in the settlement of the economic disputes between nations.

### 7. Colonies and the Mother Countries

It is also often supposed that if Japan were to have colonies, these colonies would become integral parts of the Empire and could be fully relied upon to back up any policies that might be promulgated at Tokio. It is, of course, impossible to speak with assurance on such a matter. It is pertinent, however, to call attention to the experience of Great Britain in this respect. The people in the Thirteen Colonies soon found that they had interests quite opposed to those of Englishmen and would not brook interference in their affairs. Thus Great Britain lost the richest area in the world. Today Canada, Australia, and South Africa are, for all practical purposes, separate nations. One hears the frequent complaint from Englishmen that they are ungrateful children, particularly when the economic and immigration policies of these countries are under discussion. Is there any reason to suppose that after several generations the Japanese immigrants to New Guinea or Borneo will be more disposed to follow blindly the statesmen in Tokio than the Canadians or Australians are to follow the statesmen in London? When British and Australian interests coincide, they work in full harmony; when they are divergent, Australia goes its own way — witness the present tariff and immigration policies in Australia. Colonies that

have gained strength and wealth have always been ungrateful upstarts in the eyes of parent countries, and Japanese colonies would probably be no exception.

In the very nature of the case, colonies develop differently from the parent country, and the inhabitants of the colonies come to feel that they belong in a different world with different interests and different aims in life. Often a visit to the mother country is the most disappointing event in the life of a colonist and he returns from it a far more staunch nationalist than when he set out. This is particularly true of the second generation and later. They are unable, generally, to understand the life of the mother country and they feel fully as much strangers there as in any foreign land. The ties to the homeland become very tenuous, and the empire that was becomes a "commonwealth of nations," each pursuing its own course except on occasions when temporarily its course seems to be that of the mother country because they happen to coincide.

There is no reason to suppose that Japanese colonies would be different from others in the closeness of the ties to the mother country. Japanese colonists, like most colonists, would be economically better off than their relatives at home and would come to feel the same estrangement from the homeland as the others. They would soon become unwilling to be used for imperial purposes, just as the Australians and Canadians are today. The establishment of Japanese colonies does not mean, therefore, a proportionate increase in the power of the Japanese Empire. Indeed, it may very well be that in a short time, as the life of nations is counted, these very colonies the Japanese are so eager to establish now would be the chief agents in thwarting imperial designs. There can be little doubt that Japanese colonists will as much dislike the idea of being exploited in the interests of the ruling

class at home as other colonists and will stand out against it as vigorously.

To refuse to recognize the rights and the needs of the Japanese today for fear that they will grow into a strong empire at some future time seems, then, a very short-sighted policy in view of the experience of other countries with their colonists. It should also be noted that if the Japanese can secure the necessary resources, they are going to industrialize their country even more rapidly than in the past. This should materially assist in caring for the surplus population for some time, perhaps for a decade or two. There are limitations to such development, however, as we have already pointed out, even when it is not a question of available resources. Great Britain is finding this out to her great cost. But from the standpoint of population growth, industrial growth and its accompanying urbanization of population lead to the checking of rates of increase. Hence, if Japan had access to new lands for settlement and to reasonably abundant mineral resources, there is every reason to suppose that, after two or three decades, its rate of growth would slacken and in another decade or two the Japanese, too, would cease to be a "swarming" people.

#### 8. Birth Control Must Accompany Expansion

It must be recognized that colonial expansion is no solution of the problem of population pressure in Japan or any other country if it is not accompanied by the practice of birth control. There would, indeed, be "standing-room only" on the earth within a very few generations if the Chinese and Japanese, over four hundred millions of people, were to expand in the century and a half that lie ahead as the Europeans have in the last century and a half. If, for example, these peoples were to send out as many net emigrants

in proportion to their numbers as Sweden did during the eighties of the last century, they could send out about three millions annually and still have a large surplus for growth at home. Indeed, their birth-rates are such today that there would be a surplus of eight or ten million annually if their death-rates were as low as those of Europe.

It should also be recognized in connexion with emigration as a solution of problems of population pressure that almost never does emigration actually reduce the numbers of the homeland. Ireland is the only example of a European country in which the population has decreased since emigration set in on a large scale. Famine, emigration, and, more recently, the practice of birth control have reduced Ireland's population till it is now but little more than half of what it was in 1840. Everywhere else in Europe emigration has been accompanied by a growth in population at home. Thus Sweden has grown from 4,566,000 in 1880 to 5,988,000 in 1922, or 31.1 per cent in forty-two years; and during that time has sent out a net total of about 720,000 emigrants.

Emigration can, therefore, only be regarded as a temporary expedient for any people. It will keep the pressure on certain areas from growing much greater as long as there is abundance of new land, but it will not actually reduce the pressure to any great extent, especially among such large and dense populations as we find in the western Pacific. The Japanese must, therefore, make up their minds that their welfare demands a lower rate of increase as well as new lands and resources. But even such large expansion as proposed here will be of little benefit to the Japanese if they do not use the breathing-space thus given them to learn to control births so that the need for expansion will cease by the time the lands open for settlement in this area are exhausted. This may appear a truism, but statesmen apparently often forget it.

### 9. The Expansion of China

It may be wondered whether China can be given relief from over-population in a manner similar to that proposed for Japan. A categorical *no* must be the answer to this question. It takes money and time to prepare tropical lands for settlement. A highly efficient government like that of Japan can do this. For some time yet, assuming that the Nationalists are strong enough to keep China united, there will be no money for China to devote to the development of outside lands even if they were available.

Moreover, China still has lands in various parts of its vast area that are in need of development, and the settling of these will be the first concern of the new government when it has time to give to such matters. The settlement of these lands will come first for a variety of reasons. In the first place, there is already a considerable movement under way into Manchuria and a lesser movement into inner Mongolia. These movements will continue and will furnish an outlet for a good many millions (perhaps fifteen to twenty millions) in the next two or three decades. In the second place, as we have pointed out above (chapter iii), China proper contains great areas of land which cannot be made to yield a living so long as only hand tillage is employed. If, however, power farming could be employed, these lands could be made productive, just as the farms in the western part of our wheat belt can be made to yield great quantities of food only when farmed extensively with tractors and combines. Undoubtedly any strong central government in China will make possible the use of these areas before seeking colonies.

In the third place, there is already a large movement of Chinese into lands to the south and east. As has been pointed out above, Indo-China, the Straits Settlements, and the Malay

Peninsula are rapidly being penetrated by the Chinese. Perhaps two to three hundred thousand are going to these countries each year. A century hence there may be one great Chinese nation, with six hundred millions or more people, covering most of the area from Siberia on the north to Singapore on the south.

In the fourth place, China has larger mineral resources than Japan, although as compared with our own country they seem meagre. China can undoubtedly employ a good many millions in factories which will be built in the next few decades. Whether this development will constitute a genuine relief from population pressure is extremely doubtful, as has already been shown. For, unless the productiveness of the people in practically every kind of occupation is considerably raised, factories may simply throw people out of work and increase the actual pinch of poverty for a large part of the population. In time, however, the presence of these mineral resources in China should contribute to the improvement in standards of living as well as to the maintenance of the increased numbers that will be the first effect of any release of pressure.

But, as was said above, there is no possibility of even temporary relief for the entire Chinese people in migration or the development of industry. They are too many. The Chinese who go to Manchuria, Mongolia, Borneo, Sumatra, or the Malay Peninsula will find relief and will leave a little more space at home, but the only real relief for the entire people is to be found in fewer births. Even the most moderate standards of comfort in western Europe cannot be attained in China until births are limited to a marked degree. The younger Chinese who have come in contact with the West realize this and they will spread the knowledge that births can and should be limited. But this knowledge will spread

slowly because, as we have seen, the whole Chinese social system encourages great fecundity, and the inertia to be overcome in changing this system is enormous. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the Chinese will not appreciate the advantages of fewer births as well as any other people and that in the course of some decades they will not come to practise restriction. Here lies their only chance to live comfortably.

#### 10. The Expansion of the Malays

The Malays constitute the third great group of people in this region. They number possibly seventy millions at the present time. In any close competition they cannot hold their own with either the Japanese or the Chinese. Whether or not they will expand seems to depend upon the type of their contact with other races. Under Dutch tutelage in Java they have grown enormously in numbers, and under American control in the Philippines a similar growth is taking place. Under British control in the Malay Peninsula they are growing, but not so fast as in the other two areas, because of competition with the Chinese and Indians. It is doubtful if they would grow at all if left entirely to themselves. There would be ample room for the expansion of the Malays, as compared with other peoples, if they were left undisturbed in the Philippines, with the possible exception of Mindanao, and in certain parts of the Dutch East Indies: for example, Java, Sumatra, Celebes, and the smaller islands in their vicinity. It is a question for the future to decide whether a people like the Malays (*lazy, inefficient, careless of sanitation, and so forth*) can survive at all in a world where more efficient peoples are demanding room for expansion.

The Malays may revolt from Dutch, American, or British

rule and claim independence, but there is almost no likelihood that they will endanger the peace of the world by pushing into new lands. For this reason we need not concern ourselves further with them here.

## II. The Future of the White Race in the Western Pacific

Supposing that such an adjustment of population pressure as that suggested above would relieve the situation in the western Pacific for a century following its consummation, would the situation then be worse than it is now? Worse for whom? we must ask; and the answer is: Worse for the white peoples, either those who live there, like the Australians, or those who want merely to exploit these areas.

I cannot see that their position would be any more precarious than that it is now. Indeed, if Australia and New Zealand take care, in the interval, to people rather fully the lands where white men can live and work, they should be better able to defend these areas then than now even against the greater numbers of the other races. If in the meantime the Australians learn that their tropical lands are not a white man's country, as it seems very probable they will, they can choose the people to work it for them at leisure. If the land is in use, even though it does not belong to the actual tillers of it, there is less chance of invasion to secure it than if it were not in use.

Besides, the expansion of both Japan and China during this century is almost certain to bring them into conflict at many points. They will each be developing numerous economic interests that are antagonistic to those of the other, just as has happened among Europeans (including America) during the last century. The chances are that each will be more jealous of the aggrandizement of the other than at present, and that

each will be more eager to help prevent it than it now is. All this will be in Australia's favour, provided its temperate lands are well utilized.

The fear of an alliance between the coloured races against the white race appears fantastic in view of the way in which antagonistic economic interests are almost certain to develop between the coloured races as they become industrialized and come to take an active part in world trade. In the recent past the coloured races have had few points of contact with each other and they have all had unpleasant experiences with the white race. This might seem to lend some weight to the view that they would combine against the white race. But, of course, they cannot combine effectively until they have become Westernized to a considerable extent. In this very process of Westernization, however, they will develop many points of contact with one another and every contact is a possible source of irritation as well as of understanding. Unfortunately, it is much easier to become irritated and fight than to understand and adjust.

Recent developments in China have shown that the Chinese will become irritated with the Japanese as quickly as with the British under similar provocation. A Japanese-owned cotton mill is not less disturbing economically and mentally than a British- or American-owned mill; and Japanese merchants are out to make what they can, just as American merchants are. So we may expect to find that Chinese, Japanese, and possibly Malays in the western Pacific will be as ready to leap at one another's throats over economic gains as the rest of us. A century hence, this fact may be the greatest safe-guard of a white Australia if adequate measures have been taken to build up a fairly large white population in the meantime.

Then, too, there is always the possibility that race prejudice

may be mitigated as the races come into closer contact, have more opportunity to understand one another, and develop more similar standards of living and modes of conduct. At present such development seems rather remote, as does also the actual fusion of races by intermarriage, but a century hence racial problems may have assumed an entirely different aspect and may find our great-grandchildren little concerned over them.

## CHAPTER VII

### INDIA

India contains about 1,800,000 square miles, lying ~~quite~~ largely in the tropical and subtropical latitudes of southern Asia. Its population in 1920 was about 319,000,000, and, allowing for growth up to the present, at known rates, it probably is now close to 335,000,000. This is just about the size and populousness of China (including Manchuria) on the basis of the estimates used above. Thus India contains by far the largest body of people in the world accustomed to life in the tropics or near tropics.

Thanks to the British control of India we have a large amount of relatively exact information about its population, its agriculture, its mineral resources, its climate, its industries, etc.

#### 1. Population

The population of India was first counted in 1872. It then numbered about 206,000,000. As was said above, it was 319,000,000 in 1921. This is an increase of 113,000,000, or 54.7 per cent, in forty-nine years. But more than half of this increase in census numbers is due to the fact that between 1872 and 1921 new areas were enumerated from time to time and the enumerations were becoming more accurate. The real increase in population during this period was only about 54,000,000, or twenty per cent. Even this is a fairly large increase for an Oriental people and undoubtedly is to be attributed

largely to the benefits derived from British rule, in the form of better government, the beginnings of modern sanitation, the extension of the irrigated area, the development of internal transportation facilities, and the prevention of war between the different states. We have seen these same factors acting to reduce the death-rate in some of the countries of the western Pacific. It is obvious, of course, that a country like India, which for centuries has had a relatively large population, cannot have been increasing at the rate of approximately four per thousand per annum (that is, twenty per cent in fifty years) for any great length of time. This can be shown by the fact that if India had had but one million people in the time of Christ and this rate of increase (four per thousand per annum) had continued until the present, it would now have 2,048,000,000, or six and four-tenths times its 1921 population. But it is known that India was a populous land in the time of Buddha — over five hundred years before Christ. A great deal of the time since then the population of India must have been practically stationary. At times it may even have declined. For, supposing that there were twenty millions of people in India in Buddha's day (a most conservative estimate) and the increase has been continuous and steady since then, the rate of increase, instead of being four per thousand per annum, would have been only one and one-tenth per thousand per annum. Any country in the West that had this rate of increase today would be thought to be practically stationary, for it would only double in numbers in about six hundred and thirty years.

In three of the five intercensal periods since 1872, India has had a rate of increase only slightly higher than this. This almost stationary population should perhaps be regarded as more normal in India than the fairly rapid increase since 1872.

Among a people such as the Indians, the growth of population, or its lack of growth, as the case may be, is due to the amount of disease and hunger that prevails during a given time. The birth-rates are always high except in periods of unusual distress. They vary somewhat from year to year, it is true, but on the whole they are remarkably steady. Of course, any great catastrophe that raises the death-rate for a year or for several years will result in a decline in the birth-rate in the following years. But in a country like India the death-rate is far more variable than the birth-rate, because disease and famine, the two great positive checks, affect the former more than the latter.

The birth-rate and death-rate in India have both been rising somewhat in recent years if we may trust available statistics.

Table VI  
Average Birth-rates and Death-rates in India for Given Periods

Periods	Births per 1,000 population	Deaths per 1,000 population
1885-90	35.83	27.44
1891-1900	35.43	31.31
1901-10	38.18	33.94
1911-20	36.93	34.13

No doubt most of this rise in rates is apparent rather than real. The better registration of births and deaths in recent years is quite sufficient to account for the changes noted. In certain years, however, the rates vary greatly from the averages given and of course affect these averages. Thus in 1918-19 the influenza epidemic wiped out almost all the increase in population that had taken place since 1911. The recorded deaths due to influenza were about eight and one-half million, and on account of the complete break-down of the registration machinery the actual number was probably sever-

1a millions more. The recorded death-rate in the year 1918 was of 46 per thousand of the population and the actual death-rate was no doubt well over seventy. This alone would raise the average death-rate for 1911-20 above that for some of the preceding decades in which no such plague ravaged the country.

But famines and plagues are not uncommon in India, and not infrequently the death-rate exceeds the birth-rate. We have in famines and plagues causes of high death-rate which are catastrophic in nature and hence attract considerable attention. But even in a decade (1901-10) when, on the whole, conditions were favourable and the growth of population was large, the following description is given of famine and disease as affecting population growth:

"The next decade, 1901-1911, was free from any serious wide-spread famine, though crop failures occurred over a wide area in 1907, extending from Behar to the Punjab and Bombay and famine conditions prevailed in the United Provinces and in a few districts elsewhere. This period has been characterized as one of 'moderate agricultural prosperity' for the country as a whole.

"The real increase of population in this decade was 6.4 per cent. It would have been greater but for disease. Malarial fever took a heavy toll of mortality in the irrigated tracts of Eastern and Central Punjab, and the Ganges-Jamuna Doab in the United Provinces, where in 1908 alone the reported mortality from 'fevers' was nearly two millions. The Punjab, the United Provinces and Bombay suffered severely from plague; the total plague mortality was estimated to be 6.5 millions, of which over one-third occurred in the Punjab."<sup>1</sup>

If one follows the occurrence of famines and plagues, one finds that they are so common in India that what seems to be

<sup>1</sup> Brij Narain; *Population of India*, pp 6-7.

the unusual and catastrophic to the Westerner is really quite customary in India, and scarcely a decade goes by without several outbreaks of disease and some local famines which carry off millions of people. In other words, famines and epidemic diseases are chronic causes of a high death-rate in India. If for a few years the country is comparatively free from them, as in the decade 1881-90, the death-rate (27.44) falls and there is a large increase of population. But with this increase to be supported on lands already taxed almost to capacity the following decade or two is likely to see a large increase in deaths.

The fact seems to be that a very considerable part of India's population is under-nourished most of the time. This means, of course, that they are a comparatively easy prey to disease when it breaks out in virulent form. It also signifies that *under present conditions* in India the population is constantly pressing on its means of subsistence and that the general hardship of life is at the bottom of a death-rate averaging thirty to thirty-four over several decades. The meaning of such a death-rate can be better understood if it is recalled that our own averages about twelve at present, and that the age constitution of our population is less favourable to a low death-rate than that of India's population.

## 2. Expansion of Agriculture

There is little doubt that in India poverty is the chief cause of the high death-rate, inasmuch as most of the more immediate causes (famine and disease) are more or less closely related to poverty. The causes of poverty are, in turn, numerous, but the principal one under present conditions is the density of population in relation to the agricultural resources available. This is not to say that an absolute limit to the

capacity of the land to support people has been reached; for conceivably another people equal in numbers but with a different social and economic organization might be able to live better on the same territory. Every people has its own economic optimum population in relation to the resources available and its own social organization. In many parts of India where only agricultural resources are used and where custom and tradition in a thousand ways restrict the use of these, the economic optimum population has been passed and the people are suffering grievously from over-population. Until some change takes place in methods of production which will result in a greater return for a given amount of work, or until more land is available, increase in India's population will, in many parts of the country, be accompanied by a decline in the standard of living and more severe pressure on the means of subsistence. This will in turn be reflected in an increase in the death-rate.

Some people think that this state of affairs is already general and that the increase in the death-rate shown by the registration data in recent years is evidence of this increasing pressure. As was said above, it appears to me that most of the indicated increase is due to better registration; but it is by no means improbable that poverty is becoming more severe in some sections of the population. It is certainly no light matter to crowd some fifty-four millions more people into a territory like India in the course of half a century. For India is not a country in which the area of tilled land can be increased rapidly. Irrigation works can be developed only slowly and at great expense, while land suitable for extensive cultivation with power machinery, but not usable under the more intensive methods customary in India, can only be brought into use with great difficulty. Semi-arid lands, for example, yield but small returns per acre and must be tilled

extensively in order to return a living to the tiller. To get the machinery necessary to use them involves a large capital expenditure. Not much capital is available in India for such purposes. Furthermore, the people themselves, not being accustomed to this kind of tillage, would be extremely reluctant to engage in it. It is, therefore, anything but easy to extend the tilled area in India even when the rainfall, topography, and soil are not hindering factors.

As a consequence of the slow pace at which material changes take place in India, a very considerable part of the country is over-populated today. This fact is stated over and over again by Indian officials, both British and native, who are in a position to know the facts. On the other hand, there are those who believe that the failure of the Indians to cultivate the land in the most efficient manner possible, and the failure to develop factory industry, indicate that there is no pressure of population or at least that it is not serious. Such an attitude is undoubtedly due to failure to realize that very severe population pressure may arise while there is still the possibility of greater total production, but not of greater production per head *under the existing conditions*. Only such a misconception could account for the following statement by the census superintendent of the United Provinces.

"The conclusion of the whole matter is obvious, but it is so important that I may be pardoned for emphasizing it. The population reacts extravagantly to conditions of health. And this reaction completely cancels any reaction there may be to agricultural, economic or commercial conditions, which latter reaction, if it occurs at all, is so slight as to be negligible. Possibly this may be true of all tropical countries. But it appears to suggest, what is also suggested by the population figures when examined from other points of view, that congested though the Province may be, the limit of pressure of

population on the soil is not yet in sight, and that in the absence of severe epidemics there is no present reason why the numbers of the people should not continue to increase.”<sup>2</sup>

A previous census superintendent (1911) in the same province has a clearer view of the situation in the eastern districts:

“The pressure on the land has long been considerable in these tracts, and must still be very great, though plague has ruthlessly relieved it.”

And again:

“There were signs ten years ago that the most densely inhabited tracts in the Province, the Eastern Plain and the Eastern Sub-Himalayas, were beginning to feel seriously the pressure of the population on them; but the pressure is relieved, not by internal emigration to other parts of the Province, but by emigration to the east, to Bengal, and Assam, and it was the growth of this emigration which showed that the tract was getting over-populated. But the pressure now is far less than it was ten years ago, for plague has proved a terrible though effective adjunct to emigration in relieving it.”<sup>3</sup>

When it is found that the population of certain areas “reacts extravagantly to conditions of health,” it would seem rather obvious that these “conditions of health” might have an intimate relation to economic conditions, and the facts seem to bear this out even though some of the census officials deny it and also deny that there is any connexion between emigration out of a province and the economic or agricultural conditions existing there.

The facts show that in many districts there has been a decrease in population in the last fifty years, in others there has been little or no increase, while in new areas, especially some of the new irrigated areas, there has been a rapid

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Brij Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted by Brij Narain, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

increase. There has also been a great deal of migration from the less prosperous to the more prosperous parts of the country, and whenever emigration was possible, there has been no lack of emigrants.

One need not argue the point as to whether there are more people in India than it *can* support. There are never more persons in an area than it *can* support. Their presence proves this. But there may be so many people living on the resources of any given area that with their mode of life they suffer want and privation and are unable to withstand disease and protect themselves from its ravages. This is the condition in many parts of India today and it seems merely a useless quibble to say that there is not over-population because under other imaginable conditions the country could support a larger population at better standards of living.

The important fact regarding India's population from the standpoint of our interest here is not that there *is* increasing pressure of numbers on agricultural resources, although we believe that there probably *is*, but that the Indians are coming to *feel* that the pressure is greater. This seems to be a fact about which there can be no dispute and this is the important fact from the standpoint of the relation of population pressure to war. The *absolute* difficulties of life in any given area are not so important in creating unrest as the hardships which people *feel*. It is not at all necessary that life become more difficult to maintain at a given level, in order to have people *feel* that it is more difficult. In fact, it is very easy for people to come to *feel* that they are being deprived of things they have never had.

There is not much doubt that the situation in India can be somewhat changed — we hesitate to say relieved — by the better utilization of the land. The providing of irrigation on dry lands will extend the arable area, and the im-

provement of farming methods will increase yields on land already tilled. The development of extensive agriculture in certain areas will also help the opening up of parts not hitherto well settled. For example, the opening up of new areas in Burma and Assam, where over a million Indians from other parts are to be found today, will give some of the more restless spirits a chance to pioneer; but it is more than doubtful whether these extensions of agricultural areas within India will actually furnish much relief to the population of India. For we have seen above that famine, disease, and a general hardness of life are the controlling factors in population increase. If new lands within the country are opened up, they will soon be settled to capacity, using present methods of production; if better methods of cultivation are adopted, they will but enable more people to live on the same land at customary standards, and when poor years come with the failure of the monsoons, as they are certain to do, the famine will be all the more deadly. As long as hardship and catastrophe are the controlling forces of population growth in India, the palliatives applied there are more or less likely to prove boomerangs. There is no real relief for such a country save the restriction of births, although emigration on a large scale would give temporary relief to certain areas and, of course, to the emigrants themselves.

It has been shown above that the increase in India's population over a long time cannot have amounted to one per thousand per annum. It is not known what would be a reasonable death-rate for a tropical people, but there is little doubt that it can be cut from thirty-three to eighteen or twenty with the improvement of sanitation and the elimination of famines. If, then, the death-rate were reduced to eighteen or nineteen, the birth-rate could be reduced to nineteen or twenty and India would still have a larger

increase on the average than it has had for some centuries past. As long as the birth-rate is fifteen to twenty per thousand higher than a reasonable death-rate, there can be little or no permanent improvement in the standard of life in India. Any increased product will shortly be needed to fill the additional mouths with rice and will not be available for sugar to add to the rice.

Many people seem to forget this expansive power of population under such conditions as prevail in India and assume that if there is over-population under an agricultural regime, it is because of the inefficiency with which it is carried on. They believe, therefore, that if agriculture can be made more efficient and other kinds of work which are more productive can be made available, the situation of the masses will be permanently improved. The new kinds of work they have in mind are, of course, to be found in factories. They believe that since factory work is more efficient than hand work, its adoption generally will relieve the poverty of the masses of the people. Since I do not believe that factory industry can be developed very rapidly in India, or that it will relieve the poverty of the masses for a long time to come even if it is developed largely, I shall take time to set forth briefly my reasons for this belief.

### 3. Industrial Development

In a country like India the growth of factory industry must necessarily be slow and, far from relieving pressure on the land, its first effects are to increase this pressure. In its first stages of development in an old, well-settled country, machine industry throws large numbers of hand-workers out of employment. This is a well-known fact. Now, the only thing these people can do is to hire out as labourers on

the land. There is no other outlet for their work. The fact that there has been an actual increase, in recent years, in the proportion of the Indian people directly dependent upon agriculture proves that this has been happening there. More people on land already intensively tilled means but one thing — increased pressure of population and a lower standard of living. There is very good reason to think that in India the displacement of village and cottage industry by factory work is being accompanied by a real decline in the individual productiveness of large sections of the agricultural population, which constitutes three-fourths of the whole. This development necessarily results in a large amount of unemployment for the artisans of the villages when the customary articles of local manufacture are made in factories. Furthermore, there is a great deal more under-employment for the agriculturists who were also accustomed to supply their own needs for cotton yarn, etc., by working at such occupations during slack seasons in agriculture. This unemployment and under-employment following in the wake of industrial development in thickly crowded countries is likely to cause considerable hardship in these countries for a long time to come.

The adjustment of a population to a new method of production is an exceedingly difficult matter, as we well know from the history of the industrial revolution in Great Britain. But it was as nothing there compared with the adjustments necessary in countries like India and China. Indeed, these adjustments are so difficult that it is doubtful whether they can be accomplished at all in India unless large emigration outlets are provided for those thrown out of work by the adoption of machines. There are many careful observers of Indian life who believe that the industrialization which has already taken place in India has had the effect of

increasing the poverty of great sections of the population so that they are now worse off than they were fifty or a hundred years ago.

Now, it is quite obvious that if any considerable proportion of India's population is growing poorer, the possibility of extending home markets for machine-made goods is very small indeed. The great need of India is more steady productive employment for a great majority of the village population. This should be an employment which will add directly to the real income of the family. The most obvious source of this employment, of course, would be more land, but, as we have seen, this cannot be readily provided; hence we have the movement looking towards the revival of hand spinning in the villages. It is not at all fantastic, as it may at first appear, to hold that the welfare of the people at large will be increased by a return to more primitive methods of production. Any employment which can be made to contribute to the real income of the worker is clearly better than under-employment; and when three-fourths of the population is seriously under-employed, it may well be that a return to a primitive type of hand work will, by reducing this under-employment, add materially to the welfare of the average family. It is impossible, then, to see how there can be any considerable increase in machine industry as long as the population remains so poor and as long as the workers who will be displaced in the process can find no new lands on which to settle.

It is perhaps not generally realized that as many as ninety per cent of the families in India have incomes of less than fifty dollars per year. Can such people buy much machine-made goods? If this pittance is still further reduced by under-employment attendant upon the development of machine industry under a capitalistic regime, how can one reasonably

expect any increase in the market for manufactured goods.

The very condition of the existence of over-population in India is the greatest possible barrier to the rapid development of more productive machine industry. India lacks a market, and modern industry, by itself, is powerless to create one. If India had half its present population, its market for machine goods would probably be much greater than it now is because the tillers of the soil would be more fully employed and would have a surplus above actual needs to exchange for these "extras."

Not only does the machine industry already developed injure the earning power of those whose employment it decreases, but it also fails to improve the status of its own workers, because, as is customary in capitalistic society, its labourers are paid competitive wages and in this case competitive wages are practically the subsistence wages of the under-employed agricultural labourers. There is little excess here available for the purchase of aught beyond the barest necessities. The factory worker has almost nothing with which to buy his own products.

As regards the possibility of developing export industries, India will be greatly handicapped by its late entrance into this field. Competition is keen now and is becoming more so. Great Britain is finding it steadily more difficult to maintain its position and is almost sure to lose trade in certain lines for which it is not especially well equipped by nature. How much more difficult is it going to be for a new-comer among industrial countries to secure markets unless there are some fields in which it has decided natural advantages over those countries already in the field! It does not appear that India has such unusually good resources of any kind that it has large natural advantages in supplying foreign markets. It is

true that it does possess abundant iron-ore deposits of high quality in close proximity to coal and not far from the sea; but it is not so well circumstanced in this respect as several other countries because its coking coal deposits are not large, only sufficient to last about forty years at the present rate of increase in consumption.

Labour is very cheap in India; but it is no cheaper than in China, if as cheap. Furthermore, it is exceedingly doubtful whether cheap labour is really cheap and it is also doubtful whether, if cheap in the early years of industrial development, it will remain cheap for any great length of time. The experience of Japan indicates that cheap labour does not stay cheap very long. The very conditions under which modern factory industry must be organized and its workers mobilized into comparatively large groups make it difficult, if not impossible, to keep the workers living at a low peasant standard for any great length of time. Their wants increase almost as fast as their production, so that there is little to be hoped for from low wages in the competition for world trade on purely economic grounds.

But even if cheap labour remains cheap, the tariff policies of most countries remove the last vestige of hope of exploiting cheap labour to capture world markets. For the desire of men in all countries to keep the profits of machine industry at home is resulting in the building of tariff walls higher and higher. It appears not unlikely that in the future the trade between nations will tend to become a smaller proportion of all trade and that it will consist more and more of the exchange of those products for whose production each country has special aptitudes either because of abundance of natural resources or because of the special skill and ability of its people, or of those articles for the manufacture of which materials are lacking in the importing country.

It does not seem reasonable, therefore, to expect that a country like India can absorb any of its increase in population into the machine industries for a long time to come. The development of factory industry will be extremely slow at best and may even receive a set-back from time to time, as is not unlikely to happen to machine spinning and weaving under the stimulus of a rapid development of nationalism, the urge of increasing poverty, and the leadership of a man like Gandhi.

The introduction of factory industry into a country like India is, then, by no means the simple thing it appears to us Westerners. It has far-reaching effects on the lives of the people which it is difficult for us to understand and its immediate effects are by no means wholly beneficial. It does no good to talk of the benefits of the new system "by and large" and "in the long run." People cannot live on *tendencies*. They must have something more substantial; and hand labour, though far less efficient, may prove more substantial under certain conditions than factory industry. We should not forget that the spread of machine industry in the West has been accompanied by the most rapid acquisition and settlement of new lands of high quality that was ever known. Forgetting this fact leads many people to suppose that the relation between standards of living and the intensity of machine industry is the important relation rather than that between land and the standard of living. Power machinery is after all only a means of extending men's reach in the use of land. If men become so thick that there is no need of extending their reach, then the benefits of power machinery are questionable. In this country our civilization is based on extending our power over land (including all of its resources) by the use of machines because there were never enough of us in these new lands to make good use of them without this extension.

In India (and China) there is not so much room for extending man's power by use of machinery because there are too many people needing the work. In the West power machinery is taking the place of people and we have a declining birth-rate; in the East people are cheaper than machinery and are used to exploit the land. As yet there is no displacement of births by machines.

The Indians and the Chinese are right when they protest that modern industrialism cannot be transplanted bodily from the West to the East. The economic organization of a people is just as much a part of its civilization as its literature or its art. It is a part of the adaptation which has been made throughout the ages to all the manifold conditions of its life, and it cannot be shifted and changed at the behest of every chance comer. Furthermore, the outsider is seldom in a position to understand and appreciate the values that a people finds in its own mode of life. He is largely unaware, therefore, of the greatest inherent difficulties standing in the way of the introduction of novelties from without.

#### 4. Improvement in India's Situation

The basic conditions in India, then, are not such that we should expect any rapid improvement. New land is not readily available; custom and tradition in innumerable ways prevent the best use of the land already in tillage; machine industry cannot expand rapidly because markets are not to be found for the products; the population is growing more rapidly than in the past; and emigration on any adequate scale to relieve pressure permanently is simply unthinkable. This does not mean that things cannot be bettered. It does mean, however, that the process will be very slow at best, and that there is great danger both to India and to the world in

attempting to force processes which will add to the exploitation value of the country.

The educated people in India, as, indeed, in all parts of the East, are no longer blind to what is happening in the world. They are in a position to see into the underlying economic motives of peoples and nations as never before. The white man is under suspicion, and if he is to make for himself a position of respect and honour (we will not say retain a position of respect, as a thing can scarcely be retained if it is not first possessed), he must change his tactics and in a spirit of frank goodwill join with these peoples in the effort to improve their life. The white man is known as an exploiter, contemptuous and ruthless, and as such he is suspect. It is little wonder that the Indian feels aggrieved at white men and has little confidence in them. We should feel the same if we were in his position.

Of course, much of the bitterness in India towards Great Britain is not a result of its present economic situation, although no doubt this is an aggravating factor in most relations. If the economic situation were improved, however, others matters would be easier to adjust. I believe that Great Britain has it in its power to offer the Indians opportunity for a considerable amount of temporary economic improvement, through expansion to new lands, as will be shown in the succeeding chapter. I also believe that the danger of revolt in India would be materially lessened if these lands were to be opened to them.

No doubt there are many who will feel that a revolt in India is a purely domestic affair for Great Britain, and that suggesting means for preventing such a revolt is not within the province of this book. I do not believe so. I believe that a revolt in India greatly concerns all of us who would like to see the differences between peoples settled by peaceful means.

My reasons for this belief may be stated here briefly as I shall recur to them in later chapters.

There can be very little doubt that if Great Britain were occupied rather fully by revolt in India or were to lose its grip there, Japan and Russia would be ready to profit thereby as seemed best under the conditions — Japan in the western Pacific, as we have already noted, and Russia by the extension of Sovietism in western Asia. In a word, the strategic position of Great Britain is such that if it were to become rather heavily embroiled in India, the present balance of power in the world would be upset and those peoples who feel that they have been treated badly would have the chance for the redress of grievances for which they are waiting. Thus it comes about that any disturbance which is likely to occupy Great Britain's attention rather fully in one quarter for any considerable length of time is quite likely to be the signal for trouble in other quarters where it is exercising repression.

From the standpoint of world peace, therefore, it is important that the Indians should not be driven nearer to revolt by too rapid industrialization and by being kept from settlement on unused lands which would temporarily relieve their economic distress.

## CHAPTER VIII

### WHERE CAN THE INDIAN GO?

A study of the rainfall map of the northern Indian Ocean shows that in a large part of this area from India to equatorial Africa the rainfall is less than ten inches annually and that in most of the rest of it there is less than twenty inches a year. It is obvious, then, that there is little chance for the expansion of India's population into those lands nearest at hand. Persia, Afghanistan, Arabia, and British and Italian Somaliland offer little opportunity for close settlement. These lands are thinly settled now and so far as can be foreseen will never be able to support a dense population. Only in a few spots, where irrigation is possible, can people live with a density approximating that of large parts of India. As areas of expansion for India, then, there are no suitable lands on the Indian Ocean north of the equator. It is not until Kenya Colony (lying across the equator) is reached that lands suitable for settlement by the Indians are found in abundance. From Kenya Colony to about twenty-seven degrees south—that is, to South Africa, and extending inland perhaps a thousand miles—there is a vast and fertile tropical area which is very thinly settled (see map preceding chapter ii). To this we may add Madagascar, having about 240,000 square miles, because it, too, is almost empty (about fifteen persons to the square mile in 1926) and in climate and soil is much like the neighbouring mainland. Only a very small part of this entire area, less than ten per cent in fact, has a population of more than twenty persons per square mile.

Table VII

Area and Population of Countries Around the Indian Ocean			Per cent of total population	Per cent of total population	Density of population, 1920	Estimated population, 1928
	Area in square miles	Population, c. 1920				
India	1,805,332	26,13	318,942,480	82.23	1,76.67	335,000,000
Afghanistan	250,000	3,62	12,000,000	3.09	48.00	12,000,000
Persia	628,000	9,09	9,000,000	2.32	14.33	9,000,000
Arabia (including Oman and Yemen)	1,000,000	14.48	10,000,000	2.58	10.00	10,000,000
Abyssinia	350,000	5,07	10,000,000	2.58	28.57	10,000,000
British Somaliland	68,000	0.98	300,000	0.08	4.41	300,000
Italian Somaliland	210,000	3.04	750,000	0.19	3.57	750,000
Kenyo Colony	208,320	3.02	2,400,000	0.62	11.52	2,700,000
Uganda	117,700	1.70	3,072,000	0.79	26.10	3,200,000
Tanganyika	365,000	5.28	4,124,000	1.06	11.30	4,400,000
Portuguese East Africa	428,000	6.20	3,120,000	0.80	7.29	3,200,000
Northern Rhodesia	287,950	4.17	983,500	0.25	3.42	1,200,000
Southern Rhodesia	149,000	2.16	899,000	0.23	6.93	900,000
Bechuanaland	275,000	3.98	153,000	0.04	0.56	160,000
Basutoland	111,716	0.17	498,780	0.13	42.57	500,000
Swaziland	6,678	0.10	112,800	0.03	16.89	120,000
Nyasaland	399,00	0.58	1,201,500	0.31	30.11	1,210,000
Union of South Africa						
Total population	472,347	6.84	6,928,580	1.79	14.67	7,700,000
White population	235,000	3.40	1,519,488	0.87	1,730,000	1,730,000
Madagascar			3,382,161	0.87		3,700,000
Total	6,907,943	100.0	387,867,801	100.0		407,770,000

The area of this region (including Madagascar), which we shall call east Africa for short, is almost the same as that of India (1,800,000 square miles), but it apparently contains almost twice as much good agricultural land as is now being tilled in India.<sup>1</sup> Within this area the total population is estimated at about nineteen to twenty millions, or approximately one-seventeenth that of India.

In this region, belonging chiefly to Great Britain, but including Portuguese East Africa and French Madagascar, we have a great undeveloped area of good land which would seem to be the natural region for the expansion of the Indians. It is relatively near at hand; in climate it is similar to India, and its population is so sparse (it averages between ten and eleven persons per square mile) that there is abundant room for a large Indian immigration and for large increase in the natives without undue crowding.

Furthermore, the Indian agriculturist is accustomed to growing the same crops to which most of this land is suited. If reasonable care were taken in directing early settlement in any given area, there is every reason to believe that the Indians would make successful agricultural colonists throughout this whole area. The experience of the few Indians already settled in certain of these lands also confirms the belief that they are well adapted to life in this region. In Kenya there are already some thirty thousand or more Indians. They are also to be found trading in most of the coast towns in other parts of east Africa, and many have penetrated considerable distances into the interior. There is no more reason to doubt that the Indian is adapted to life in this whole region than that the white man is not adapted to it.

<sup>1</sup> This estimate has been made on the basis of information contained in *The Vegetation and Soils of Africa*, by H. L. Shantz and C. F. Marbut, American Geographical Society Research Series, No. 13. The maps accompanying this study are particularly good.

Since this region is but thinly settled and there is plenty of good land available, why are there so few Indian settlers here? There are many reasons, but the most obvious is that they either are not encouraged to settle or are prevented from settling by the Europeans who control this area. A large part of the few Indians in this region have been brought in from time to time to build railroads, or to construct other public works, or as plantation labourers and then have been allowed to settle down and make their homes here. This is the history of the presence of the thirty thousand or more in Kenya. In general, however, not only has no active effort been made to encourage Indian immigration, but the migration of Indian agriculturists has been discouraged.

### i. Reasons Indians Are Not Wanted in East Africa

The reasons generally given for the discouragement of Indian immigration are: (1) This land belongs to the natives and is being held in trust for them by the white man. If the Indians are allowed to enter and settle, they will soon occupy a large portion of the lands and thus deprive the natives of their birthright. (2) The Indians, being politically disaffected, tend to spread distrust of the British among the natives and thus complicate the problem of government. (3) The Indians exploit the natives unmercifully and therefore must not be allowed to come in contact with them to any great extent. (4) The Indians, particularly those who are Moslems, spread their religious beliefs among the natives, and this is bad for both the native and the British inasmuch as it renders understanding between them more difficult.

It appears that in this case, as so often happens, a mode of conduct is justified by reasons which do not fully disclose the

real motives out of which it grows. It is a natural tendency in all of us to explain our conduct in terms which we think will put us in a favourable light before those listening to the explanation. The real reasons for the discouragement of the Indian settlement in east Africa are without doubt less creditable to the white man than those generally given.

Let us examine the reasons given, in order to find out if possible what lies behind them.

The first reason is that this land belongs to the native Negroes and that the white man must preserve it for him against the time when it shall be needed. This is felt to be a fine ideal and one which fully justifies the exclusion of an outside people from settlement on these lands—especially such a people as the Indians, who would be able to send out almost an unlimited number of immigrants and who, on these new lands, would multiply rapidly and soon occupy the major part of them.

From my point of view there are two defects in this line of reasoning. The attitude taken in this book is that no people has any moral right to hold lands out of use which are needed by other peoples. This would apply to the Negroes as well as the whites, and, indeed, the whites in going into thinly settled lands and assuming control and undertaking settlement have generally assumed the soundness of this position. One of the chief arguments in justification of the white man's exploitation of new lands has always been that he needed new lands and larger resources and that the natives in a large part of the earth were not using their lands and resources as well as he could; hence he felt that he was entitled to take control of them and put them to use. He is now finding that there is some truth in the homely expression that "chickens come home to roost." The same argument for the better, more complete use of lands would certainly justify the Oriental

peoples in taking the lands which the white man is not using as well as they could.

It seems not unlikely, then, that this theory of trusteeship which is particularly applied to Africa is only a cloak under cover of which other interests can be served. This cloak also apparently hides from the conscience some of the true motives and thus renders it quiet in the face of conduct that might disturb it if they were clearly and nakedly revealed. To the Oriental this certainly appears to be so. He sees in the history of the West during the last five hundred years or more a constant denial in conduct of the theory that lands should be preserved for the use of those who happen to live in them.

It appears to the man from the East that the Westerner has never hesitated an instant to dispossess the natives of any land he has wanted for his own use. If he has not wholly driven out the natives or exterminated them, he has enslaved them as far as was possible and made them serve him. The theory that he derives from the European's conduct as pictured in his history of expansion is that the only right is might. Nothing but force seems to him to count in the determining of the European's relations to other peoples. Thus, if the Oriental feels that the theory of preserving the lands of the African Negroes for them in the future is merely a high-sounding phrase devised to cover their exploitation solely by the Europeans, we can scarcely be surprised. Often it is not pleasant to see ourselves as others see us, and particularly is this true if the others are not properly appreciative of the values for which our civilization stands.

In order to help us understand the attitude of the Indian towards the conduct of the European abroad and in particular his feeling about his practical exclusion from east Africa, an example of British conduct in Kenya Colony will be given.

I preface this example by saying that, on the whole, the conduct of the British has been much less ruthless than that of other Europeans in Africa. But the example given will enable us to see why the Indian regards the claim that the white man is holding this land in trust for the natives as sheer hypocrisy.

In Kenya there are highland areas in which the white man can live in reasonable comfort even though they are under the equator. This was called by the British a "white man's country" and it was desired to reserve it for future white settlement. In order so to reserve considerable parts of it, it was necessary to clear out some of the native tribes, and this was done with what looks to the outsider like complete indifference to their rights and with much unnecessary suffering. It so happened that one of the peoples whose lands were coveted was a particularly friendly group of Negroes which had been of great assistance to the British in actually bringing the country under their control. They thus merited special consideration at the hands of their masters, but instead of receiving it, they were compelled to leave their native lands for much poorer lands in a less favourable situation. Moreover, the migration was not well planned and resulted in great hardship both in direct suffering on the road and through the loss of a very considerable part of their cattle, on which they depended for their living. All this in order to provide a larger subtropical area for British exploiters.

When this land became available, the British found that they needed labourers to develop it. For a "white man's land" in east Africa does not mean land in which the white man expects to do his own work as a settler in Canada or Australia would, but a climate in which he can live in moderate comfort and ease, provided he can get cheap labour to do the actual field work. It being necessary to have labour

now that the land was available, it was decided that the natives should work for the white man whether they cared to do so or not. It would be for their *good* to be kept busy and would prevent their getting into mischief and having so much time to "plot against the whites." The labour orders intended to furnish the workers are a matter of record, and though they have since been modified, there is no question that the ignorance of the natives is imposed upon by the whites in every conceivable way to get service out of them at a cost much below its economic value.

Many of the same natives who were driven out of these "white man's lands" have since been "recruited" for labour on them for certain periods each year. They are still working their own lands, but the produce (above mere subsistence) goes to the British adventurer.

Such instances of "ruthless exploitation" are not isolated cases. They are rather the customary thing in the contacts of whites and Negroes in Africa. Many ways have been found to force service from the natives at a low cost without resorting to anything that can be called slavery or the corvée. Among these various ways may be mentioned cutting down their land reserves and increasing their taxes.

Is it any wonder in view of what is actually happening that the Indian looks upon the "white man's burden" as a burden of gold wrung from the painful labour of the native races he is exploiting? The growing distrust of the Europeans by the Negro in many parts of Africa attests to the same belief that the white man is in Africa solely to exploit it and its inhabitants for his own benefit. This common grievance of the Negro and the Indian tends to draw them together when there is opportunity and probably accounts in large measure for the ease with which disaffection towards the government is spread among the

Negroes by the Indians, as alleged in the second reason given for not wanting the Indians in east Africa.

There can be no question but that from the standpoint of government a disaffected element in a subject population is extremely undesirable. They are the leaven which causes ferment in the whole body, or, at least, they seem so to the administrators. For administrators and those engaged in pure economic exploitation can seldom see that they themselves are the people who have prepared the medium in which the ferment can work rapidly. It is certainly not difficult to imagine that a tribe which has been dispossessed and given much poorer and more limited lands in order that their masters may make more money is easily led to believe that they are being badly used by the white government and that they will never get justice until they offer sufficiently stubborn resistance to this government.

Again, a band of Negroes comes back to their village from service on the plantations of the whites; they have probably been coerced to a considerable extent into going in the first place; they have been poorly paid and badly used while there and have been made to work more steadily than they are accustomed to; besides, they have less to sell to or trade with the Indian trader who visits them because they have been away and have not had a chance to hunt or raise crops of their own. Is it a matter to occasion any surprise that men in these circumstances listen readily to abuses heaped upon their white masters and are not loath to believe tales which make the white man's conduct appear fully as bad as it really is or even worse?

Then, again, the natives find one tax added to another until they are very heavily laden according to their standards. They cannot see that the labour they are compelled to spend on the roads, or that the money they pay as a "hut" tax,

does them any good. It all goes to pay the white man, who makes them do things they do not want to do or to build things that enrich their masters and render their own subjection more certain. Surely there is fertile soil here in which the agitator can sow the seed of discontent. Who is to blame for discontent among the natives under these conditions—the Indian agitator or the British administrators and exploiters?

It would seem to the outsider that the way to keep a more secure hold over the natives is not to exclude the Indian, but rather to remove the just causes he has for complaint and prove that the white man is a true friend by the kind of treatment he gives. To blame the agitator is much easier than to correct the abuses that create the conditions on which the agitator thrives. To rail at the agitator has always been a favourite pastime of those who believe that this is the best of all possible worlds, but it would seem to be about time for intelligent men to recognize that it is a futile procedure and undertake more effective methods.

The third reason given for not wanting the Indians in east Africa is that they exploit the natives unmercifully, and it is, therefore, the duty of the Westerners to protect the natives in this respect as well as in the possession of his lands. It is probably true that the Indians often take advantage of the ignorance and simplicity of the Negroes to make undue profit out of transactions between them. This would be particularly true in petty trade and money-lending. The ordinary white merchant or trader may scorn such transactions, but there is plenty of evidence to show that all over the world the European has never hesitated to take advantage of the native's ignorance of economic values or to drive a profitable bargain. The difference between the white man and the Indian is the difference between the established trader who can afford to give a fair deal and the indigent trader who

has no backing and who takes advantage of every device possible to get ahead a little.

In addition to sharp practices in trade the Indian is accused, and justly, of usury among the natives. Inasmuch as the most flagrant usury is common in India, it is not at all surprising that the Indians practise it in Africa. The reason the white man does not practise it is probably that he does not live in sufficiently close contact with the natives to make it possible, and, besides, it is such small business that he could not make a living at it. Certain it is that usurers (loan-sharks) are not an uncommon type of blood-sucker in Western lands.

When all is said that can truly be said about the nefarious practices of the Indians in their dealings with the Negroes in east Africa, it seems more than probable that the chief objection to their economic relations with the natives is to be found in the fact that they render the white man's exploitation of the Negroes more difficult and less profitable than it would otherwise be. Naturally this is resented and it certainly sounds better to object to the nefarious exploitation of the Negro by the Indian than to say that the Indian is not wanted because he makes them work harder to maintain their profits and renders their lives less pleasant than they would be if they did not have to compete with him. This is too frank an avowal of their own exploitative purposes.

The fourth reason for not wanting the Indian as given above is that he spreads Mohammedanism among the Negroes and thus creates trouble for the Christian government which is trying to control the native for his own good. There is apparently a very widespread feeling that Christianity and Mohammedanism are mutually antagonistic and that they cannot exist side by side. Whether this is so need not concern us here. There can be little doubt, however, that they are both aggressive, at least in their actual development, and that

adherents of either are almost certain to be restive under the domination of the other. It is, then, with the political consequences of Mohammedanism rather than its strictly religious features that this objection to Indian settlement in east Africa is concerned.

It would seem that if it is only the spread of Mohammedanism as a religion that is objected to, it would be a comparatively easy matter to select immigrants from parts of India where there are no Moslems and thus prevent the expansion of this religion by migration. After all, less than one-fourth of the Indians profess to be followers of Mohammed and it should not be difficult to pick settlers from the non-Moslem population.

The fact is that at the present time *every* Indian is a potential political agitator against Great Britain. As such he is not a desirable immigrant because if such people become numerous, the white man's grip on this part of the world is certain to be loosened. It is the fear of losing political control sooner than would otherwise happen that lies at the root of the objection to the spread of the Mohammedan religion.

Underlying all other objections to the settlement of Indians in east Africa is, as we have tried to make clear in this discussion of the reasons usually given, the feeling that their presence spells the end of white exploitation in this part of the world in the not distant future. Economically the white man cannot compete with the Indian in a new tropical country. The modes of living and standards of consumption of the Indian are so low that they can best the white man in an open competition. Furthermore, the Indian outbreeds him so rapidly that even if comparatively few were admitted, they would soon greatly outnumber him, and since they are not so docile and so easily managed as the Negroes, they do not furnish good material for long-continued exploitation.

On the political side the Indians very soon make claims for a share in the government and object to being treated as a distinctly inferior people unfitted to participate in political activities. When Kenya was changed from a protectorate to a colony, and the white inhabitants, numbering perhaps 12,000, gained a large measure of self-government, the Indians (about 30,000) immediately demanded equal political rights. This demand was, of course, not granted, with the result that there is much hard feeling and many of the Indians are doing all they can to increase the disaffection of the natives towards the British. This demand of the Indians was refused because the whites see very clearly that if the Indians are allowed to share in the government on a basis of equality, even if very high educational standards are required for the enjoyment of the franchise, it will be but a very short time before the Indians will be in control and white empire in Kenya will come to an end.

We should make it clear that Indian immigration into Kenya has not been stopped. They may enter on the same terms as other British subjects, but once there they are subject to so many restrictions in trade, in acquiring land, in place of settlement, and in political rights that they do not care to come in very large numbers. The few British exploiters in Kenya intend to preserve as long as possible their economic control of this area. Hence they wish to make it as unpleasant as possible for the Indians already there and to discourage others from coming.

## 2. Race Prejudice

Thus far the discussion has been confined chiefly to the economic, political, and religious objections to allowing the Indians to share freely in the development of east Africa.

There is one other objection, which is almost never mentioned in giving reasons for political actions, which is fully as important as any of these and sometimes is the most important of all. I refer to race prejudice.

Race prejudice, of course, is not a separate, isolated factor any more than the political factors in a given situation are independent of the economic ones and *vice versa*. But it is of great importance in contacts of Westerners with Orientals and must be given its place in any discussion of the expansion of races.

No matter how free we may think ourselves from race prejudice, we all prefer to live with "our own kind of folks" and will avoid contacts with those who do not belong to this category unless it is the contact of master with servant. This feeling is by no means confined to different races. It is present in all human relations where differences of a cultural nature exist. But when these differences, which naturally lead to a stratification of society, can be identified with a particular colour of skin or type of features, the stratifying process is speeded up because it is easy to tell who are and who are not "our own kind of folks." It comes about very easily, then, that the qualities we do not like in a different civilization and the personal qualities of those who belong to it that irritate us and seem to us unbecoming to "real folks" are fastened upon the race or class as a whole. In other words we generalize regarding races and classes from a few instances and of course always pronounce judgment from the standpoint of our own mental set. As often as not this point of view is extremely narrow and represents the ideas we have gathered in the course of living within the circumference of a very small circle.

It is inevitable, then, under our present conditions of life that race prejudice should very quickly arise when people

having marked differences in culture and physical appearance come into contact. It is also certain that the customs and habits of each will be despised by the other and that each will feel superior to the other. If it further happens, as it often does, that the races come into economic competition, we may be sure that great bitterness will arise between them; for each will regard the other as an obstacle in its path to success. In such competition, furthermore, the race having the higher standards of living will invariably fare badly and comes very easily to feel that all its troubles are due to the fact that the "inferior" race has not been kept in its place, both locally and socially.

These general considerations will enable us to understand more fully the race prejudice developing between the whites and the Indians in east Africa. Immigration of the Indians into east Africa always involves the white man in economic competition. Since the Indian has a lower standard of living and, from our standpoint, is lacking in business ethics and is also better adapted to living in the tropics, he frequently succeeds at the expense of the white man. Hence it is inevitable that the white man, who is generally a Britisher, should feel that the Indian is a very undesirable immigrant. He makes life harder economically for the white man and sometimes causes him to fail. This ruffles the white man's complacency and piques his race pride.

As compared with the native Negro, the Indian is economically efficient. He is often not content to remain a poor tiller of the soil participating only in the life of his own village and working at low wages for the white man whenever he is wanted. Then, too, his claims to a share in the government are most unreasonable in the eyes of the typical colonial administrator. Thus it happens that race prejudice is fanned to a glowing heat by the acquirement of economic

equality and by claims to political equality and later to social equality.

The result is that in a comparatively short time all relations between the races are complicated by a general prejudice involving every individual of both races. Facts are never seen except as coloured by this general prejudice and each race is looking for unworthy motives to discredit the other. The ruling race is afraid of encroachment on its power and wealth, and the ruled race is constantly on the look-out for slights and discriminations against it. In this frame of mind the possibility of the development of better relations between them becomes almost negligible.

It may be wondered why it is that the white man is so friendly towards (note the preposition) the Negro and opposes settlement by the Indian if race prejudice is such an important factor in this opposition at the present stage. The answer is that race prejudice does not become active and militant as long as one race accepts an inferior servant status and remains docile. In this situation often a very kindly relation grows up between master and servant, because the servant does not threaten the economic position or the political and social prestige of the master. In east Africa the Negro generally accepts this inferior status and makes little or no effort to become the "equal" of the white men economically, politically, or socially. He is still willing to be used as a tool for the purposes of the white man. In places where this is not so, we find the beginnings of active race prejudice. In time there is every reason to think that the claims of the Negroes will be much the same as those of the Indians and then they will be no better liked. The decisive factor in the contact of races determining mutual hostility or friendliness is whether one of them accepts docilely an inferior status and serves faithfully the interests of the other. As long as this

happens, things will move smoothly, but when claims to equality are made on the part of the serving class, we get active race prejudice. The history of the Negro in America will furnish many instances of this change of heart on the part of the whites. There is every reason to think that the exploitation of the Negro in east Africa will, in the not distant future, lead to the same feeling towards him that is now manifested towards the Indian. The Indian is only a few decades ahead of the Negro in his education as to the significance of the "white man's burden."

### 3. "White Man's Land" in the Tropics

It may not be out of place at this point to say a little more about what is meant by a "white man's country" in Africa and in the tropics generally. There are very few white men (a few Australians in Queensland are the most important exceptions) who believe that the white man can actually live and do manual work in the tropics.<sup>2</sup> Hence by far the greater part of the land within the tropics and for three to five degrees beyond them is conceded to be a coloured man's land so far as its actual occupation and cultivation are concerned. The white man may exploit it, but he can do so only if he is able to get away from the tropics frequently for relatively long vacations in the temperate regions. This appears to be particularly true of white women and children.

There are, however, mountainous and plateau regions within the tropics where the climate is much better for the white man on account of the altitude. These are often called "white man's land," meaning that they are fairly healthful places for white men to live in permanently. It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that the people who wish to

<sup>2</sup> For a brief statement of the writer's opinion, see *supra*, pp. 71-73.

reserve such areas for the white man really expect white farmers to settle there and do their own work and develop a white man's civilization. The idea is that white men with capital could live there for relatively long periods and manage estates, worked by the natives for a subsistence wage. Life could be pleasant for the whites in such regions if only the coloured natives would consent to be permanently docile. The white "settlers" in such regions could then furnish at reasonable cost much of the raw materials needed by the home countries. This is the real idea behind a "white man's land" in the tropics. It is the exploiter's notion of a fairly comfortable place to live for twenty to twenty-five years perhaps, while making his "pile" so that he can go back home and retire.

Without going into the matter in any detail it may be said that frequently these tropical highlands are considered by the natives as well as the whites the most desirable land. This is shown by the fact that they are often the most densely settled areas prior to white occupation. Hence if they are to be reserved for the whites, it is necessary to remove the natives, as in the instance in Kenya cited above. This is one way in which the white man preserves the land for the native. In any event the native works the land even though all but a subsistence wage may go into the pockets of the white man who holds title to it.

It will be seen at once that the white exploiter of "white man's lands" in the tropics as well as of other tropical lands is in effect an absentee landlord at all times, even though he may actually live on and manage the estate for some years continuously. The white man in these areas never identifies himself with the future of the country in any thoroughgoing fashion. He is always a member of a ruling caste first and treats the land and the natives as tools useful in attaining his

goal. In general this goal is to accumulate enough before he is fifty to enable him to go home and live in leisurely comfort among people who properly respect the strong and successful exploiter.

More and more the white man in the tropics is being seen as the pure exploiter by the resident coloured races, and his presence is being resented accordingly. It is time that he realized his inability to hold on in these regions and, making a virtue of what will before long be necessity, began to use his control over tropical areas to help in the rational adjustment of resources to population needs. In this way his presence there now and for some decades could be fully justified and he could be a true friend to the backward peoples while they are making the adaptations they must make to the conditions of a world in which economic and social life is changing very rapidly.

The whole of the white man's tenure in the tropics has no vestige of right save as might makes right. The coloured races are not slow to perceive this, and if the white man does not take steps to hand over these lands to peoples who need them, he may expect that might will be employed against him wherever and whenever possible. The white man's domination is peculiarly galling to the coloured races because it is mastery by an alien race in the interests of an alien civilization. It is not that the masses in India or Africa have not been exploited before the coming of the white man; it is rather that the white man introduces a new form of exploitation, which is more keenly felt because it is different from the customary burden and because the new burden can be readily identified with a small group of alien race.

#### 4. Great Britain's Responsibility for India's Restlessness

To return to the main line of thought in this chapter, we find that in tropical east Africa we have an area in which population is very sparse. It is also an area well suited to Indian migration. The chief reason, and the one that is really decisive in discouraging Indian migration today, is the desire of the British to keep this area for their own exploitation as long as possible. In order to do this they are willing to risk offence to a great people, densely crowded, who really need an outlet for expansion. That the British should object to Indian expansion as they do seems the more unjustifiable in view of the fact that they are directly responsible for the growing national and racial consciousness of the Indians. It is they who brought to India the knowledge of other lands and the system of transportation and communication which makes them conscious of new powers and therefore eager to attain new ambitions. This expansion of horizon is of the very essence of modern Western civilization and may prove to be the one quality that will justify its exploitative methods to future generations. However this may be, it is quite certain that if India had been left alone by the Western powers, it would not now be in ferment and would not now possess the power to throw the world into turmoil by disturbing the existing equilibrium between nations. Has Western civilization, in its efforts to subdue the earth, created in India a Frankenstein's monster which it cannot control?

It would seem a very simple and obvious duty of the powers that have created this ferment among the peoples of the Orient to find use for it. India is in the throes of a new birth and needs the means to satisfy larger cravings. These means exist and are largely in the control of the same nation that is responsible for the new India.

There can be little doubt but that if the British were to take the lead in developing a policy of Indian migration into east Africa, the French and Portuguese who own the parts not under British control would follow suit. They could not do otherwise once the Indians became well established in neighbouring lands. Furthermore, the Portuguese and the French, but the Portuguese in particular, have never shown the same repugnance to the social equality of races that the northern Europeans have. There would be little difficulty in assimilating the small Portuguese population in Africa into the Indian population that would enter. This is clearly shown by the way in which the Portuguese in Goa (on the mainland of India) have mingled with the Indians, and the two races have become one people. This same thing might happen in Madagascar with the French.

### 5. Indian and Negro Relations

There is one other aspect of the settlement of Indians in east Africa that is of great importance. It is the race relations of Negroes and Indians. If the effect of the immigration of Indians would be to create a race problem between them and the native Negroes, there would be good grounds for hesitancy in admitting them. Such is not the case, however. Intermarriage between the Indians and Negroes readily takes place. There is no colour bar, of course, and, besides, there is but little difference in standards of living. Thus in time there would grow up a single African race with a culture adapted to the conditions of life prevailing in east Africa. Such a mixed race would in all probability be better fitted to take its place in the organization of a world under modern conditions of life than the native Negroes. For there is much evidence that where social conditions are not adverse,

the children of race crossings exhibit many of the qualities of the race having the higher culture. It might be much better, therefore, for the future of the world, to have an east Africa peopled with a mixed Indian and Negro race, manifesting the predominance of Indian culture, than a pure Negro race. There is some reason to think that such a mixed race would be better able to hold its own in contact with the world at large than a pure Negro race. The direct contact of European civilization with peoples in the tribal state of culture has often proved fatal to them. The change is too great and our vices and diseases are too deadly for a people not adapted to them.

The settlement of east Africa by the Indians would, then, appear to be one of the ways of easing the strain in India and would also provide for the settlement and use of this now almost vacant land by one of the neediest of peoples. Of course, not even a vast area like this could long furnish relief to India if births remain unrestricted. But again we must say that the most effective promoter of birth control known today is prosperity. If the opening up of east Africa to the Indians relieved the pressure on a few millions who were more or less directly affected by access to new lands, it would aid very materially in the spread of the knowledge of birth control. Migration would break down the barriers of custom and tradition in family life and would thus open the way to the practice of contraception. With the large amount of travel back and forth between the new settlements and the homeland that would ensue, birth control within India itself would be given great impetus. If the new settlements could do nothing more than care for the people thrown out of work by the development of machine industry, they would do much to spread the practice of birth control, for by providing places for the displaced workers they would make more rapid industrialization of India possible and, as we

have seen elsewhere, industry and a high birth-rate do not consort in the modern world.

There is, therefore, reason to think that an outlet for the Indians as great as that of east Africa would very materially help in solving India's population problem. Throwing this area open to Indian settlement would most certainly contribute largely to a better understanding between Great Britain and India and thus render the Indians less likely to disturb the present balance of power than they will otherwise be.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Union of South Africa covers practically the whole of the southern tip of the continent of Africa below the latitude of twenty-seven degrees south — that is, from twenty-seven degrees south to thirty-five degrees south. In addition the Transvaal extends northward to latitude twenty-two degrees south, reaching into tropical Africa like a deep bay. The area of the Union is 472,347 square miles. If Basutoland and Swaziland, which lie wholly within the boundaries of the Union, but are not a part of it politically, are included, the total area is about 490,000 square miles and the total population in 1921 was 7,534,322. Of this total population only 1,523,296, or 20.2 per cent, were European. The remainder were largely Negroes, although there were somewhat more than half a million persons of mixed blood, principally white-Negro crosses, called "coloured" by the South Africans to distinguish them from the pure blacks, and about 165,000 Indians.

It may perhaps help us to realize the size of the Union of South Africa if we compare it with an area of equal size in the United States. The states of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico contain 458,587 square miles. If we add about one-third of Colorado we have an area of exactly the same size as South Africa and also containing practically the same population. Furthermore, it is not improbable that the agricultural potentialities of these two areas are much the same. It appears likely, however, that the mineral resources of South

Africa are considerably more abundant than those in these states, except for petroleum. On the whole, then, it seems likely that South Africa can support a larger population at the same standards of living than these three and one-third states.

The present density of South Africa is light — only about fifteen per square mile — as can be seen from the above figures. South Africa, however, like the states mentioned, has considerable areas which will support but a very sparse population. More than one-quarter of the total area receives less than ten inches of rain annually and must be classed as poor grazing-land; practically another fourth receives only ten to twenty inches annually. Some of this land having ten to twenty inches of rainfall is suited to dry land crops, but where water for irrigation is not available, its capacity to support people is low. When account is also taken of the untillable land in areas receiving more than twenty inches of rainfall annually we find that more than one-half of the area of the Union of South Africa is untillable. Much of this untillable land can be used for grazing, but at best it will support very few people per square mile. In this respect it is like grazing-lands of the states just compared with it. When due account is taken of these facts, it seems reasonable to assume that about nine-tenths of the population engaged in agriculture will always be found on approximately 200,000 square miles of the better lands and that this same land must furnish the food for eighty per cent or more of the total population of the Union unless imports are to be relied upon. The effective density of the population is, then, about twice the actual density and is about thirty to thirty-five per square mile of reasonably good land.

In making even a crude estimate of the population that could live on the agricultural products of the Union of South

Africa it is necessary to keep in mind the differences between the whites and the non-whites in the matter of consumption. At the present American standard of consumption, which is probably not greatly different from that of the whites in South Africa, the Union could probably support fifteen to twenty million white people. It could easily support more than double this number of blacks at their usual standards. If the population were to remain at its present proportions of one white man to four blacks, it might support seven to ten million whites and thirty to forty million blacks. This does not necessarily mean that ten million whites and forty million blacks could live in all respects as they are now living. This would depend upon a great many other factors as well as agricultural production—for example, the minerals present, the industrial development that can be based on them, the possibilities of the development of a market for these industries, the extent to which efficiency in all kinds of production increases, and a variety of other factors, many of which have to do with the moral fibre of the future population and the aims of life that they pursue. The point we are interested in making clear here is that the agricultural possibilities of the Union of South Africa are sufficient to furnish the food needed by a population several times its present size.

Here, as in many other places, the white man is holding a land which as yet he has settled but sparsely (about three white persons per square mile) and is using but meagrely. Is it likely that he will settle and use it to anything like its full capacity before he is forced to defend it against other peoples who really need it? What are the facts regarding the growth of population in the Union of South Africa and what do they indicate as to the racial future of this area?

### 1. Population Growth in South Africa

It may be said that there are two population problems in South Africa at the present time which are frequently spoken of as racial. It is unfortunate that the problems of adjustment between the Dutch and the British are ever spoken of as racial, for they are only cultural. There is not the least bar to intermarriage between these two groups except such as different cultural backgrounds always oppose to the ready mingling of groups. But this is not the case as between blacks and whites; hence the problem of their relations is of an altogether different nature. Only this latter problem is a real racial problem. It must be a matter of great regret to the more far-sighted men in South Africa that the politics of the Union often hinge upon the relations of the Dutch and British while little attention is given to the far more important problem of keeping South Africa "a white man's land." In order to understand the racial situation adequately it will be necessary to give considerable attention to the processes of population growth in South Africa.

The European (white) population of the Union has increased at a rate of about two per cent per annum since 1904, except during the war. The exact percentages are: 1904-11, 14.28 per cent; 1911-18, 11.40 per cent; 1918-21, 6.87 per cent; 1921-6, 10.34 per cent. Of this increase probably not over one-tenth is due to immigration (net). South Africa, then, has a rather high rate of natural increase, averaging about eighteen per thousand per year. This would lead to the doubling of the population in about thirty-nine years. During the period 1911-25, however, the birth-rate has been steadily falling, so that this rate of natural increase cannot long be maintained. A birth-rate of 31.11 per thousand of population in 1911-15 had declined to 27.2 in 1921-5, a decline of 12.5 per

cent in ten years, and it will no doubt continue to decline if it follows the same course in South Africa as in other countries of European settlement.

It is important to note further that in South Africa we again find proof that the Anglo-Saxons have ceased to be a "swarming" people which can settle new lands and "replenish" them. It is the Dutch who are adding by far the larger increment to the population—an increment considerably larger than their proportion of the white population.

In the most distinctly British state in the Union—Natal—the birth-rate is considerably lower than in the other states, which are more strongly Dutch. Thus in Natal the natural increase of the white population was 12.76 per thousand in 1925, while it was 17.65 in the other states; that is, it was 31.5 per cent greater in the more strongly Dutch states. But this is not all. The British have never settled on the land to any great extent. Being city-bred people, they have largely gone to the cities in South Africa, while the Dutch have stayed on the land. The rate of natural increase in the urban population of South Africa is only 13.26 per thousand, as compared with 22.66 for the rural population, or almost forty-one per cent lower than the latter. Whereas it would take the city population about fifty-three years to double, it would take the rural population only about thirty-one years.

That this difference in rates of increase between the Dutch and the British is a fact is further shown by the proportion of the children under seven who speak Dutch or English or both. In 1921 in the rural population 70.53 per cent of all the children under school age spoke only Dutch, as compared with eleven per cent who spoke only English. Of the 18.47 per cent speaking both Dutch and English the large majority are the children of Dutch parents; for, according to common opinion, the Dutch are more ready to learn English than the

British are to learn Dutch. Hence it is quite probable that about eighty-two per cent of the children in the rural population are the children of Dutch parents. This would mean that about 113,000 out of a total of about 138,000 rural children under seven are the children of Dutch parents, while only about 25,000 children in these communities are of British parentage. In the cities the British are a much larger proportion of the population than in the rural districts, comprising considerably over one-half of the white population, but, judging from the large proportion of the children under seven who are bilingual and from the well-known tendency of the Dutch to have their children learn English, it seems practically certain that the Dutch supply about one-half of the city children. It appears, then, that Dutch children actually outnumber British children almost two to one in the Union. But, even so, the Dutch in the cities can scarcely be called a "swarming" people. With immigration from Britain practically at a standstill now, however, the white population of South Africa will become increasingly of Dutch stock. In another generation they will outnumber the British by about two to one.

The facts of the relative increase of the Dutch and British in South Africa are of considerable interest from the standpoint of where the political control of the Union will rest, but they are of little importance as compared with the relative rates of growth of the European and the non-European groups.

On the surface the facts seem to indicate that the white population is more than holding its own with the non-European population, for between 1911 and 1921 the white population increased 19.1 per cent, while the non-white increased but 15.16 per cent. If, however, account is taken of the fact that the influenza epidemic of 1918 took a toll of about ten

per cent of the total non-white population, amounting to about half a million, while the excess deaths among the whites were only about 10,000, or about 0.6 of one per cent of the white population, it will be seen that under normal conditions the non-white population increases considerably faster than the white. Even though the white man's diseases and vices (drunkenness in particular) take heavy toll from the natives, they cannot be relied upon to prevent his increasing faster than the whites. This is shown by the rates of increase for the seven years preceding 1911 (the earliest period for which we have population data for all the territory now in the Union). During this seven years the white population increased 14.28 per cent, while the non-white increased 15.70 per cent. In the future, barring epidemics, the likelihood is that the blacks will increase considerably faster than in the past because every improvement in sanitation will cut down their death-rate, but will have little if any effect on their birth-rate, thus leaving a larger margin of births over deaths. Since the birth-rates among the natives are now very high, the potential increase is far above that of the whites, among whom the birth-rate is declining rapidly, as has been shown above. Unfortunately not a great deal is known about the birth-rates of the natives, but in the three cities where the registration of non-white births and deaths is believed to be fairly reliable, we find the following birth-rates (those in parentheses are for the whites): Cape Town, 53.94 (21.75); Port Elizabeth, 51.72 (28.03); East London, 56.06 (27.09). At present, on account of the very high death-rate of the non-whites, their natural increase in these towns is not so great as might be expected. It is as follows: Cape Town, 26.80 (11.44); Port Elizabeth, 14.14 (15.93); East London, 16.49 (14.91); but since there is no reasonable doubt that the death-rate of this part of the population will decline considerably in

the future while the birth-rate still remains high, it is practically certain that the non-white population of South Africa will increase considerably faster in the future than in the past and far faster than the white population. It may be stated categorically, then, that South Africa cannot long remain a "white man's land" unless the present white population is reinforced annually by a large contingent of white settlers and such settlers as have a high birth-rate. Before this question of white immigration into South Africa can be discussed satisfactorily, it is necessary to describe at some length the relations now existing between the whites and the blacks.

## 2. White and Black

Even more than in our "old South" the entire economic life of South Africa depends upon the Negro, the Negro-white crosses, and the Indians. This may seem a very strong statement, but the facts bear it out and the testimony of experienced observers is to the same effect. By way of comparison it may be well to recall that in 1860 the states that became the Confederate States of America were sixty per cent white and only forty per cent black. This is vastly different from the twenty per cent and eighty per cent, respectively, in these groups in South Africa today. The fact is that a very considerable part of the tilled land in our South, outside of the black-earth belt which was peculiarly suited to cotton culture, was always owned in small farms (fifty to one hundred acres for the most part) and was actually worked by the white owners, who were often called "crackers" or "poor whites" because they did not belong to the small slave-owning aristocracy. The changes wrought by the Civil War affected these people very little.

In South Africa today in contrast to our "old South" there

is no small-farmer class depending upon its own labour for its daily bread and raising huge families of children to become pioneers on new lands. Practically every farmer counts upon having his work done by blacks at slave wages—that is, at cost of subsistence. The great dependence of farmers on black labour is shown by the fact that, while there were 163,830 white men, fifteen years of age and over, engaged in agriculture on 81,432 farms in 1921, there were 368,122 Negroes and approximately 75,000 other coloured employees on farms at that date, making a total in round numbers of 443,000 non-European persons engaged in agriculture on these same farms. This is 2.7 coloured persons for each white man and is 5.4 coloured persons per farm.

These facts certainly render entirely credible the statement of travellers that practically every farm has native labour for the rough and unskilled work and that the white farmer considers it quite beneath his dignity to do what is called "Kaffir work."

Far more than in our "old South" it is becoming impossible for any white man to do any manual labour that is not highly skilled or of supervisory nature and yet retain his social station. It is little wonder, then, that the cost of establishing a man on the land is estimated at 7,500 to 10,000 dollars for general farming and at a much higher figure for many specialities. "Gentleman" farming always comes high and South Africa offers no exception.

It may not be amiss in this connexion to remind the reader that there are many parts of this country and Canada where an industrious young fellow can get a good start at farming with 1,000 to 2,000 dollars in cash, if he is favourably known in the community, and with 3,000 to 4,000 dollars he can get a start in a great many parts of the country where he is an utter stranger. It is not at all surprising, then, that very few

young men from Britain go to South Africa to undertake farming. The number of young men who can raise 7,500 to 10,000 dollars in cash is not very large in any country and most of those who can do this in Great Britain are able to find some other investment that will pay them fully as well as a South African farm and be much more to their liking. There can be little agricultural expansion as long as the white farmer depends so completely upon native labour. Australia and Canada will draw the bulk of the intending farmers from Great Britain as long as things remain as they are in South Africa. But we have seen above (chapter iv) that there are by no means enough emigrating farmers or intending farmers in Britain to satisfy the needs of Australia alone, to say nothing of the other dominions. Naturally, under the existing conditions South Africa gets almost none, nor can it expect any appreciable number unless there is a complete change of policy which will result in the development of smaller farms that can be worked by the owner. And even then no appreciable number of farmers will be attracted thither unless all hard labour ceases to be "Kaffir work," and settlement by some of the more backward European peoples is encouraged.

There is little likelihood that the older men of the present generation of South African farmers could learn to work their own farms or even learn to use white labour, say from Italy or the Slavic countries, in the place of the present native labour. Their habits of life are too firmly fixed. If, however, white labour from some of the more backward countries in Europe were gradually introduced by the younger farmers and if it were made relatively easy for these labourers, after a few years as hired hands, to acquire land of their own, it is possible that a self-sufficing white population could be developed in South Africa — a population that would be

able to work the land without the aid of the blacks and that would multiply faster than the blacks.

Only such a self-sufficient population can really conquer the land and make it their own. There can be little doubt that some of the more backward peasants from Europe would be willing not only to work the land with their own hands, thus dispensing with black labour, but also to raise the big families needed to hold it against the increasing pressure of the natives. But such a policy of European immigration could not succeed unless it were part of a general population policy which assigned to the natives a distinctly different place in South African life from that they now occupy. Some of the most essential features of such a general policy will be suggested later.

What has just been said about the dependence of farming on the blacks is true of every other aspect of South African life. The very cheapness of native labour (the labourer will work for little more than his keep) causes it to be used prodigally for every kind of work, and, as always happens in such contacts, the governing race soon comes to despise the work done by the servant race and to depend upon it for all the tasks that they, the masters, do not want to perform.

The facts of employment in occupations of different kinds will make clear this all-pervasive dependence of the whites on the natives. In the year 1923-4 there were 66,189 Europeans employed in manufacturing establishments and they were paid an average wage of 1,098 dollars during the year. In the same establishments 116,688 coloured people were employed and they were paid an average wage of 232 dollars during the year. Here, as on the farms, the whites are greatly outnumbered, although not to quite the same extent. The coloured labourers are depended upon for all the heavy, hard, unskilled work, but they are paid only about

one-fifth the wages of the white men. The skilled workers, the bosses, and the foremen are white; all others are black. There is a very strict colour line drawn in industry so that the labour unions reserve such of the work as they desire for their members (only white men are admitted to union membership), leaving the rest to the natives. Manufacturing no more than farming can proceed without the native; his cheap labour is believed to be the *sine qua non* of success; for here, as on the farms, the white worker will not do "Kaffir work." Such work is contaminated because of its close association with a subject race.

In mining it is the same story over again, only more so. In 1924 there were 31,928 Europeans and 274,018 black persons employed in mining, about nine black persons to each white man, yet the total pay received by the white men exceeded that received by the black men by five and one-half million dollars. The black men averaged only 147 dollars per year, while the white men averaged 1,439 dollars, almost ten times as much. It should be said in this connexion that the mining companies frequently furnish housing and certain other perquisites to the blacks which materially increase their real wages. But, even so, there is not the least doubt that subsistence at a very low standard is the basis on which wages are paid to black labour in South Africa.

There are also over 300,000 black persons engaged in domestic and personal service in the Union. This is a great number if it is realized that there are only about 314,000 married, widowed, and divorced European women in the Union. There is, then, practically one black person engaged in domestic and personal service for each white household. It is doubtful whether such a proportion of domestic servants can be found in any other country. It speaks well for the standard of living of the European population, but, as we have already

seen, it also means that the natives are being used merely at maintenance cost by the whites. Practically all the surplus the native produces over actual needs goes to the white masters. This is what cheap native labour means in South Africa.

This cheapness of native labour for all sorts of rough, heavy, and disagreeable work is having a very marked effect upon the white population in South Africa. It is not only robbing them of the spirit of initiative and independence, but it is making them unwilling to do many of the hard and disagreeable tasks that must be done by any virile and progressive people. Just as farming is not attractive unless it can be "gentleman" farming, and the scale of living is pitched to such an organization of the industry, so the white man in mining, manufacturing, and trade and as an artisan must find something of the "boss" in a job before he will undertake it. It is no doubt flattering to be "waited on," whether in the home, the field, the factory, or the mine, and it is not surprising that most people yield to the temptation to become dependent upon this menial service. This is happening in South Africa today and while it certainly adds to the pleasantness of life for the whites, it is enfeebling them for coping with the great problem of holding South Africa as a white man's country.

It is a plain fact of history that never have servant and master been able to live long together without the moral fibre of both being greatly weakened by this relationship. With the pioneering days pretty well behind them, the whites of South Africa are beginning to show the effects of this master-and-servant relationship.

All classes of men want to be coddled. The new farmer wants his farmstead made ready for him, and credit on easy terms for its purchase, so that he can live at the best standard from the moment of settlement; the mining companies

want to be protected in their supply of cheap labour so that they can exhaust the mineral wealth in the least possible time; the manufacturers want high tariffs and large government aid in getting under way so that they can compete with foreign goods; the merchants want to be assured of no competition from Indians or Negroes in their trade. The spirit of the pioneer adventurer seems to have departed from South Africa even more than it has from the United States and Canada, and it is the presence of an unlimited supply of cheap and docile labour which has so quickly wrought this change. The dependence on this docile labour is rendering the white man in South Africa unfit to possess further and to hold the land. He is becoming soft, so that he neither pioneers nor raises the children needed to replenish the part of the earth he would like to keep. This is particularly true of many of the British, who have the true exploiter's attitude towards the land, its resources, and the natives—that is, to use them for the rapid accumulation of enough to retire on and return home (to Britain). The Dutch as a body have more the attitude of settlers, but even they are losing the pioneering spirit because of cheap native labour.

It appears impossible to rear a strong nation where the distinction between servant and master is basic in all social and economic relations and particularly so where this distinction is based on race differences. The master race remains an exotic plant, highly specialized and but little fitted to survive in the inevitable competition of races.

On their side the blacks are also said to be showing the effects of the corruption of their traditional modes of life, due to working for white masters, particularly in the cities and in the mining camps, where they are almost wholly removed from the controlling influences of the tribe and the tribal elders. As is usual under such conditions, the vices of the

master race are the first aspect of their life imitated by their servants. Then, too, the diseases peculiar to their occupations (for example, miner's tuberculosis) and to the whites are widely disseminated among the natives in their villages when workers return home from a sojourn among the whites. But perhaps the most disturbing feature of the contact of whites and blacks in South Africa from the standpoint of the whites is the fact that the blacks are no longer content to be exploited in the usual fashion. Some strikes of black workers have occurred in recent years and there is much agitation against the way in which the colour line is maintained. Clearly the native in South Africa is about ready to cease being the docile beast of burden he has been hitherto. This certainly makes the outlook for the continued dominance of the whites, who even now are outnumbered four to one, appear ominous.

That such a change in the attitude of the blacks towards the dominance of the whites is taking place is not surprising, for every contact of the blacks with the whites in the cities, in the mining camps, as domestic and personal servants, as factory workers and as helpers in the trades, is calculated to open their eyes to new possibilities in life. It is inevitable, then, that they should claim the right to share in the life of the country on more equal terms. That they will be more and more insistent in pushing these claims as time goes on admits of no doubt.

There are very few whites who do not admit the justice of the claims of the blacks to better schools, to better housing in the cities and on the farms, to more health service, etc. Yet everything that is done in this direction makes it more difficult to keep the blacks in their present servile position. It is one of the ironies of the exploitation of backward races in this modern era that the rudiments of education, industrial

training, and sanitation which must be given them to render them acceptable servants to the white man soon create in them new desires, and a new outlook on life, which render their exploitation steadily more difficult.

Now, if we add to this fact of increasing assertion by the blacks of the right to a larger part of the produce of their toil and a larger share in the political life of the nation, the fact that as time goes on they are certain to become an increasing proportion of the whole population unless a totally different immigration policy is adopted, we can readily see that the position of the white race in South Africa is becoming extremely precarious.

### 3. White Settlement

Can South Africa attract the number of European settlers needed to ensure white dominance and to displace the black man? Such a question cannot be answered with a categorical *yes* or *no*. There are too many variable circumstances to be taken account of to allow of its disposal thus. If we split this general question up into several which are more concrete and which have to do with definite situations as they exist, we shall be better able to arrive at the probable answer to the general question.

Will the South African farmer be willing to forgo cheap native labour and his "gentleman farmer" position for the sake of establishing his own children and the children of European immigrants on smaller farms worked by the owner and his family? It seems to us that the answer probably is that he will not. Very few people will look ahead any length of time and sacrifice present prosperity and ease for the sake of their descendants two or three generations removed.

In South Africa, moreover, we have what amounts almost to proof that the large farm worked by natives will be very tenaciously held on to, even in the face of urgent need for its division. This proof is found in the existence of a so-called "poor white" class. These "poor whites" are chiefly the children of farmers for whom there is no land unless the large ancestral farms are broken up. They have been crowded off the land by their own near kin rather than given an opportunity to engage in farming on a smaller scale, where the labour of the blacks could not be so profitably used. These "poor whites" have no trade or commercial education and so cannot enter the ranks of skilled workers or the lower "white collar" jobs; and, being white, they will not become farm hands and common labourers. Their plight, indeed sad, is a logical outcome of a social system based on servant labour. They are said to number 120,000 to 150,000 — almost one-tenth of the total white population. And this is a new country with "unlimited" possibilities. What chance is there for white immigration on the land in a country which, because of its social system, cannot provide farms or farm work for younger sons, reared on farms, who do not inherit them and who do not have capital sufficient to set themselves up in farming or in business?

The presence of this "poor white" class is the most severe indictment that could possibly be made against the adaptability of a social system such as has been developed in South Africa; and this lack of adaptability is directly chargeable to the abundance of cheap black labour which leaves no place at all for the strong, willing, but poor white working-man. Contrast this with the situation in Canada, Australia, or the United States, where, even though free land is no longer readily available, the young man who is willing to work and save can generally get started on his own farm in a few

years. This is true even of the young immigrant who is willing to work by the month for several years until he has earned enough to strike out for himself. Until the conditions under which one can get started in agriculture "on one's own" in South Africa are made somewhat similar to those in other countries to which the intending farmer from Europe may go, there is no room in it for the poor man who must rely solely on his own industry and thrift to get a start. The Union can find places for a few farmers with 7,500 to 10,000 dollars or more in capital, but such men only reinforce the "gentleman farmer" class and thus aggravate the racial problem rather than further its solution. They are essentially exploiters rather than settlers and are not fundamentally interested in the future of South Africa.

It can be said, then, with a reasonable degree of certainty that the chances are against the farmers' being willing so to change their modes of life as to make possible a large immigration of white people who will settle on the land, work their own farms, and raise the large families which are necessary if the white man is really to "possess" South Africa.

In practically all other fields the situation appears to be much the same. The white people have become so habituated to the exploitation of native labour that they will give it up only under severe pressure and it is scarcely to be expected that they will apply this pressure to themselves. If there is some talk of preventing the mining companies from recruiting even cheaper labour from Portuguese East Africa, they appeal to the farmers to stand by them, to help preserve their rights of getting the cheapest labour possible. They also point out how certain of the mines and farms must be closed if the labour cost of production is raised. They assume that the purpose of mining, and of farming too, is to get all the mineral

or fertility out of the ground as quickly as possible, no matter what the effect of their labour policy may be upon the future composition of the population of the country. Mine-owners everywhere are much the same and are the "exploiters" *par excellence* in modern society. They know that in the not distant future their stock in the country as mine-owners will be exhausted and they hope to be able to hold on to their present advantages until this happens. For the future of the country they have little concern. No appreciation of or help in the solution of the racial problem in South Africa can be expected from them. We could anticipate as much from what we know of them everywhere, but in South Africa they are at their worst because most of them either do not live in the country at all or are there only for the purpose of making their fortunes. They are not putting forth any roots that will bind them to the soil.

No matter in what direction we look, we find much the same situation. The interest of every class is bound up with the maintenance of an abundant supply of native labour because it is "cheap." The South Africans are no different from the rest of us in holding on tight to what they believe to be their present advantage. That in so doing they sacrifice the chances of future generations to live the good life concerns them but little. The fact that their racial problem is more urgent than the population problems faced by most other white peoples might lead us to expect greater realism in dealing with it. But, after all, it is not surprising that we find it ignored by most people and even find South African writers apologizing for calling attention to it. People always like to forget unpleasant things and are irritated in having them thrust upon their attention.

#### 4. Measures Needed to Keep South Africa "White"

Only drastic measures will save South Africa for the white man, and drastic measures self-imposed to one's economic disadvantage are not common in human experience. What is meant by drastic measures can be seen if a brief outline is given of the changes necessary to ensure white dominance.

The first requisite, of course, is the national determination to replace practically all black labour by white labour. Once this is decided upon, the means for accomplishing it will depend upon a variety of circumstances. We have already discussed some of the changes that would be necessary in agriculture if farm life in South Africa were to be made attractive to any considerable numbers of Europeans. Notwithstanding these difficulties, one of the best places to begin the substitution of whites for blacks is in agriculture; for a family or two of Italians or Slavs could replace all the blacks on any one farm and there would be no mixing of white and black labour, which might cause trouble. Furthermore, the displacement of the blacks would not cause them any serious inconvenience provided the reserves to which they were sent had been properly selected and were well managed by the whites until the renewed tribal organization of the blacks became capable of taking over their control.

It is true that the farmers would have to provide better housing for European immigrants than they have been accustomed to provide for the blacks. They would also have to pay better wages. But they would undoubtedly get more work per person, and if they were to provide more labour-saving machinery, they would probably get their work done as cheaply in the end. But European peasants would not come unless they were assured of the right to acquire land after a few years. The older farmers will not take kindly to this

demand, for it means that a great change will ultimately come over South African agriculture. But unless the way is opened for this change, there is very little chance of retaining South Africa for a white man's land. The land must be made available to those who are willing to work it. There is no other way in which it can be held in perpetuity by the whites.

In the mines the change to white labour could also be undertaken by small units. There need not be any sudden shift. At present about one-third of the black miners are recruited in Portuguese East Africa. As these go back, white miners might be brought in to replace them. Indeed, if the recruiting of blacks were stopped, the number of them in the mines would decline as fast as white substitutes could be secured — perhaps even faster — for the blacks work but a few months at a time and then return to their native villages for a rest. The turnover of black labour in the mines is very high. Now, there are a great many unemployed miners in Great Britain, and European peasants make good miners, as we well know in the United States. It would seem altogether possible to try substituting these Europeans for the blacks in some of the units of operation. Of course, they will have to be paid better wages than the blacks and will not be so docile, but it is not at all certain that the cost of production would be greatly increased by their use. They would certainly prove much more efficient than the constantly changing blacks. It is quite probable that some of the mines would have to be closed because of the increase in the cost of operation, but to one not financially interested in their stocks it would seem a good thing to have the exploitation of the minerals proceed at a slower pace. South Africa will be better off a century hence if its minerals are not dug out as fast as is humanly possible. They will certainly not be wasted if the country has an industrious and progressive population.

Many difficult questions of the procedure to be followed in substituting white labour for black will arise. But if it is once realized that this must be done or the white race in South Africa is doomed, even heroic measures will not be impossible; and if the problem is tackled in time, really heroic measures can undoubtedly be avoided.

As for the blacks who would be displaced by British or other European workers, they could readily be settled on lands of their own in regions which the white man need not try to hold. There would be little difficulty in getting the natives back to land of their own as fast as they were displaced; for, according to all accounts, most of them are only in industry and in the mines temporarily and fully expect to return to their tribe and share its life. Furthermore, there is abundant land under British control near the Union where reserves could be set up for black workers as they were displaced by white men. Rhodesia, for example, is almost vacant. The total white population does not exceed 40,000, and the Negroes do not number more than 2,000,000. The whites could easily be accommodated within the Union, as they could be spared from administrative functions in connexion with the settlement of South African blacks in Rhodesia. Then there is Portuguese East Africa, which has a very small population. There is certainly no lack of land on which the blacks could be settled. No injustice would be done in thus segregating them on good lands where they can live after their own fashion and develop their own civilization.

If such a policy as has just been outlined were followed out consistently, there is very good reason to believe that within two or three decades almost complete segregation of the races could be achieved and the white population of the Union could be increased to several times its present size. In this way South Africa could really be made a "white man's

country." If, however, matters are allowed to drift in their present course, the descendants of the present white people are almost certain to be absorbed by the surrounding blacks. Perhaps it is best that this should happen — that the white population now there should be engulfed by the blacks and a new race developed. Some centuries hence this racial experiment might prove far more enlightening to mankind than the attempts of the white race to keep itself unmixed and preserve this heritage for its children. I am only trying to make clear the nature of the measures that must be taken if South Africa is to remain a white man's land, and to point out how South Africa's problem is likely to affect the more equitable distribution of resources in the world.

If it is urged against such a plan as that just suggested that the white man cannot work his own land in South Africa, or ply his trade without a black helper, because of the excessive heat, then clearly he is only an exploiter in the land and will be treated as such by the natives as soon as they can gain the upper hand. This time will not be far distant if matters are allowed to take their own course.

It is probably not true, however, that white men cannot work efficiently in the greater part of South Africa. Much of this land lies at fairly high altitudes — above three thousand feet — and has a bracing climate, even though it is not far outside the tropics. So far as climate is concerned, it can undoubtedly be made a "white man's land." But it cannot be kept so by a race of exploiters; only a race of settlers can truly subdue the land and replenish it with their children.

##### 5. The Racial Problem and Industrial Development

There is another aspect of the development of South Africa that is closely bound up with increasing the white population

and the segregation of the races in different regions, which is not generally thought of in this connexion. It is the damping effect of the present racial situation upon the industrial development of the country. For some time now there has been considerable talk about the industrial development that should take place in South Africa, but it has not shown many signs of arriving in the near future. It is a country of rich and varied natural resources and possesses the material basis for an extensive industrial growth. Everyone is familiar with the gold of the Transvaal and the diamonds of Kimberley, but these, important as they are, are of little significance compared with other and more useful resources. Indeed, the profitable production of gold and diamonds has been possible only because of their nearness to good coal.

The reserves of coal in the Union are estimated at over 56,000,000,000 tons. Some of this is good coking coal, and fortunately this is found in close proximity to iron ore, of which South Africa possesses some thousands of millions of tons readily accessible and of good quality. Thus South Africa possesses the materials for the development of an extensive iron and steel industry. Two requisites only are lacking. One is a sufficiently large population of high consuming power; the other is the technical and manual workers needed to carry on this industry efficiently. The iron and steel industry more than many others must be undertaken on a fairly large scale if economical production is to be secured. Consequently it must have a large and stable market, which only a relatively large population can supply. South Africa lacks the population to support a vigorous and efficient steel industry. Since so many other industries depend upon cheap iron and steel, their development is also handicapped by the lack of steel-consuming power in the population.

It may perhaps be thought that even if South Africa does

not have a large market at home for iron and steel, it could develop the industry with a view to exporting a large part of the product, since it has the basic raw materials. What has been said above about the difficulties of securing world markets for other countries applies with equal force to South Africa. It is a vain hope to rely on at the present time, and if South Africa awaits its realization, it will be a long time in developing its iron and steel industry and other industries dependent thereon.

When it was said that the consuming power of the population of South Africa was too low to support much industry, it was the size of the population rather than the size of incomes that was referred to. The incomes of the whites are high, but we must recognize that the presence of cheap native labour results in the expenditure of a large part of these incomes on labour and on personal service which would be spent on machinery and labour-saving devices if most of the labour of the country were done by highly paid white workers. Native workers cannot be trusted with expensive labour-saving machinery; they must work with simple tools. Where human labour is very cheap, there is no need for much of the modern machinery which in our own country is calculated to save a man's time. It follows, then, that even the white population of South Africa is not a large consumer of manufactured goods in proportion to its means. It hires natives instead of buying machines. Of course, this affects very materially the size of the industrial growth that the country can support. This growth must remain relatively small as long as the native remains the king-pin in the country's economic organization.

The presence of cheap native labour not only renders the white population less able and willing to buy manufactured goods, but it deprives industry of the market of the entire

labouring class below the skilled grades because these natives work for virtually subsistence wages. The policy of substituting white labour for native labour would in a comparatively short time supply the consuming population on which home industry could subsist. The absence of a well-paid labouring class capable of doing the work that industry demands and able to buy its products is the decisive factor in the slow development of the Union as compared with many other countries.

If it should seem that due weight has not been given to the native as a consumer, one can only say that labourers who receive from 150 dollars to 235 dollars a year (see page 192) in a country where the cost of living is high cannot buy much beyond the bare necessities of life. They are not potential consumers of industrial products, as every well-paid white labourer would be.

At every point where one starts to analyse the economic and social life of South Africa, one finds that the decisive factor is the racial situation. It is the nemesis of South Africa. Until it is settled in such a way that white people will begin to flow into the country in considerable numbers, there is little chance that the Union will make much economic progress, and if it is not settled soon by some decisive action resulting in heavy white immigration, nature will settle the matter in her own way. This way will probably be through the absorption of the whites into the surrounding Negro population.

## 6. The Racial Problem and the Maintenance of Peace

But, it may be asked, what has the racial problem in South Africa to do with the maintenance of peace? Surely there is no very immediate danger that the quarrels of the whites

and blacks in South Africa will endanger the general peace, or that the blacks will become a crowded people likely to attempt to seize the territory of the whites and thus precipitate a war that will spread to other lands? This is probably true, but it fails to take account of the fact that the attitude of South Africans towards the settlement of east Africa by Indians is going to be determined largely by the racial situation in which they find themselves at home. If there is real danger of their being swamped by the blacks they are not likely to be favourable towards the settlement of Indians as neighbours in east Africa as this will certainly increase their danger. They are more than likely to attempt to maintain their dominant position by harsh measures in dealing with the natives and by the exclusion of peoples from neighbouring lands who are likely still further to endanger their position. The most natural reaction against racial competition appears to be to exclude the competitor regardless of whether or not this exclusion can be enforced in the future. If the white man could only see that exclusion now from lands which, manifestly, he cannot people is only creating bitterness and enhancing the feeling of solidarity in the excluded peoples, he would perhaps be more realistic in his dealing with this whole matter of racial expansion.

To be concrete: If the whites in Africa south of the equator would recognize that only in South Africa is there any chance whatever for genuine white settlement and would show a willingness to allow the rest of this great area to be used by Negroes and Indians, who can work it, they might possibly save the southern tip of the continent to Europeans. Of course, now that the whites are in political control everywhere, it would not be wise to withdraw at once; but if it were definitely understood that the white man did not intend to stay very long, except in South Africa, that he would

not exploit the natives, and that he would allow immigration from India under reasonable safe-guards as to native rights, he would certainly simplify very greatly the racial problem around the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, in so far as South Africans in their attempt to keep South Africa white succeed only in antagonizing Negroes and Indians as races and do not actually settle closely the territory they can work and consequently will be able to defend, they will only hasten the time when European occupancy of any part of the continent will become impossible. Furthermore, in antagonizing the Indians, as they are doing in Natal and the Transvaal, and in opposing their settlement in east Africa, they increase the difficulties of the British with the Indians everywhere and thus add fuel to flames which are already blazing fiercely. So not only is the future of South Africa as a white man's land at stake in the way in which South Africans handle their racial problem, but the political equilibrium of the British Empire is involved; and, as I have said elsewhere, this cannot be greatly disturbed without precipitating another Great War — probably a Greater War. Why this is so has been touched upon at several points, but will be explained more fully in the two concluding chapters.

## CHAPTER X

### ITALY AND ITS POPULATION PROBLEM

At present the population problem of Italy is, in many respects, more urgent than that of any other European country and is the one most likely to lead to fateful issues in the near future if some reasonable solution is not found for it. This may appear to be an unwarranted assertion, but I hope to be able to justify it by a statement of the facts showing Italy's economic position in the world today in relation to its growth of population.

Italy is a small country having an area of only 119,710 square miles (about the size of New Mexico and considerably less than half the size of Texas). The population in 1921 was 38,756,433, and by the beginning of 1927 it had increased to 40,548,683. Its density in 1927 was therefore 339 per square mile. This is almost the same as that of Germany (347) in 1925; but because of differences in resources Italy is really much more densely peopled than Germany. This will be made clear as the discussion proceeds.

#### I. The Growth of Population

Unlike many of the countries of central and western Europe in Italy the natural increase of population has shown no marked decline since the war. In fact, it is a little higher now than in some pre-war years, for the death-rate has declined fully as fast as the birth-rate. As compared with Germany, for example, the rate of natural increase in Italy

Table VIII  
Area and Population of Countries Around the Mediterranean Sea

	Area in square miles	Per cent of total area	Population, c 1920	Per cent of total population	Density of population, 1920	Estimated population, 1928
Morocco	171,000	8.22	4,535,000	3.06	26.52	5,930,000
Algeria	222,213	10.69	5,806,000	3.91	26.13	6,170,000
Tunis	48,300	2.32	2,094,000	1.41	43.35	2,185,000
Tripoli and Cyrenaica	579,170	27.85	775,000	0.52	1.34	800,000
Egypt	12,020	0.58	13,387,000	9.03	1113.73	14,400,000
Palestine	9,000	0.43	757,182	0.51	84.13	890,000
Trans-Jordan	20,000	0.96	200,000	0.13	10.00	260,000
Syria	77,200	3.72	2,535,000	1.71	32.84	2,535,000
Turkey	342,500	16.47	11,741,600	7.92	34.28	13,670,000
Greece	49,912	2.40	6,000,000	4.05	120.21	6,250,000
Albania	17,374	0.84	800,000	0.54	46.05	840,000
Italy	119,670	5.75	38,755,576	26.13	323.85	40,750,000
France	212,659	10.23	39,209,518	26.44	184.38	41,000,000
Spain	194,850	9.37	21,389,842	14.42	109.78	22,500,000
Monaco	8	0.00	22,153	0.01	2769.12	23,000
Cyprus	3,584	0.17	310,709	0.21	86.69	330,000
Total	2,079,460	100.0	148,318,580	100.0		157,633,000

was 10.9 in 1927, and 10.8 in 1907, twenty years earlier; while in Germany the rate of natural increase was 6.4 in 1927, and 14.2 in 1907. Thus Italy, with a population of slightly over forty millions in 1927, had an absolute natural increase of 489,175, while Germany in 1927, with a population 64,038,000 had an absolute increase of only 402,949. It should not be inferred from these facts that the birth-rate is not declining in Italy. It is; but as yet the death-rate is declining about as fast, so that the rate of natural increase is on the whole about the same since the war as it was during any similar period for the last forty-five years. As yet, then, Italy is not meeting its population problem by the same rapid cut in natural increase as most of the countries of northern and western Europe.

Indeed, the decline in the birth-rate in Italy in the last forty-five years has been about ten to eleven points only—from about 37-38 to 27-28, while in Germany the decline in the same period has been about eighteen to nineteen points—from 36-37 to eighteen. This is one of the chief reasons why Italy's population problem is now more urgent than that of most other European countries.

There is also another factor increasing the urgency of Italy's problem at the present time which is not operative to the same degree in most of the other countries. The post-war restrictions upon immigration have not borne so heavily upon most European countries as upon Italy.

Italians are now practically barred from the United States. What this means to Italy can best be realized if we know that about 90,000 Italians settled here permanently each year before the war (between the years 1902-13), and that the total number of Italian-born persons in this country was 1,610,000 in 1920.

Roughly speaking, about 25.0 per cent of the natural in-

crease of Italy was coming to the United States to settle permanently in the pre-war years. Last year the net Italian immigration was less than one thousand. Since no other outlet has yet been found to take the place of the United States as a destination for emigrants, Italy must for the present care for a considerably larger part of its natural increase at home. It is this strain of accommodating a larger part of a larger increase at home that makes Italy's problem so acute at the present time.

Furthermore, since the war the seasonal migration of Italians to neighbouring European countries has also fallen off to some extent. Thus the total number of Italian emigrants is much less now than it was fifteen years ago, and when account is taken of the more largely temporary nature of the movement of Italians today as compared with pre-war times, it means that places must be found at home for a much larger number each year.

The matter of absorbing from about 400,000 additional persons into the national economy each year may not seem to us at first to offer much difficulty, but we shall see that it is quite different for Italy from what it would be for us. The absolute size and the density of the population which any country can support at a given standard of living are dependent upon its resources and its opportunities, agricultural, industrial, and commercial. Thus England and Wales, with a density of population of about 650 per square mile (almost twice that of Italy), are not so crowded as Italy (though in our opinion they are over-populated now) because of the unequalled industrial and commercial opportunities which they enjoyed in the past and still enjoy to a certain extent. In order to understand the situation in Italy we must look rather closely at the agricultural and industrial resources which it possesses.

## 2. Agricultural Possibilities

By no stretch of the imagination can Italy be regarded as a rich agricultural country. If one were to list the factors limiting Italy's agricultural production, it would take many pages, a good many more pages than to list the favouring factors. It will be necessary to mention a few of the most decisive elements controlling Italy's agriculture. In the first place, the rainfall over the greater part of Italy comes chiefly during the autumn and winter. Such a rainfall limits, very materially, the kind of crops that can be grown and the yields of produce. This is one of the chief reasons, for example, why almost one-half of the land devoted to food crops is sown to wheat each year. The winter rains can be taken advantage of better by wheat than by crops which need more summer warmth and rain for their growth.

Italy is also a very rough country, and much of the agriculture is carried on under conditions which we should consider impossible. Indeed, they are quite impossible from the standpoint of making a decent living, as anyone can testify who has visited hill communities in various parts of Italy. Not only must much of the working of the soil in the rough lands be done by hand, but often the soil itself is poor and stony. It certainly appears less fertile than much of the soil in our own north-eastern states, which has been abandoned to pasture or is used only for meadow.

Again, the poor drainage of many of the valleys and more level areas makes them malarial, so that they cannot be used intensively. The people who work them or pasture stock on them cannot live on them, but must live in the higher lands, where they are safe from malaria. This is the reason, for example, for the deserted appearance of the plains that surround Rome itself. Furthermore, many of these malaria-

infested areas and marshes can only be reclaimed with a vast amount of labour because the watercourses which should naturally drain them have become so filled up with rocks and silt brought from the hills that they will no longer carry off the water from the valleys and plains.

This silting up of the natural watercourses is in part a consequence of the reckless manner in which deforestation of the hills and mountains has been carried on. Still another consequence of the rapid run-off of water from the deforested hills is that many of the streams have a very uneven flow and are practically useless for irrigation during the dry season. On the whole, the stripping of the forests from the hills has proved a very harmful thing for Italy and probably can never be wholly rectified; at least, it will require generations to improve this situation to any great extent. Even as large a river as the Po, in one of the most fertile regions of Italy, is in danger of changing its course owing to the silting up of its bed.

If to these drawbacks of a general nature affecting the yield of the land we add the fact that all Italy has just one acre of tillable land for each person in its population today, we shall see that Italy is in no position to support an increase of numbers through extension of its agriculture. Indeed, agriculture in Italy fails to support even the people who apparently live by it, because it is of such a seasonal nature. Unlike the general farmer in this country, great numbers of Italian peasants can work at home for only a few months each year; and as a consequence for a century or more the migratory Italian labourer has been a well-known figure all over central and western Europe. There is comparatively little room for more workers in Italian agriculture. Any addition to their numbers necessarily means that an already very low standard of living must be still further reduced,

and it cannot be reasonably expected that this increased, hardship will be endured passively if it appears at all probable that any alleviation is to be secured by the use of force.

It is also of importance to note in this connexion that even now Italy is not self-sufficient agriculturally. It imports large quantities of cereals and cotton (the cheaper foods and fabrics), and exports in part payment for them the more expensive foods and fabrics (cheese, butter, fruit, and silk). Besides, the importation of cereals is on the increase, being about fifty per cent greater now than before the war. These facts still further reinforce the conclusion that Italian agriculture cannot provide a living for many more people than it now does without materially reducing their standards of living, which are already very close to subsistence level. If Italy is to support more people at home, it must be through the development of its industry rather than its agriculture. We shall next examine the possibilities of Italy's development in this direction.

### 3. Industrial Resources

Unfortunately, Italy is even poorer in the essential materials needed by modern industry than in its agricultural resources. Italy possesses in abundance not one of the minerals of prime importance in industry, while it is almost destitute of those of greatest usefulness. The entire coal reserves in Italy are less than the coal mined in a single year in this country. Since there is practically no petroleum produced in Italy, it is, for all practical purposes, dependent upon imported fuel, not only for much of its industrial power, but also for household uses.

Italy does, however, possess considerable water-power in the northern provinces and in the Apennines. It is estimated

that about five and five-tenths millions of horse-power can be developed by its streams at ordinary river flow, and about half this amount at extreme low water. At present between one and five-tenths and two millions of horse-power are developed — perhaps about one-third of what can ultimately be made available. This is of great use to Italy, and the manufacturing cities of the north (Turin and Milan) owe an appreciable part of their prosperity to the use of this water-power. But five to five and five-tenths millions of horse-power are, after all, a comparatively small amount and are insufficient for any large industrial development. It is quite clear, then, that the lack of cheap power, which is a necessary consequence of the lack of cheap fuel, is a great handicap to the development of industry in Italy. It will also be decisive in determining the type of industries that can thrive best in the country.

When, in addition to the lack of fuel, we find that Italy's resources in iron are both small and expensive to mine, we can be quite positive that Italy has little chance of developing an iron and steel industry of any consequence. Certainly this industry cannot employ many workers and cannot, therefore, do much to provide places for any appreciable part of its yearly increase in numbers. This also means that Italy can do but little in the development of those derivative fabricating industries in which iron and steel are the materials principally used. It is not surprising, then, to find that even in Switzerland American automobiles are far more numerous than those from Italy. In all such industries Italy labours under an initial handicap in the cost of basic materials which cannot be overcome by the cheapness of labour.

In developing an electrical industry the situation is practically the same as for iron and steel. Only three hundred and fifty men were employed in the mining of copper in 1926.

Italy must import its copper either from this country or from South America and is at a disadvantage in fabricating it as compared with the United States and Germany.

Italy's poverty in all the basic minerals can best be realized if we compare the number of persons engaged in mining in Italy and in some of the other European countries. In 1926 there were only 49,630 persons employed in the mines of Italy, while there were about 780,000 in Germany and 1,140,000 in Great Britain. Nothing could show more clearly that Italy labours under a great handicap in developing its industries. It is difficult for it to supply home markets with metal goods even with tariffs aids; and of course there is little chance to compete successfully with more favoured lands for world markets in such goods.

In textiles Italy's position is more favourable than in metals for several reasons: (1) Italy exports considerable quantities of silk, because the production of silk is an industry in which a large amount of hand labour is used and Italy has an abundance of cheap hand labour; (2) the manufacture of textiles does not require a very great amount of power, and consequently expensive power can be partly compensated for by cheap labour; and (3) other European countries must also import most of the cotton and wool they use; hence they have less advantage over Italy in this field than in many others. But even in this field Italy cannot hope for a greatly increased foreign trade. There are too many competitors in the market. Several of the European nations are already better established in the textile trade, and if cheap labour is relied upon, Japan, India, and China have even greater abundance of this than Italy.

In all lines of manufacture the situation is much the same. Italy has an abundance of cheap unskilled labour, but the differential in the cost of power and materials is too heavily

against her to enable her to manufacture most types of machine-made goods as cheaply as those lands that are blessed with a greater abundance of resources. Under these conditions the process of acquiring markets abroad in the face of competition from other peoples already established must be very slow and will be costly, if, indeed, they can be acquired at all. Besides, even when markets are secured, they are often of doubtful permanence. There is, then, very little reason to believe that Italy can much expand its production of machine-made goods for export, and that its large increase in population can be employed in these new industries.

It would seem that, on the whole, the Italians would succeed better in those industries where hand work is essential; for example, in the raising of silk, in the making of fashion and art objects, and so forth, rather than in machine industry. But of course there is much competition in these fields from the Japanese and other Oriental peoples and the French, so that progress in these lines will be slow also.

Indeed, from whatever angle one studies the possibilities of Italy's industrial development, it does not seem probable that there can be any growth at all adequate to care for its present increase of population. Italian industry can grow only slowly and can provide only a few new jobs each year; and year by year the provision of even these few will become more difficult.

If it were worth while to follow this whole matter further, one could show that both capital and technical skill are lacking in Italy; and these are almost as important as the basic minerals for the rapid development of machine industry. But we need not pursue this line of thought further; there is no need of piling up evidence of Italy's industrial handicaps. They are too generally known to need more than this brief statement.

It appears, then, that Italy has neither the agricultural nor the industrial resources to care for the present growth of population for more than a few years. If they must remain at home, the pressure of population will shortly become intolerable and we may look for some kind of an explosion. It is certainly not to be expected that a people of spirit will not choose war when there is hunger at home and when there is at least a chance that war will lead to the expansion of their resources.

#### 4. Present Outlets for the Population

But why need the Italian people remain at home, it will be asked. They have been emigrating in large numbers for several decades; why should they remain at home now more than in the past, especially if the pressure of population is becoming steadily greater?

We have already mentioned that the United States is closed to them, and that their European neighbours have less need of them now than before the war, owing to general economic depression.

The South American countries, on the other hand, still welcome Italians as well as most other Europeans and offer, as far as they are able, very favourable terms to intending settlers. In most of these countries there is a great deal of interest shown by all manner of private organizations, as well as by public authorities, in securing immigrants as settlers. But it appears that all these schemes, both public and private, are only moderately successful. This is probably due in part to the world-wide depression in agriculture since the war, and in part to the lack of capital by both the immigrant and the country in which he wishes to settle. In any event, Italian emigration to Argentina is not now quite so great as

in pre-war years, and to Brazil it is hardly one-half as great. It has never been large to other South American countries, so that, all told, it has averaged only about 80,000 a year since the war. Probably less than one-half of these are permanent settlers, for it has always been characteristic of Italian emigrants that they went out in search of work fully as much as in search of new homes. Reliable data indicate that approximately one-half of the overseas emigrants eventually return to Italy.

In spite of the fact that the post-war movement of Italians to South America has slackened, there is some reason to believe that it will increase before long. These countries want European immigrants, and when the present program of public works in Italy is completed (in perhaps another decade), there will be many thousands of Italians to seek work abroad. It is not improbable, then, that the stream of Italians to South America will soon be larger than it has been recently. But it does not appear that permanent emigrants will amount to more than one-third of the natural increase in Italy. The countries of South America are not in the stage of development where they can use additional hundreds of thousands of common labourers each year in the development of their natural resources and in their industries, as was the United States before the war. A large part of the immigrants into South America must settle directly on the land, and this will necessarily be a rather slow process under the conditions prevailing in this region. I refer here particularly to the lack of transportation facilities, to the system of large land holdings, which is quite general south of Panama, and to the settlement of subtropical regions, which is far more difficult for Europeans than the settlement of the temperate areas.

It does not seem likely, in view of all the facts, that the lands which have hitherto accepted Italian settlers, will, in

the near future, provide places for as large a proportion of Italy's natural increase as in the past, and they certainly will not take as many migratory labourers.

This situation, resulting in greater pressure of population at home, is leading Italy to enter into negotiations regarding Italian settlement with various countries which have not hitherto had much Italian immigration and to investigate the possibilities of emigration into the more thinly settled parts of the world where its people might find good economic opportunities. The reader who has followed us thus far will realize that, except in South America, the real white man's lands (temperate and subtropical) which are most thinly settled and which will support largely increased populations are in the hands of the English-speaking peoples. The Italians are finding to their great chagrin that these peoples do not want them, whether it be in the United States, in Australia, or in Canada. Naturally this is a shock to the pride of the Italians and when insult is added to exclusion, as it often is, we need not be surprised to find considerable bitterness of feeling arising against English-speaking peoples. There is no need to cite utterances showing this regarding our own country, for we all remember the debates, the editorials, the "expert" testimony, and so forth accompanying the discussion and passage of our recent immigration acts. Much of this discussion and testimony we should perhaps prefer to forget, and no doubt many of us have forgotten it, as it reflects but little credit on either our intelligence or our honesty. But we may rest assured that it will not be forgotten by the Italians as quickly as we should like, for it is no light matter to tell a people that it is inferior and throw on them the burden of proving in some easily recognizable way (successful war, for example) that they are not. Unfortunately we are not the only English-speaking people that has hurt the pride of the

Italians by the method of their excluding them and particularly by the many public utterances of more or less responsible people in which they have been referred to as an inferior people.

### 5. Some Italian Views on Expansion

A quotation from an article by an Italian journalist who went to Australia to look into the possibilities of Italian emigration to that country will show us how he felt, and there can be no doubt that most of his fellow-countrymen who read his articles felt the same way:

“‘The Italian invasion,’ the favourite cry, is the most common of the catchwords that one hears repeated in the daily polemics directed against Italian immigration. A metaphor of journalists overburdened with imagination? Not at all. . . .

“You are confounded! Why all this bitter feeling against the Italians? I will explain—in order to keep Australia ‘white.’ ‘Keep Australia white!’ is the true catchword of this crusade. In fact we are not ‘white,’ we are ‘olive.’ ‘Olive-skinned influx,’ the invasion of the ‘olive-skins’ is how a large Melbourne evening paper refers to the announcement of an inquiry by the Queensland Government into Italian immigration in the northern districts. And at another congress, of Australian women, a well-known speaker, after exhorting Australian housewives not to purchase fruit of Italian vendors, even at lower prices, laments that after so much done to preserve Australia ‘white’ against the menace of the Asiatic, ‘olive’ immigrants continue to establish themselves in the country. We are so degraded a race that the Australian women are exhorted not to marry our immigrants. Let us hope it, poor lads, for their own sakes! Brave comrades! Our blood sullies, soils, adulterates their Australian blood. ‘Pollute, polluted,’ are the concise and brutal expressions employed. . . .

“This theory of the superiority of the north to the south went so far that the Catholic Archbishop Mannix took occasion in a speech at a great Catholic congress to inform his compatriots that, after all, some of these beggars from South Europe created Rome, the Papacy, the Renaissance and some other trifles. They do not know it. They do not know anything. They have ideas of Italy that make one despair of the future of humanity. . . . Do you know what was the number of

Italian emigrants disembarked during the entire year of 1924, to cause such a bother? It was 4,286. They are astonished when one tells them that in 1923 we sent, for example, 93,000 emigrants to the Argentine, and 183,000 to France. And it is for these 4,286, for this infinitesimal percentage of Italians — healthy, model workmen who come to offer strong arms and willing hearts — that commissions are set up, congresses are agitated, newspapers are perturbed, it is for this . . . that the doors are shut in our faces with foul words, as upon another 'yellow peril' — the olive peril — shut against the ally of yesterday, the friend of to-day, the third great European Power — Italy! . . .

"This defamation must come to an end, and to stop it there is but one means — to speak through clenched teeth. All the protests of our consuls, all the efforts which the Federal Government (we are duty bound to state the facts) does not fail to put forth to restrain this ill-advised language amount to nothing. Only the reacting force of our public opinion can bestow a sense of international responsibility on those sections of the press and of Australian politicians who have lost it. *These things must not be said.*"<sup>1</sup>

In March, 1928, a former premier of Australia in attacking the government's immigration policy is quoted as saying:

"Italians are coming to this country at the rate of three hundred monthly. To whom does this country belong? to us or to Mussolini? Apparently all Mussolini has to do is to rattle the sword and we must allow all the grandmothers, grand aunts and other relatives down to thirty-third cousins of Italians here to enter. We colonized this country and it is for us to develop it along our own lines without dictation from anybody overseas."<sup>2</sup>

In Canada an Italian farmer who wished to have a fellow Italian admitted so that he could employ him received the following letter from the Department of Immigration and Colonization at Winnipeg.

"It has been the experience of this Department that Italians as a class do not readily accept and remain at agricultural work, but sooner or later drift to the urban centers and engage in other occupations. As I have no definite assurance or guarantee that Filippo Greco, if ad-

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Fleetwood Chidell *Australia — White or Yellow*, pp. 76-8. This letter appeared in *Corriere della Sera*, June 10, 1925.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from the *New York Times*, March 29, 1928.

mitted to Canada, would accept and remain at farm-work, I regret no action can be taken to facilitate his admission ”<sup>3</sup>

This letter elicited the following comment in an Italian newspaper:

“ If *bona fide* agriculturists are admitted, why reject the above application on a pretext which deceives no one? . . . to us it seems that the specific case here cited gives a picture of the injustice committed by the Canadian Immigration authorities to our damage. We want the ambiguity cleared up once for all either admittance or rejection. At least the loss to worthy people of precious time would be avoided, and an end would be put to the continual affront which is directed against our nationality by acts of discrimination like the one just reported

“ We should prefer that the door should be closed to all Italians, rather than be the witnesses of daily denials and refusals, which constitute a real insult to our emigrants, who are, however, inferior to none.”<sup>4</sup>

The two significant facts in this exclusion of Italian immigrants from the English-speaking countries are that: (1) such exclusion has the immediate effect of increasing population pressure in Italy and thereby renders some desperate or reckless attempt to ease this pressure more probable; and (2) it creates a fund of resentment against the excluding peoples, a large part of which is quite likely to be transferred to Great Britain and which may go far towards dissolving — in connexion with Italy’s treatment at Versailles — the traditional bonds of good feeling between Great Britain and Italy. This is a very important matter because, as we have pointed out in several other connexions, there are a number of possible, even probable, situations in which, to say the least, it would be exceedingly inconvenient to Great Britain to have Italy for an enemy.

Of course, such a flaring up of resentment on the part of individuals in Italy and Australia should not be taken too

<sup>3</sup> Quoted from Chidell, *ibid.*, p. 79

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

seriously. In the name of politics, even good men will commit many indiscretions; but it would be a great mistake to ignore the facts that create this resentment if they are persistent, and are practically certain to furnish a constant source of irritation.

Mussolini may be a sabre-rattler and his comrades may be given to echoing his chauvinistic utterances, but only the blind will refuse to see that there is a solid basis of fact behind their jingoism. I have shown above what these facts are. They need not be repeated here, but we must bear them in mind when we read such statements as the following or we shall be disposed to dismiss them too lightly, as merely the fulminations of inflated nationalists.

Francesco Coppola in an article, "Land for Italy," in the *Tribuna*, an official Fascist journal, discusses the way in which France and Italy could co-operate, France to enhance her security, and Italy to secure land for expansion. He says:

"In other words, France must realize that the method followed so far of opposing Italy systematically everywhere from the Balkans to Ethiopia, from Tangiers to the Near East, in the absurd hope of being able to hold us down, is most stupid and most dangerous. . . . It is equally useless for France to believe that she can obtain Italy's friendship as Senator Coty suggests, by granting Italian citizens in the French North African colonies special concessions. Italy will never consent to her subjects colonizing other people's possessions and losing their nationality into the bargain. Respect of the citizenship of Italians in French possessions is a condition *sine qua non* of any agreement between Italy and France of any nature whatsoever. . . . When we speak of Italian expansion we mean chiefly political and territorial expansion, or what is practically the same thing, colonial expansion. There is only one solution for Italy's problem — land. Colonial land for Italy or at least land under Italy's political control; land for Italian people who are too crowded in their own country; land for her power, land for her freedom on the Mediterranean. With this we do not mean to ask France to make us a present of any French land. We merely ask her to cease being systematically against us. We ask her to help us, frankly and sincerely, both to put right the iniquitous

distribution of mandates by the League of Nations and to favor our direct political expansion outside our boundaries. Only thus shall we be able to take together the first step toward a solution of our relations.”<sup>5</sup>

In speaking of Italian emigration, Mussolini explained the movement as follows:

“Italy each year produces an excess of 500,000 men who must in one fashion or another emigrate. After the war nearly 1,000,000 went beyond the Alps to the relatively depopulated regions of France. . . . In Paris some people are alarmed as though the immigration were directed by a political idea, but in reality there is no truth in this. It is a question simply of a natural and spontaneous economic phenomenon. Even with all this our emigration taken in the aggregate in the last three years had decreased because we are in a period of national reconstruction. . . . Remember what Italy is—a country half the size of France, which however, must sustain and keep alive a population of 40,000,000 of inhabitants. . . . It is enough to pass through any little village of our country and see its lanes crowded with men and women, especially children, to understand the extraordinary vital energy of our race and the consequent problems contingent upon furnishing for it necessities of life. We must calculate much more on the basis of human energies than on the gifts of nature. . . . Life in a poor country is a continual struggle for which it must be organized in a most efficacious manner, like militia, unable to permit itself to lose any battle and over which the government must have complete authority and supreme command.”<sup>6</sup>

Count Cippico at the School of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts, in 1925 said:

“One of the worst errors of the Paris peace treaty was that no provision was made for giving Italy more colonial territories, Italy who has the largest and the most laborious emigrant population of any country in the world and the smallest colonial possessions. There are all over the world waste lands underpopulated and underdeveloped, crying for labor. Italy is almost the only country that can supply it. But if Italian labor is to be secured, measures must be taken whereby these emigrants shall not lose their nationality and their absence from Italy shall not result in the cutting off of all political ties with Italy.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted from the *New York Times*, November 6, 1926.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, January 11, 1926.

Either colonial territories should be given to Italy where her sons can settle under the Italian flag and increase the production of the world for the benefit of the whole world and not of Italy alone, or Italian emigrants in foreign and thinly populated countries must be grouped together and remain Italian citizens."<sup>7</sup>

The following quotations are taken from Mussolini's speech of May 26, 1927, before the Chamber of Deputies, outlining his plans for a greater Italy:

"I affirm that the fundamental if not the absolutely essential datum for the political and therefore the economic and moral power of nations is their ability to increase their population. Let us speak quite clearly. What are 40,000,000 Italians compared to 90,000,000 Germans and 200,000,000 Slavs? Let us turn toward the West. What are 40,000,000 Italians compared to 40,000,000 Frenchmen plus the 90,000,000 inhabitants of France's colonies or compared to 46,000,000 Englishmen plus 450,000,000 who live in England's colonies? Gentlemen, if Italy is to amount to anything it must enter into the second half of this century with a population of at least 60,000,000 inhabitants. You will say: But how can they live in our territory? This same argument very probably was used in 1815 when in Italy there lived only 16,000,000 inhabitants. Perhaps it then seemed most absurd that in the same territory it was possible to find, with an infinitely higher standard of life, food and homes, for 40,000,000 Italians of the present day. . . . In Italy the maximum [birth-rate] was reached in 1886 with 39. Since then we have been decreasing steadily. From 39 we have now reached 27. It is true that the death-rate has fallen just as much. But the ideal would be a maximum birth-rate and a minimum mortality. . . . Nor is this enough. There is a type of urbanism which is destructive which renders our people sterile. It is industrial urbanism. . . . If we decrease in numbers, gentlemen, we will never create an empire but become a colony. . . . This explains to you why I do everything to help agriculture, why I proclaim myself a convinced ruralist. This explains to you why I do not want industries around Rome. This explains to you why I do not want in Italy any but healthy industries, which are industries which find work for citizens who have gone astray and must be helped to find themselves again." Again, compulsory military training "forms generations which obey, not because they are ordered, but that fight because that is their desire. . . . Hence we must at a given moment be able to mobilize 5,000,000 men

<sup>7</sup> Quoted from the *New York Times*, August 2, 1925.

thoroughly armed, we must strengthen our navy, while aviation must be on such a large scale and so powerful that the noise of its motors must surpass any other noise and the area of the wings of our aeroplanes must obscure the sun from our land. Then between 1935 and 1940 when we shall reach the crucial point in European history we will be able to make our voice heard and see at last our rights acknowledged. This preparation requires some years more.”<sup>8</sup>

Many similar statements could be gathered from the speeches and writings of Italians in positions of authority. It is clear beyond question that many of the leaders in Italy today feel very keenly the need for expansion and apparently would be willing to pay a large price to bring it about. It is extremely unfortunate that such statements are not always accompanied by the facts which would justify them; also that they are often uttered in the heat of controversy, where but little consideration is given to the form of expression. But often it is the grim spectre of want and hunger in the background that gives such vehemence to their expression. Then, too, it is not unlikely that the facts seem so obvious to many of those familiar with them that they take for granted that they are known by all people, and hence they become too easily irritated with those who seem to ignore them.

#### 6. New Outlets for Italy's Surplus

“But,” it may be said, “Italy has colonies with an area of almost 1,500,000 square miles; why does she not exploit them and cease to complain of having no outlet for her people and of insufficient resources for her industrial development?” The answer to this is very brief, but conclusive. A rainfall map of north and east Africa shows that Italy's colonies are of little worth agriculturally. Only in very restricted areas is the rainfall over ten inches annually, and almost nowhere

<sup>8</sup> Quoted from the *New York Times*, May 29, 1927.

does it exceed twenty. A little, but after all a very little, may be accomplished by irrigation. Italy's colonies are chiefly poor grazing-lands and desert. At the best they will furnish land for only a few hundred thousands of settlers and consequently will do but little to postpone the day when Italy must look elsewhere for land.

Where, then, can Italy find room for expansion, and where can it secure the resources needed for its industrial development?

In addition to the possibilities of settlement in South America which have been pointed out above, the most feasible direction of expansion would seem to be in Asia Minor — Syria and Mesopotamia. The former of these is now mandated to France by the League of Nations, and the latter, though now called an independent kingdom, is under the control of Great Britain.

Syria has a population of about two and a quarter millions. It is said to be capable of supporting three or four times as many people at better standards than are now prevalent if irrigation is developed in the fullest degree. This would mean that it could support between four and six millions more people than it now does. Clearly there is room for considerable expansion here without seriously interfering with the development of the native population. The country has been badly misgoverned in the past and the population is decidedly backward in its development. A progressive, modern, non-exploitative European administration would undoubtedly be of benefit to the natives at the same time that it opened up unused lands for settlement. In many respects the Italians are well adapted to make use of this land. The climate is much the same as in southern Italy, and the type of agriculture is also similar. No great break in the mode of living would be involved in taking possession

of the land and reclaiming and making it available for intensive use.

There are, of course, many historic reasons why this area (Syria) should remain under the control of France rather than be transferred to Italy, but to one looking at the matter from the standpoint of the needs of the people, it appears that very little advantage will accrue to either France or Syria under the present arrangement. Its trade is worth something, it is true, but France has neither the man-power nor the capital to develop the resources of the country in the near future. This statement will scarcely be challenged even by the imperially-minded Frenchman. For it is well known that France has no colonists to spare, even for lands of much greater value to it in north Africa. France has had practically a stationary population for a half-century and is much concerned with increasing the population at home — so much concerned, in fact, that no one expects or encourages French youth to go to the colonies to make their homes. Indeed, as yet, the numerous efforts to encourage larger families among the French are not making any headway. There is no reason, then, to suppose that France will, within two or three generations, if ever, be able to supply any appreciable number of colonists to any land, and Syria will by no means be the first choice of such colonists as may go out.

As regards capital, the situation is practically the same. The outward flow of capital from France has been greatly curtailed since the war, and the number of dependencies needing money for development is large. The amount available is a mere driblet compared with what could be used to good advantage. It is but natural to expect that those dependencies that have a closer relation to France than Syria (merely a mandate) will have first call upon French capital seeking colonial investment. It is not likely, then, that Syria's

economic development will proceed very rapidly while it remains a French mandate.

On the other hand, if Syria were to be transferred to Italy, the man-power for its development would be assured and it is probable that there would be comparatively little difficulty in borrowing abroad the money needed to build the irrigation works as rapidly as settlers would be ready to use the land. The development of Syria would also furnish a considerable amount of seasonal work for Italian labourers who cannot now find work in neighbouring European countries.

Furthermore, it would appear that if France were voluntarily to transfer this area to Italy, it would help materially, as is stated in one of the quotations given above, to gain that security which France so much desires. The friendship of Italy cannot be a matter of indifference to France. Then, too, any pressure that Italy may now be disposed to bring to bear on France to allow settlement of Italians retaining Italian citizenship in French north Africa would undoubtedly be eased if Italy had Syria open for settlement and development.

It would seem to the outsider that France had much more to gain than to lose in ceding its rights in Syria to Italy. France could provide that its trade with this area would not be disrupted by sudden transference to Italy and that the cultural relations which are of long standing should not be terminated until new bonds had grown up between Italy and Syria. The political aspects of the transfer of rights from France to Italy should not be impossible of arrangement once the French were convinced that Italy's friendship could be secured in this way.

For Italy, Syria would not only be a land for agricultural settlement, but also a source of various raw materials which Italy sadly needs for its industries and which France does not need and consequently is not likely to develop in the near

future. There are considerable deposits of lignite, iron ore, copper, lead, and so forth in this region. Besides there are some indications of petroleum, although as yet no profitable wells have been brought in. Such of these products as France does not possess at home, it has in greater abundance close by, in north Africa, so that it would not cripple itself industrially in allowing Syria to pass into the control of Italy. Indeed, there is good reason to think that if France were to concentrate the development of its dependencies more, the actual benefit derived from them would be considerably greater.

In order to make Syria most useful to Italy, it should be coupled with Mesopotamia or Iraq, which is under British control. These two countries are contiguous and (except Mosul) are much alike in climate and in agricultural possibilities. Iraq is even more thinly settled than Syria, having less than 3,000,000 persons on an area of 143,250 square miles. Of course, much of this area is unproductive without irrigation, but with full irrigation it is estimated that about 7,000,000 acres can be made available for winter crops—wheat and barley principally—and about 4,000,000 acres for summer crops—fruits and so forth. At considerably improved standards this area would support a population of six or seven millions more than at present.

In the Mosul district Iraq is supposed to possess large reserves of oil, and there are other valuable minerals in the country. Clearly, these resources as well as the undeveloped agricultural land would be a real godsend to Italy, but they do not constitute a very great addition to the already almost unlimited resources of Great Britain. If both France (France has the right to buy one-fourth of the oil produced in Iraq) and Great Britain feel that they cannot forgo the right to some of the oil in this country, there is little doubt that an

arrangement could be made between the three powers whereby each would get a reasonable share of it, and it could be exploited jointly.

It may appear, at first, that Great Britain has less reason than France to cede its rights in Asia Minor to Italy. Great Britain has the capital to exploit such resources as it needs and to build such public works as might be profitable as an investment. It also has the expert personnel to carry out these works. In these respects it is in a better position to develop Iraq than France is to develop Syria. It may also appear that Great Britain has less reason to make a bid for Italy's friendship than France. It seems very doubtful, however, whether this is so when we consider Great Britain's truly enormous commitments in all parts of the world. This matter will be discussed more fully in chapter xiii, but it may not be amiss to point out here that if Great Britain were in trouble in east Africa, or India, or the western Pacific, it would be a comforting thought that Italy was a staunch friend that would not be disposed to make capital of one's temporary embarrassment. Such considerations should certainly weigh heavily in the minds of statesmen who have to decide between holding Iraq with Italy's enmity or ceding the rights in it to Italy and securing its active goodwill in return.

If in addition to the acquisition of Syria and Iraq the immigration policies of Australia and South Africa were changed so as to admit considerable numbers of Italians, the pressure in Italy would be relieved for some time to come and the Italian jingoes would find themselves without a sound basis for agitation.

#### 7. Will Emigration Relieve Population Pressure?

Someone will point out that even if there were room for eight to ten millions of Italians to settle in Syria and Iraq,

and that many more in Australia, South Africa, and Tunis, Italy's population problem would not be solved by giving her these new outlets. It will be said that the population will go on increasing in Italy just as in the past, and after twenty or twenty-five years the problem will have to be faced all over again. It will further be urged that having once bluffed some of the great powers into giving her new outlets, Italy will try the same thing over again and will be in stronger position to make good her threat to take something if it is not freely given.

If population were increasing in Italy wholly without regulation, and if there were no prospect of increasing control of births, this might be the correct view. I have shown above, however, that the birth-rate is declining rather rapidly in Italy. We know further that under modern conditions nothing increases the practice of birth control so much as enhanced prosperity and the growth of industrialism. Now, there is not the least reason to suppose that as prosperity becomes greater in Italy (through the access to new lands), and as industry develops (through the acquisition of enlarged resources), the Italians will not respond to better conditions in the same manner as the rest of the Western peoples and reduce the size of their families very materially.

We must recognize that the knowledge of harmless and reasonably certain means of preventing conception changes almost beyond belief the likelihood of a population's growing up to the limits of subsistence under the conditions of modern life. There is no people that cannot and probably none that will not, sooner or later, adapt its fertility to the actual situation in which it must live. The personal advantages of controlled fertility are so obvious that it is unthinkable that they will not appeal to all peoples. There are, of course, obstacles of various and different kinds opposed to the control of conception by the traditions and customs of

different peoples. But among a people that is rapidly emerging from the thrall of superstition, it is not at all likely that these inheritances from the past will long postpone the conscious control of growth in numbers by almost the entire population. The control of conception is one of those great movements in the history of mankind that proceed to their issue in spite of all difficulties; albeit, at times, they seem to proceed far too slowly.

It is unreasonable, however, for the peoples who have made the greatest headway in the control of their growth in numbers to demand that all other peoples follow their example *at once*. It is no more possible for Italy with its historical background to control its fertility to the same extent as France than it is that France should have the birth-rate of China. It takes time for great social changes to become ingrained in the mental attitudes of people, and during the period of their establishment the needs of peoples should be ministered to as far as possible.

It is frequently said that the population problem of any nation is purely a domestic question — that “the day has passed when any nation has the right to use its own reckless [sic] overbreeding to justify a course of action in international affairs which would be inexcusable if its population were stationary.”<sup>10</sup> Such an attitude shows a complete failure to understand what is really possible in the matter of the control of conception in countries like Italy and Japan. It is in the best imperial style of successful “land-grabbers” and is really *inexcusable* in a “liberal” journal like the *New Republic*, which prides itself on its *realism* in politics and economics.

• We should face the facts of the given situation and attempt an adjustment to them which accords with our most en-

<sup>10</sup> “Japan and Manchuria,” *New Republic*, September 12, 1928.

lightened sense of justice. Surely when the facts are known, Italy cannot be said to be inexcusable for wanting and preparing to take, if need be, land for its surplus population, while Great Britain and France are held blameless for the war which may ensue, although they are holding land and resources which they do not need and cannot possibly settle and develop within the next century. It must be remembered that no nation has deliberately and with forethought made its birth-rate what it is today. Everywhere the birth-rate is a natural consequence of the conditions of life existing among the different peoples, and as such it is inevitable that it should be what it is. Furthermore, it is not at all likely that its course will be greatly altered by any governmental action aimed directly to that end, for it is too intimately bound up with personal development and subconscious mental attitudes to respond readily to such external influences.

The present distribution of land and resources among the peoples of the world, on the other hand, is quickly alterable. We all know what war can accomplish in this respect. Just as much could be accomplished in a short time by peaceful negotiations if the nations thought this more desirable than war. For there could be great changes in the distribution of land and resources among the peoples of the world with no very great fundamental change in the lives of the individuals involved in the transfer. A change of sovereignty and migration to a new land certainly does not involve any such revolution in mental attitudes as the change from uncontrolled to controlled fertility.

When there is no possible chance for birth control to become general among a people for two or three decades, or even for several generations, it is absurd to call conduct based on this fact inexcusable, while overlooking the fact that aggressive conduct on the part of a growing people is only

necessary because other peoples are holding out of use land and resources which the expanding peoples need. It is an interesting kink in our notions of international ethics that aggression is condemned indiscriminately, apparently because it is aggression, while the maintenance of the *status quo*, which may work untold hardship on millions of people, seems to have general approval. It is, of course, to the interest of peoples who have all they want to throw the onus of moral responsibility for war on those who have little and would, therefore, necessarily be the ones to initiate a struggle for a change of the *status quo*. But we should have arrived at sufficient knowledge of the methods and conditions of the acquirement of lands in past times, to prevent mere possession from creating in our minds an unshakable presumption of moral right to hold them under any and all conditions. I shall not pursue this line of thought further here, as I shall have occasion to recur to it in more detail in the concluding chapter.

## CHAPTER XI

### CENTRAL EUROPE

By central Europe is meant the entire area bounded by Russia and the Baltic states on the one side and France, Switzerland, and Italy on the other. This area includes a diversity of peoples and of population problems. Justification for treating the population problems of this area in a single chapter lies not in their common nature nor in their being of less intrinsic interest than the problems of the nations treated more fully, but rather in their less immediate urgency than these others in their probable effects on the peace of the world. The main purpose of this exposition thus dictates a rather brief treatment of the population problems in central Europe.

There are two quite distinct forms of social organization found within this region. In general, the Germans are a highly industrialized people, having the outlook and problems characteristic of other such people. The Slavs, on the other hand, are largely an agricultural people, just entering the industrial stage of organization. These two peoples are, therefore, quite different, although having a good many elements in common.

#### i. The Germans

For about forty years before the outbreak of the war the Germans had been experiencing a growth of their industry and commerce somewhat similar to that of Great Britain

Table IX  
Area and Population of Countries of Central Europe

	Area in square miles, 1928	Per cent of total area	Population, c 1920	Per cent of total population	Density of population, 1928	Estimated population, 1928
GERMANY	181,714	25.54	59,852,682	40.47	356	64,700,000
POLAND	149,958	21.08	27,392,674	18.38	203	30,400,000
AUSTRIA	32,369	4.55	6,151,445	4.15	205	6,650,000
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	54,207	7.62	13,613,172	9.20	268	14,550,000
JUGOSLAVIA	96,134	13.51	12,017,323	8.13	135	13,000,000
BULGARIA	39,814	5.60	4,816,971	3.27	143	5,700,000
ROMANIA	122,282	17.18	16,202,177	11.00	147	17,350,000
HUNGARY	35,911	5.05	7,987,143	5.40	239	8,600,000
<b>Total</b>	712,389	100.00	147,903,587	100.00		161,550,000

following the Napoleonic wars. But, coming on the scene after modern science had demonstrated its economic value, the Germans were not content merely to adopt British practices and usages. They began, almost with the birth of their machine industry, to apply the latest scientific knowledge to industrial processes. As a consequence they made especial progress in those industries where technical training, as contrasted with the manual skill acquired through apprenticeship, was of value. German education was extended so that it could produce an abundance of well-trained technicians who would be useful in the new industries which were developing. In time the German schools were able to turn out competent technicians in such large numbers that they could be hired for little more than the wages paid to skilled mechanics. This was of great advantage in certain types of work and soon the Germans came to excel in these fields. Furthermore, not having any traditional methods firmly fixed in their machine processes, and being relatively unhampered by trade-union restrictions, they made great strides in improving the processes of manufacture in many directions and they were also able in many instances to cheapen the costs of production.

## 2. German Population Growth

The effects of this industrial expansion on German population growth were very marked. The population of Germany at the close of the Franco-Prussian War was slightly over 41,000,000, in 1910 it was almost 65,000,000, and at the outbreak of the World War was about 67,000,000. Thus there was an increase of sixty-three per cent in the population of Germany in the forty-three years between the two wars. But this was not all, for during this whole period

Like the attempted expansion of France under Napoleon the expansion of Germany under the Kaiser was bound to create an enormous disturbance in the world — far greater, indeed, than anyone anticipated. But as we look back on events, we see that it was inevitable under the existing conditions. It is to be hoped that we have all learned a lesson from the attempted expansion of Germany which will be useful in dealing with the expansion of other peoples when the time for such expansion arrives.

For the time being, the Germans have been stopped and it is doubtful whether they will soon again have as strong an urge to expansion, for they are steadily becoming more industrialized and the birth-rate is falling very rapidly in consequence. The birth-rate in Germany today is only about sixty-five per cent of what it was in 1913 and the rate of natural increase has fallen in about the same proportion. The same relation to the 1913 rate of natural increase holds in Austria also, although neither the birth-rate nor the death-rate has fallen so low there as in Germany. Today the absolute increase in numbers among the Germans, including Austria, is scarcely more than half of what it was in the highest of pre-war years and there is good reason to think that it will still further decline in the near future. In Berlin the death-rate exceeds the birth-rate today, and in most of the other larger German cities the margin of increase is very small. This is shown clearly by the fact that in all the cities in Germany having over 100,000 inhabitants in 1925, containing 26.78 per cent of the total population, the total excess of births over deaths was only 47,979 in the year 1927. This is only 11.9 per cent of the excess in the entire country for this year and amounts to a natural increase of only 2.7 per thousand per year. This is a very low rate indeed, considering the age groups living in these cities, and it indicates a very high de-

gree of voluntary control of births in this part of the German population. If the same rate had prevailed in the entire population, the total increase would have been only 172,903, considerably less than half of what it actually was (402,949). If Austrian Germans are included, the total increase is now about 430,000 a year, but it appears quite probable that this number will not be long maintained. It would not be at all surprising to see the total increase of Germans in Germany and Austria fall to about one-half to three-fifths of its present numbers within a decade. This would mean an annual increment of only 200,000 to 250,000.

This does not seem a very large increment to care for, but it is doubtful whether even this many can be provided with profitable work within the present boundaries of Germany and Austria for any great length of time. It may, of course, happen that the decline in the birth-rate will continue to extend so rapidly to all classes of the population that there will soon be no increase to provide for; but this seems rather doubtful and can scarcely be relied upon as a solution of the German population problem. For it should be remembered in this connexion that the war losses of Germany and German Austria were tremendous (about two and one-quarter millions killed, not to mention those incapacitated through wounds) and that most of these were young men. Hence, the present low birth-rate among the Germans may represent only in part a definitely controlled fertility. When the sex ratios of those in the child-bearing ages again become normal, the rapid decline in the birth-rate may be somewhat slowed up, so that the absolute increase of population among the Germans may be larger than at present appears probable.

In any event it seems likely that the pressure of population among the Germans is likely to increase rather steadily, though slowly, unless some definite steps are taken to

provide larger resources for their support. If the pressure of the Germans on their means of livelihood is allowed to augment to any considerable extent, it is certain to increase the instability of the present world organization and thus increase the likelihood of war. Let us examine, then, the possibilities of providing for the increasing numbers of Germans in such a way that they will not constitute a liability against world peace.

### 3. The Extension of German Agriculture

German agriculture is not likely to contribute very considerably to the support of increased numbers. The land is already rather fully utilized. Before the war the yields per acre were high and were maintained only by intensive fertilization and much hard work. The yields are lower since the war and can only be brought back to pre-war standards by more hard labour and by the use of the most scientific methods of farming, accompanied by liberal use of fertilizers. There is, however, no real prospect of increasing the product per worker in German agriculture over pre-war levels by more intensive cultivation. The yields per acre may possibly be increased somewhat, but only by an increased application of labour, either directly in the form of work or indirectly in the form of chemical fertilizers. In any event, there is very little room for additional hands (or mouths) in German agriculture except at the expense of the already low standards of living of most of those now engaged in it. The Germans in the future must look almost wholly to other sources for the employment of their increase in numbers.

### 4. The Expansion of German Trade

Any considerable increase in foreign trade would assist the Germans very materially in caring for increased num-

bers. Now, it appears that the prospect for such an increase is moderately good. It is generally known that German goods were rapidly gaining a foothold in markets all over the world in the years before the war. From 1900 to 1913 the value of Germans exports more than doubled and Germany was becoming a strong competitor of Great Britain. The war practically stopped German foreign trade and in 1920 it had recovered only about one-third the volume of 1913. By 1926, however, it stood at about two-thirds of the 1913 level and was making steady progress. There does not seem to be any reasonable room for doubt that Germany will soon again be a very strong competitor in world markets in all the lines wherein it excelled before the war. To these it will probably add other lines also as new industries are developed and as its industrial and commercial organization readjusts itself to the needs of today. It seems practically certain, then, that the Germans will, in the near future, not only recover their trade in the fields in which they have shown special competence, but also make inroads on the trade of both Great Britain and the United States in new lines in those markets where they do not labour under any special handicaps—that is, where all competitors are given the same treatment.

The Germans have shown that they possess the technical skill to organize production efficiently; they have also shown much ingenuity in organizing the marketing of their goods at low cost, and they have demonstrated great adaptability in fitting their goods and services to different markets.

Then, too, Germany occupies a specially favoured position with relation to trade with Russia and can expect to increase this rather largely in the near future. Already Russia's foreign trade has attained nearly one-half its pre-war bulk and more goods are imported from Germany than from any

other country. Germany's relation to Russia can be likened to our relation to Canada. There is every reason why the Germans should do a big business with Russia during the time that Russia is developing its own resources and building up its home industries. Propinquity alone should make trade relations between Germany and Russia most intimate. But when we consider that Russia should be able to furnish just the food and raw materials that the Germans most need in exchange for their manufactures, there is no reasonable room for doubt that the economic ties between Russia and Germany will steadily become closer. Then, too, there is the fact that both Great Britain and the United States have been very hostile towards the Soviet government while Germany has cultivated its goodwill. Certainly, the German attitude is the more sensible one from the standpoint of the development of good trade relations. If we in the United States have secured a considerable amount of Russia's trade in recent years, we can attribute it to Germany's impotence rather than to the establishment of cordial economic relations which are likely to endure even after competition for this trade becomes lively.

### 5. Increased Efficiency of Industry in Germany

It is impossible to go into any detail here regarding the means the Germans are using to maintain and even improve upon their productive efficiency in spite of the loss of resources due to the detachment of territory as a result of the war. The use of lignite to take the place of Silesian coal; the extension of the use of electricity by lowering its cost through the establishment of more efficient central power-stations; the modernization of factories and plants of all kinds with the view of reducing the cost of production; the integration

of industries where waste energy or material could be conserved by such integration; the improvement of transportation facilities; and many other changes in the organization of production and distribution indicate that the Germans are fully awake to the conditions they have to meet in competing for world trade and are prepared to revamp their system wherever and whenever it seems wise to do so.

Furthermore, the Germans are developing international organizations in various industries where it appears that, by so doing, raw materials can be assured at more reasonable prices, or where the more orderly marketing of the product seems likely to have a beneficial effect on costs of production and on profits. Already it appears that these various methods for the improvement of Germany's economic position are beginning to bear fruit in the recovery of its foreign trade. Thus it appears that Germany is strengthening its economic position by many mechanical improvements in productive processes, and, with rather low labour costs, there can be little doubt that it will soon be even a more formidable competitor in world markets than it was before the war. It is quite probable, then, that Germany will be able to support some increase of population through increased foreign trade. In this respect the Germans present quite a contrast to the British, as we shall see in the following chapter. The Germans are determined to make their industry as nearly mechanically perfect as possible; they are also quite willing and ready to try out new types of organization in both production and distribution; and their workers are apparently willing to co-operate with the employers to make the new methods effective. All this augurs well for the extension of German trade as compared with that of certain other countries. But it is uncertain how long the foreign trade of the world in manufactured goods will continue to

increase, and it would be folly to suppose that Germany could care for such an increase as it now has (about 430,000 per annum, including Austrian Germans) for any great length of time through increased trade abroad.

## 6. Outlets for Germany's Surplus People

But, fortunately, increased foreign trade is not the Germans' only resource. They also have rather large outlets for emigrants open to them. The quota of Germans allowed to enter this country has, until now (1929) accounted for about ten per cent of the present annual increase and it is enough to help the situation at home to some extent. Besides the emigration to this country, about 9,000 to 10,000 are going to South American countries each year. It seems quite possible to increase this number considerably in the near future if their migration is carefully planned. Germans are welcomed in most South American countries, but these countries cannot use any large number of industrial workers. They need agriculturists rather than factory hands, and as the Germans have become more industrialized, they have found it more and more difficult to get a start in this part of the world. We have seen above, however, that by far the larger part of the increase in population among the Germans takes place outside the larger industrial centres. Indeed, the excess of births over deaths is almost three times as great in the rural districts as in the cities of over 100,000. Consequently, the emigration of young people in rather large numbers from the agricultural areas of Germany to the agricultural areas of temperate and subtropic South America should not be a very difficult matter if it is taken in hand with customary German thoroughness. There is need for agriculturists in these South American countries and they are desired by the people already there. Since

about one-third of the Germans are still engaged in agriculture at home and this one-third is producing a large part of the natural increase in population, it would appear that Germany could spare a considerable number of agricultural emigrants each year, perhaps as many as 100,000 to 150,000.

There is abundant room for German agriculturists in various parts of the British Empire, but they are not much wanted there at present. Unless conditions in Australia and South Africa change considerably, there is little chance of German migration to these areas attaining substantial proportions. Another possible outlet for the Germans, which may prove very valuable within the course of the next decade or two, is Russia. Russia should be able to use and will probably welcome a considerable number of technically trained men and skilled workmen when political conditions have become more settled so that more attention can be given to the development of its economic life. Once Russia is in a position to begin on a program of public works and to undertake the exploitation of its vast resources, it will have need of large numbers of well-trained men, both for executive work and for technical guidance. It will also need many skilled workmen to get the new industries under way. Germany should be in a position to furnish these men better than any other country on account of its propinquity, its technical education, and the readiness with which its people learn foreign languages. Furthermore, the use of German-trained men in Russian industry would in turn prove helpful to German trade, for the time being, in any event. For these men would naturally prefer German machines and tools for their work. It might also happen that if the Russian peasant shows a reluctance to enter industry, as he well may, the Germans would be called upon to man entire industries. If this should happen, it would afford a

considerable amount of relief to Germany over the next two or three decades.

Considering, then, the rapid decline in the German birth-rate, the probabilities of the expansion of German industry, and the outlets for Germans in other countries, it seems not improbable that the pressure of population in Germany will not, in the near future, become much greater than at present. It is, of course, considerable now, and the Germans would be better off if there were fewer of them, but the present pressure of numbers is not likely to lead to efforts for national expansion.

The Germans are no doubt greatly enlightened, if not chastened, by the outcome of the war. They know the futility of their methods and attitudes in the past. But it can scarcely be supposed, in view of what actually happened at Versailles, that they have renounced for all time a fairer share in the world's resources. If they can secure this by peaceful negotiations, they, like all other peoples, will prefer it so. If it turns out that the peoples in control of these resources have not also learned a lesson from the war, then it can scarcely be expected that Germany will preserve more from its recent experiences than the belief that its supreme fault was in being the weaker side. Another time it may well happen that the Germans can arrange their alliances better and can draw more fish from the troubled waters than their adversaries. It is certainly not fantastic to suppose that some millions of Germans are thinking something of this sort now, although there is no reason to suppose that any definite plans for future expansion are being laid. It is quite likely that if Germany figures in international strife in the near future, it will be as an ally of some other powers which have taken the initiative, but in a situation where it is fairly clear that German aid will be decisive.

It will be shown later that such situations are not at all unlikely to arise in the not distant future; and it is asking more of human nature than can be expected of it to hope that the Germans will not take advantage of the difficulties of those nations now holding excess resources to secure something more for themselves. If the Germans are but patient for a season, time will bring allies among those peoples who, like themselves, are being kept out of what they feel to be a rightful share in the heritage of this world.

### 7. The Slavs of Central Europe

Of all the peoples west of Russia the Slavs (including in this classification all the people in central Europe who are not Germans, although this is not strictly accurate) have the greatest expansive power (see Table X, p. 295). The birth-rates are still very high in most of these countries, and though their death-rates are also high, they are beginning to yield a little to the better sanitation that is slowly being introduced. The expansive power of these peoples is well seen in the excess of births over deaths that is taking place in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Roumania. But if all these non-German peoples in central Europe are taken together, it appears that their natural increase will average from twelve to fifteen per thousand per annum, which means that they will double in about forty-six to fifty years. In discussing the population problems of this part of Europe, it will be best to treat each country separately, as the situation can probably be made clearer by so doing.

### 8. Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia there is a wide difference in population growth in different parts of the country where

living-conditions are different. In Bohemia proper, where there is considerable industrial development and a large German population, the birth-rate is declining and the rate of natural increase is low (five to six per thousand per annum). In general, this part of the country seems to be much like Germany and Austria in its outlook and in its population problems. Continued industrialization seems likely to reduce the birth-rate here until, in a short time, there will be little natural increase. In Slovakia and in the sub-Carpathian region, however, the improvement of sanitation is leading to a very rapid rate of increase — about eighteen in the former, and about twenty-three in the latter. These parts of the country would, at these rates, double in numbers in thirty to thirty-five years. Inasmuch, however, as two-thirds of the total population of Czechoslovakia have low birth-rates, it seems rather probable that this country will not have any very serious population problems in the near future, for there is considerable opportunity for the expansion of its industry, and, along with Germany, it should share in the trade increase with eastern Europe which is quite likely to take place.

In fact, Czechoslovakia is very fortunate in the mineral resources it possesses. It has quite abundant supplies of coal and iron, and it possesses fair amounts of many other useful minerals. Altogether, it is one of the richest areas in Europe and, with the start it already has, should support a considerable increase of population by the expansion and intensification of its industrial life. In proportion to its population it is much better off than Germany.

In agriculture there is also considerable opportunity for expansion and improvement. The actual area of tilled land can be somewhat extended, but the greatest increase in product is to be expected from improvement in the methods of

tillage. If the government actively encourages such improvements, as seems quite probable, the land will support a considerable increase in numbers at better standards than now prevail.

In view of these various possibilities of increasing the productiveness of labour it does not seem that the pressure of population in Czechoslovakia is likely to increase greatly during the next two or three decades; at least, not to the extent that the disposal of its surplus will become a very serious matter or will threaten the stability of the present political status in this part of the world. We must recognize, however, that the numerous other causes of friction in this area, of which Czechoslovakia has its share, will probably be made more active by any increase in population pressure. Furthermore, in a country rather rapidly becoming industrialized and urbanized, the growth of the feeling of population pressure is quite likely to be much more rapid than the growth of actual pressure, because of the rapid development of new standards. It seems not improbable, however, that much of the growth of the feeling of pressure can be fore stalled in Czechoslovakia, as in Germany, by the reduction of the birth-rate, which, as we have seen, is already well under way.

If in addition to the economic and social factors, which seem likely to keep population pressure down in Czechoslovakia for the next two or three decades, we take account of the many political factors which seem much more likely to lead to war, we are fully justified in our judgment that the growth of population in this country does not threaten serious consequences in the near future. The irritation over boundaries on practically every front; the large minorities of other peoples, totalling four and one-half to five millions, included in Czechoslovakia; the irredentist movements they

may engender; the lack of direct outlets to the sea; and many other problems of immediate concern are, in my judgment, much more likely to lead to war than the growth of population pressure; although, as I have already said, these more purely political problems are all made more difficult of solution by lack of adequate economic resources.

### 9. Poland

In Poland the situation is quite different from that in Czechoslovakia. In most years since the war the natural increase has been about sixteen to seventeen per thousand in those parts of the republic that were formerly under German and Austrian rule. This is a trifle lower than it was before the war, but it is a rate that will double the population in forty to forty-three years. In the rest of Poland the rate is probably higher, although data are not available to enable us to speak with certainty of this part of the country.

In Poland, or at least in that part of it under German and Austrian rule before the war, as in most of the other countries of Europe, the birth-rate is declining, but not so rapidly as in the western countries. In 1909-12 it was about thirty-nine per thousand per annum, and in 1924-6 it was about thirty-four. In the meantime the death-rate has also declined, so that the natural increase is but very little lower than formerly.

Unlike Czechoslovakia, that part of the population in Poland which practises birth control is a small part of the whole and is largely confined to the bigger cities. In some of these the rate of natural increase has fallen to the very low level of three to five per thousand per annum, while birth-rates of twenty-one to twenty-six are common. In general,

one may say that the birth-rates of these larger cities are not more than two-thirds as high as in the rest of the country. This is conclusive evidence that birth control is spreading rapidly in the cities, but it is also proof that it is not making much headway in the rural districts. Indeed, such a decline in the birth-rate as that pointed out above, about four to five points in fifteen years, can be accounted for by the decline in the cities and the very large excess of women aged ten years and over (almost a million) in the present population. So far as one can tell, it seems rather probable that birth control will not become general in Poland for three or four decades at the earliest. Its spread will be retarded not only by the large proportion of the population that are peasants and by their backwardness, but also, to a certain extent, by the teachings of the Church, which has a very strong influence in the country, particularly among the peasants. The chief force working for the extension of birth control and against tradition and the Church will be the growing industrialization and urbanization of the country. This will unquestionably not only affect those working in industry, but also spread gradually to the agricultural populations surrounding the industrial centres, as has happened in other countries; but when three-fourths of the population of a country is engaged in agriculture, the spread of this influence is necessarily slow.

Many Poles expect a rapid increase in the country's industry now that it is independent. They believe that in pre-war days both Russia and Germany purposely prevented any industrial development in their Polish provinces and that now there should be a compensatory development. It is impossible to say how well founded these expectations are. There is no doubt that Poland possesses some of the requisites of a rapid industrial expansion, but

neither is there any doubt that it is quite lacking in some of the others.

Poland has ample coal supplies and a fair amount of iron. It also has considerable oil, and it has zinc deposits of great value. On the whole, it may be said that it possesses good mineral resources. It also has an ample supply of good unskilled labourers. We know from our experience with them in this country that they are good workers and will undertake any kind of hard work. We also know that they can be taught to do skilled work, but this takes time and presents quite a different problem here, where they can be used to adulterate the large skilled labour force already at work, from that of Poland, where there are very few skilled workers on machines to teach them.

The lack of skilled machine-workers is, then, one of the serious handicaps to the rapid development of Polish industry. Then, too, Poland lacks trained technicians who can plan and direct the actual processes of manufacture and organize it on an efficient basis. The training of these men will also take time. Again, Poland lacks the capital to build and equip the factories essential to rapid industrial development. And lastly, but not least, the Poles as a whole are so poor that there is no adequate home market for many of the products of modern industry. This is the greatest obstacle to rapid industrialization in any country and is the one hardest to overcome because the purchasing power of a whole people can be increased only slowly as the entire system of production is overhauled and improved so that the productiveness of the worker is increased.

In my judgment, then, neither the extension and improvement of agriculture nor the development of industry will prevent Poland from experiencing a growing pressure of population within the next three or four decades. They will,

of course, prevent this pressure from growing as rapidly as would otherwise be the case, but grow it will, in spite of what can be done in these fields.

Nor do I believe that emigration is likely to offer much relief to Poland during this time unless considerable changes take place in the immigration policies of some of the more thinly settled countries. Indeed, the migration outlets for Poles are fewer now than before the war and do not seem likely to increase greatly in the near future. Polish emigration to this country has practically ceased under our new quota law. Furthermore, Europe is not now using so many seasonal labourers from Poland as before the war; hence this source of livelihood is partially closed. Argentina and Canada take a few thousands of Polish emigrants each year, but not enough to make much difference in the situation in Poland. Whether the numbers going to these countries can be greatly increased cannot be foretold definitely. But if we may judge from Canada's attitude towards non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants in general, it is pretty certain that no very large number of Poles will be admitted. As for what may happen in South America to encourage larger Polish immigration, it is pure guess-work to attempt to say. But we must remember that, after all, the temperate and subtropical lands of South America are by no means unlimited in area, and it is quite probable that much of their best land is already being used, although not very intensively. There seems to be some chance for increased Polish migration in this direction, but not for its attaining very considerable magnitude within a generation.

The one hope for a large Polish migration seems to us to be in the rapid development of agriculture in Asiatic Russia and the encouragement of Slavic immigrants from central Europe, as well as from western Russia, to migrate thither.

Whether Poles would be encouraged, or even allowed, to settle in Russia depends upon the relations between Poland and Russia developed under their new regimes. Heretofore the Poles have been very bitter towards the Russians because of long oppression at their hands. More recently there has been mutual hatred engendered by the attempts of each country to establish the boundary between them to its own advantage. Consequently it does not seem probable that any scheme of Polish settlement in the unpeopled areas of Asiatic Russia is likely to be undertaken in the immediate future. It may also be that the Polish government will discourage emigration, just as the Italian government is now doing. The desire to develop the resources of the country, and the need for a strong army to maintain her present frontiers, may lead the Polish government to frown upon emigration. Under these conditions it may appear good policy to the Polish statesmen to allow a considerable degree of population pressure to develop within the country both for defence and to prove to the world that the Poles really need all their present territory.

The point should be made clear here that there is likely to be a considerably increased pressure of numbers in Poland within thirty to forty years. This condition will certainly intensify the already great instability in this quarter and thus render war more probable. Since Poland is on the verge of war most of the time as it is, a population growing faster than it can be adequately cared for will certainly help to push it over the brink sooner than would otherwise happen. In this way growing pressure of numbers may prove to be one of the important factors determining Polish politics within the next three or four decades.

## 10. Roumania

Roumania, unlike Czechoslovakia and Poland, was not created an independent state as a result of the war, but it was somewhat more than doubled, both in area and in population, by acquisitions at the close of the war. With a population of about 18,000,000 today, Roumania has a natural increase of about fourteen to sixteen per thousand per annum, and a net annual increase of about 250,000. The density of population in the entire kingdom is about 150 per square mile, which is very considerable, in view of the mountainous nature of a large part of the country, and the fact that eighty-two per cent of its population is agricultural.

Agriculture in Roumania is, in general, of a very primitive sort and yields but small returns to the peasant cultivator. On a few large estates modern methods of extensive tillage are practised, and returns per worker are fairly high, but as a usual thing the Roumanian peasant is very poor and has low standards of living. Indeed, it is the ability of the Roumanian peasant to live on very little that lies at the basis of the recent territorial expansion of the country. By living on less than their neighbours they have been able to penetrate slowly into surrounding territories and thus they established a claim to certain areas in Hungary, Austria, Russia, and Bulgaria. Like most of the friends of France in central Europe, Roumania was given more than it was entitled to by the treaty of Versailles; although it did have a real claim to certain neighbouring areas, if similar ethnic composition constitutes such a claim.

As regards the probable increase of population in Roumania and its effects on the stability of the present political order, it seems quite likely that Roumania can care for its increase during the next two or three decades through the

improvement of agricultural practices and increasing industrialization. There cannot be the least doubt that the breaking up of the large estates and the introduction of better methods of tillage will make it possible for the peasant to get a considerably larger return for his work than he now does. As a consequence, agriculture alone can support a considerable increase in population at better standards than now prevail.

In addition to the increased population that can be supported by an improved agriculture, Roumania has large possibilities for the support of people through industrialization. In proportion to its territory and population Roumania is supposed to have the best resources of any European country. It has abundance of coal and oil, and it also possesses large supplies of other of the more useful metals. So far as natural resources are concerned, its industrial future is assured; but like Poland it lacks skilled workmen, technicians, capital, and a large, stable home market. It is bound to take considerable time to develop Roumanian industry to the point where it will absorb large numbers of workers; and the depressing effects of industry on the birth-rate will not be felt until industrialization is well started.

It seems rather probable, therefore, that the increase of population in Roumania will be fairly large during the next two or three decades, and that the pressure on means of subsistence may increase considerably during the latter part of that period. After the possibilities of agricultural improvement have been exhausted and before industry is well developed, the absorptive capacity of the country will tend to remain stationary. Perhaps there will be no gap between these two periods of development and Roumania will be able to care for its own increase without much difficulty. It is to be hoped that this will be so, for if pressure in Rou-

mania increases much, it is certain to aggravate the political problems of the country and thus contribute another unsettling element to the dangerous situation already existing in the Balkans.

### II. Jugoslavia

There is little to be said about the population problems of Jugoslavia, for little is known regarding rates of increase and the possibilities of support of increase within this area. It seems probable, however, that there is as high a rate of increase in this country as among the other Slavic peoples of central Europe, for they are among the most backward of all of these peoples and have the largest gaps to fill to reach pre-war conditions.

There will not be an immediate increase in population pressure, however, because it will require several years yet to make up war losses, and there is much opportunity for improvement in agricultural practices. But after a decade or two population pressure is quite likely to increase because these lands do not seem to be very well endowed with the mineral resources needed for industrial development. Hence, the relief of pressure arising from industrialization, both through absorption of workers and through reduction of the birth-rate, is likely to be slow in reaching Jugoslavia.

Even so, it does not appear likely that pressure of population will be more than one among many factors driving Jugoslavia to war. If Jugoslavia holds together as a nation, it will have so many more immediate causes of war with its neighbours that increased pressure of population will play a minor part. Increased pressure will make more urgent the need of Fiume and the outlet through Scutari; it will also

make more probable forced evacuations of discontented islands by Bulgars, Magyars, and others and will increase the justification felt by the extreme nationalists for provocative conduct with relation to their neighbours and in this way will increase the probability of war in the Balkans. But it may quite rightly be looked upon as one of the minor causes.

## 12. Other Balkan Countries

What has just been said about Jugoslavia applies with almost equal force to the other Balkan states. They are all bitter towards their neighbours and have almost innumerable contacts that irritate. In all of them the growth of population during the next three or four decades threatens to intensify the irritation of these contacts and thus constitutes a real danger to peace, not only in the Balkans, but in Europe and in the world. But population pressure by itself, even if it becomes considerably greater than at present, can scarcely be regarded as the major factor likely to create disturbance in this region. Political and racial injustices rankle in the minds of most of these peoples far more than economic injustices and may be regarded as the more active ferments creating friction and leading to conflict.

There can be little doubt, however, that even though population pressure is not likely to be the chief cause of trouble in this region, the whole situation could be greatly relieved by migration if it were intelligently organized and directed. This migration would need to be of two kinds: (a) exchange of disaffected groups between countries, and (b) external migration. Both would serve to ease the national hatreds of these states, and the latter would also relieve the pressure on resources and thus help to allay the irritation of old sores which is likely to arise from this source.

The exchange of disaffected groups between the different states should do much to reduce irredentist movements if it is honestly undertaken and carried through with goodwill. Certainly, if a very small fraction of the energy spent in planning even a Balkan war, and the goods wasted in carrying it on, were devoted to the exchange of disaffected nationals between countries, more progress towards peace could be made than is likely to be made by waging any number of wars. Even a certain amount of pressure exerted to induce Roumanians to leave Hungary, and *vice versa*, would be preferable from every standpoint to another war. The very people who would be involved in such semi-forced migration would be the ones who would suffer most if there were a war, so that even a considerable amount of force applied to induce them to migrate would prove to be kindness in the end.

That such migration on a large scale is possible has been proved in the case of the Greeks. The suffering involved, though great, was certainly less than would have been involved in attempting to retain their position in Asia by war. But in central Europe no such large-scale movement need be undertaken suddenly, or at all. The whole movement could be carefully planned in advance and there need be no great hardship involved.

It would also be possible to plan community migration to foreign countries for "islands" of Bulgars in Serbia, or of Magyars in Roumania, or of Poles in Czechoslovakia. Even if it were necessary to place "islands" of different nationalities close together in a new country, no great harm would result, because traditional hatreds would soon lose meaning in the new land, and the migrants would find co-operation in all essential activities quite easy. This has happened over and over again among immigrants in the United States and also

in other lands where different and antagonistic nationalities have been thrown together under entirely novel conditions.

We believe that properly planned migration is more likely to avert war in central Europe than any other one thing because it will do more to relieve the existing tensions than anything else. But again attention must be called to the fact that these tensions are not the same as those which are developing in Japan and Italy, although the most effective method of relief in the near future may be the same.

War in the Balkans or in central Europe arising from frontier disputes or the treatment of minorities may not seem a very serious matter to us at this distance and it would perhaps not even be serious to Europe if such a war could be localized. It is my belief, however, that there is very little chance of localizing even a minor Balkan war as long as there are a number of other and powerful nations which feel that they are suffering at the hands of still other powerful nations. A war in the Balkans, even though of modest extent, is, under present conditions, going to call forth new alliances and to render the nations with grievances hopeful of upsetting the present equilibrium and of profiting in the outcome. It is easy to understand why this should be so and why such nations should do all in their power to encourage the instability of the present system. But it is also obvious that if the more powerful nations which have real grievances were given the resources they need, they would not have the incentive to stir up trouble that they now have and their influence would be on the side of peace rather than of war. Hence the world at large cannot afford to be indifferent to such apparently trivial matters as the way in which population pressure in Roumania is likely to affect her relations to Bulgaria or to her other neighbours.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE POPULATION PROBLEM OF GREAT BRITAIN

It may seem rather odd, after what has been said at various places above, that anything more should be said here about the population problem of Great Britain. Great Britain possesses the largest reserves of land of any nation on earth; it has more capital available for the development of these resources than any other country, with the possible exception of the United States; and it has a larger fund of experience in the colonization and development of dependencies than any nation has ever before possessed. Why, then, should Great Britain be thought of as a nation whose population problem is of interest from the standpoint of the maintenance of peace through opening new lands and resources to it?

It is, of course, absurd to think of Great Britain's population problem as constituting a menace to peace because of excessive pressure of numbers having no place to go to, since it possesses so many dominions, colonies, and protectorates. The only justification for a chapter on Great Britain in this book is that Great Britain is the most important political power in the world today, and her attitude towards a more just distribution of the resources of the world will be determined, in part at least, by her own peculiar population problems. Hence these problems are of interest to the world at large. As the discussion of Great Britain's population problem proceeds, it will become clear how what may at first appear as a purely domestic concern is likely to affect the world

situation and thus exercise a great deal of influence upon the trend of events during the next few decades. The domestic concerns of a nation with the far-flung political and economic interests of Great Britain cannot but be matters of international concern. There is not a nation in the world that is not more or less narrowly affected by Great Britain's foreign policies, and these in turn are closely related to her population problems. Hence the domestic affairs of Great Britain become of general interest in the same way that the private lives of exalted personages are of interest to all those who look to them for leadership.

### 1. The Present Economic Situation

Ever since complete demobilization (1920) the amount of unemployment in Great Britain has attracted a great deal of attention among those interested in its economic life. The number of unemployed persons has varied from about seventeen per cent of those insured in 1921 (not including striking miners) to about nine per cent (1927); and at the low point in 1927 the excess of unemployed over those of 1913 almost equalled the total increase in the number of workers that had taken place during the interval between these two dates. In other words, it appears that in the best year Great Britain has had since the war, the amount of employment was just about the same as in 1913, while there has been an increase of about 2,900,000 in her population. We should note, too, that in addition to the unemployed persons eligible for unemployment insurance, the number of persons in receipt of poor relief was more than twice as great in 1927 as in 1913, and the amount spent in poor relief was almost three times as great in 1927 as in 1913. No doubt much of this increase in poor relief is due directly or indirectly to unem-

ployment and is a reflection of the greater difficulty now being experienced by certain classes of people in finding enough work to keep them from becoming public charges. Dependency directly due to the war is not included in either of the above groups.

It is clear, then, that unemployment has become one of the major problems—perhaps the major one—which Great Britain has had to face since the war. It is an enormous burden on the industry of the country. It seriously affects the incomes of all those who are working regularly; and it is fast creating a very considerable number of people who are unemployable because of the demoralizing effects of long-continued loafing. It is little wonder, then, that the problem of unemployment is causing much uneasiness in Great Britain at the present time and that its causes are being sought in many directions.

That there is much disagreement as to what these causes are is to be expected. In general, one may say that those who discuss the causes of Great Britain's unemployment divide into two groups: (1) those who consider these causes to be of a temporary nature; (2) those who consider them to be of a permanent nature. The first of these groups again divides into two groups depending on (a) whether they believe that the falling off in British trade is merely a result of the dislocation of trade consequent upon the disturbed conditions following the war, together with a passing depression in the customary business cycle, or (b) whether they believe that complete recovery is only possible if British industry and commerce are given a thorough overhauling which will make them as efficient technically as those of her competitors for world trade.

The first of these two groups, the one believing that Britain's problem of unemployment is only temporary, also believes that a policy of *laissez-faire* is the proper policy to

pursue. They hold, in essence, that if the individual business man is let alone to deal with his problems as he sees fit, all will be well with British industry and consequently with the British nation, within a few years. Five or six years ago this view was tenable and was very common. Today it has largely been exploded by the fact that, after several periods of rising employment, unemployment is again on the increase because British trade is not expanding as fast as world markets are recovering from the disorganization consequent upon the war.

Between the second group believing that Britain's problem of unemployment is temporary — namely, those who hold that it can be completely cured by a thorough overhauling of British industry — and the group that believes this unemployment is permanent and that the unemployed are a surplus population which Great Britain can never hope to keep profitably employed, there will naturally be many ideas in common. They will agree upon the necessity of increasing the efficiency of British industry in every possible way. They will also agree upon the necessity of modifying the traditional *laissez-faire* policy of the country in the interest of certain kinds of co-operative action and perhaps upon the need of tariff protection by certain industries. But they will disagree fundamentally upon the need for increasing the restriction of births and upon the policies to be followed in caring for the unemployed.

It is easy to see that if one believes improved efficiency in industry and commerce will enable Great Britain to sell at a fair profit all the goods it can produce, then one will naturally believe that the people now unemployed will soon find jobs and that any future increase in the number of workers can be cared for by the extension of trade. In other words, increased efficiency in industry and trade will enable Great

Britain to maintain the paramount position, economically and politically, to which it has become accustomed.

On the other hand, those who hold that, no matter how greatly the efficiency of British industry is improved, there is no chance for it to give steady and profitable employment to those now unemployed, to say nothing of the customary yearly increase of workers, recognize that a change is taking place in Great Britain's position as a world power. They believe that in a world organized as our world is, a country situated as Great Britain is must recognize that its status cannot remain fixed. They hold that Great Britain must adjust itself to these new conditions and must accept the fact that it is no longer the leading power in the world economically and probably will decline in political importance as a consequence. It appears to them that fate has shifted the cards and that Great Britain can no longer expect to hold the trump hand as in times past.

I hold with those who believe that Great Britain has entered an economic decline which is permanent—that is to say, that Great Britain is now over-populated and has no chance to employ profitably its present workers, to say nothing of future increases. I believe, further, that all possible increases in the efficiency of British industry will, at best, only enable it to maintain its position today, but will not enable it to regain the position it occupied almost without challenge through a large part of the nineteenth century.

## 2. Can Great Britain Retain Its Paramount Economic Position?

The reasons for this belief are numerous and can only be sketched here, although enough must be said to enable the reader to see that this belief rests on a reasonable basis.

In the first place, and as the British are themselves now well aware, it is going to be a long, hard pull to make British industry highly efficient. It is not implied that in many types of manufacturing the British are not highly efficient now, but it is generally recognized that there are also many fields in which they are less efficient than certain other countries. It is generally known, for example, that in the chemical industries Germany is superior to Great Britain and can place German goods on the market at lower prices. Possibly the British can in time equal the Germans, or at least approach them closely, in the efficiency of their chemical industries, but it will take considerable time and will necessitate very large changes in the attitude of the British towards technical education and the position of the educated classes in the social order. Considering, then, the differences in historical background — that is, in the social development of the two countries — it may well be that Great Britain can never fully equal Germany in this particular. Though national characteristics are by no means immutable, they cannot be changed overnight, especially in old, settled civilizations.

Again, it is very generally recognized by British engineers as well as those in other countries that in certain types of manufacturing they can learn much from the United States. We have been particularly successful in making use of automatic machinery and in organizing the manufacturing processes that can make use of such machinery. It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that our methods can be taken over bodily into British industry or into the industry of any other country. They are in part the expression of our national character and will work smoothly only when operated under conditions such as obtain among us. The spirit of the pioneer still permeates our life to such an extent that experiments can be tried and methods of work can be made to succeed

here which would not be at all feasible in an older civilization where strong traditions hold both the enterpriser and the workman within more definite limits. There can be no reasonable doubt that, though the industries in which mechanization is essential for efficiency can be much improved by the British, they will have great difficulty in competing with us in these lines. The psychological accretions of both masters and workmen are very considerable in a country like Great Britain and must be worn away by slow attrition rather than removed by surgical operation. As in the chemical industries among the Germans, the particular aptitudes which make for success in highly mechanized industry are a part of our national character. They will not manifest themselves in the British as soon as the machines are installed.

Lest I should be misunderstood, I want to say that there are, without doubt, many types of industry and particularly many commercial practices making for efficiency which are peculiarly the expression of British qualities. These should be of distinct advantage in the effort to develop national economic efficiency. They should make possible differentials in the cost of producing certain qualities of goods that will enable the British to hold more than their own in these given lines of trade. But it is extremely doubtful whether Great Britain can, in the near future, attain such proficiency in all lines of industry that it can ever again be the leader in almost all branches of world trade, as it was in the past.

This same line of argument, of course, applies to the chances of any nation for the extension of its trade. For example, as yet we have made no headway in putting woollens on the world market which can compete with British woollens and we are not succeeding very well in making the finer grades of cotton goods. Furthermore, our understanding of the fine points of foreign commercial practice is as yet

elementary and it will no doubt be a long time before we have a class of men who can carry on this work as adequately as the British experts in foreign trade. We are still thinking and shall continue to think largely in terms of home trade, while many of the British have for several generations thought in terms of world trade and world affairs.

What has been said above refers particularly to what may be called the internal or psychological obstacles in the way of improving the efficiency of industry in Great Britain or in any other country (although the older and more settled the civilization of any country, the greater the resistance to adjustment). There are also difficulties that have to do with the cost of materials needed in the making of goods. Of such difficulties Great Britain has many in spite of its vast empire. I shall mention only two here, although they are of such importance that they affect costs in most other industries. Coal is becoming steadily dearer in Great Britain. Not only have miners' wages and other costs of mining increased of late years (this is true all over the world), but the actual production per person engaged in mining in Great Britain is now only about two-thirds of what it was in 1880 and is only one-third as much as in this country. The chief reason for this apparent decrease in the British miner's efficiency is that the better seams of coal are giving out. Deeper and thinner seams must now be worked. Natural physical conditions over which man has no control are boosting the cost of British coal, and the end is not in sight. Hence in the future the cost of power for British industry seems likely to increase steadily, though slowly.

Great Britain is also unfortunate in that its iron ore is steadily falling off in quality. More than half the iron now made in Great Britain is smelted from imported ore. In general, this means that the distance between fuel and ore is increas-

ing and that the cheapening of costs in the iron industry will be more and more difficult as time passes. Thus it appears that another of the great initial advantages which Great Britain possessed in the early days when modern industry was getting under way is passing, and that in the future the difficulty of meeting foreign competition will be greater than in the past.

In the second place, if what has been said above regarding the difficulties Great Britain will encounter in producing many types of goods more efficiently and more cheaply is true, it follows that the competition in international trade is going to become increasingly severe for Great Britain. In almost all lines of manufacturing there is now some competitor which possesses conditions as advantageous for cheap production as Great Britain or even more so. One need mention only a few examples to prove this point.

In the Orient Japan is competing very successfully with Great Britain in the cheaper grades of cotton goods. Our own trade in this line is also increasing, while Germany now buys almost as much raw cotton from us as Great Britain does. In the rayon industry (artificial silk) a number of the European countries possess better facilities for its cheap manufacture than Great Britain. In central Europe there is both cheaper labour and cheaper wood than in Great Britain; while power is no more expensive. Furthermore, in the cheaper textiles, world trade is not unlikely to shrink considerably in the future because countries like India and China are rapidly becoming self-sustaining in this respect. It is not improbable that the Chinese can now produce certain types of cotton goods more cheaply than any other people.

In chemicals Germany has for some time been predominant and is likely to remain so for several decades. But it should also be noted that in the production of chemicals

where mass methods are usable and for which coal is the basic raw material, our own country is likely to become a strong competitor in world markets. We possess the best of the known coal reserves in the world and are efficient in mass production.

In iron and steel Germany had practically overtaken Great Britain before the war, and the new European combination, which Great Britain has not entered, is likely to make it even more difficult for Great Britain to hold its place in world trade. In these industries our competition is also a factor of prime importance. We are especially blessed with iron and coal, possessing between two and three times as large a proportion of the known world reserves in both of these minerals as the whole of Europe. Since the production of iron is an industry that especially lends itself to mechanization and mass production, we are certain to be an increasingly important factor in the world market.

In the machinery trade, in railroad supplies, in motor-cars, and in all other goods in which iron and steel are largely used, we shall also be an active competitor in the world markets as will Germany and some of the other continental countries. There cannot be the least doubt that it will be increasingly difficult for Great Britain to meet outside competition in all iron and steel products, but particularly in the heavier products, both those semi-fabricated and those on which a large amount of labour is expended.

In the boot and shoe industry, in tobacco manufactures, in electrical goods, and in many others the situation is much the same as in the industries already mentioned. In almost all lines of industry and commerce the early advantages of Great Britain, which contributed decisively to its leadership in these fields, are disappearing. The technical skill in the manufacture and use of machinery, which was at one time

Britain's special pride, has been widely disseminated and has become common to most nations of the Western world and to some extent even to those in the Orient. Nor is the possession of a large fund of knowledge useful in world commerce any longer the peculiar possession of Great Britain. There are several countries that have well-organized agencies for the collection of such information as is useful in foreign commerce and there are institutions for training those who desire to specialize in this field. The third pillar of British supremacy—the possession of certain natural advantages in raw materials and in location—is also becoming weak, as has already been pointed out. Hence there cannot be the least doubt that Great Britain is on the threshold of a new era as regards its position in world trade, a period in which competition will be far more severe than ever before, and on which it enters with handicaps heavier than it has hitherto carried.

There is still another element in this situation which merits our careful attention. It is the increasing extent to which the nations of the world are becoming self-sufficing in their manufactured goods. The same process of industrial development which has brought new competitors on the stage of world trade is leading to greater self-sufficiency on the part of many countries which do not yet aspire to foreign trade in manufactured goods. This is particularly true of the dominions of the British Empire, which have been among the best customers of Great Britain in the past. In Canada, Australia, and South Africa there has been a much more rapid increase in the number of persons engaged in manufacturing than in the total population. There has also been a marked increase in the other non-agricultural occupations, a change which always accompanies industrial development. Already in Australia the proportion of persons engaged in agriculture is

about the same as in our own country; in both Canada and South Africa the proportion of agricultural workers is but slightly greater than with us. Imports also show a slower rate of growth than in past times, as well as a change in character. This latter is in the direction of more goods to be used in production (machinery) and fewer for direct consumption. These signs certainly point to the desire of these peoples to manufacture their own goods and retain the profits at home. It is not at all likely that they will succeed in this endeavour as quickly as they would like, particularly in South Africa, but there is little doubt that many of the things they have been accustomed to buy abroad will soon be made at home.

It is true that there are preferential tariffs within the British Empire which are calculated to further the sale of British goods in the dominions and colonies; but such tariffs may not prove of much benefit to Great Britain if they are made sufficiently high to permit the home manufacturer to develop his plant to the point where he can supply the home market. It cannot be much consolation to a British shoe-manufacturer to have a tariff on shoes in Australia which favours him as compared with the German and American manufacturer if this tariff is so high that the Australian shoe-manufacturer gets all the business. This is what is actually happening under many schedules of the preferential tariffs being enacted in various parts of the British Empire. Besides, some of the dominions do not appear willing to give Great Britain any preference in commercial agreements, as the recent treaty between South Africa and Germany clearly proves.

When further account is taken of the progress of China, Japan, and India in supplying their own needs and in putting some manufactured goods on the world markets, one may wonder whether it is not likely that world trade in manufactured commodities will actually decline in the not distant

future. To reduce foreign trade seems to be the purpose of the tariff walls that are now being erected where they have not existed heretofore, and that are being built higher by those countries that have had them in the past. More and more it appears that international trade is going to consist in trade in raw materials and in those manufactured articles which for some reason or other no strong financial group has yet undertaken to manufacture at home. When any considerable financial interest is involved, as we very well know from our own experience with tariff, industries that are distinctly uneconomic may become thriving and supply the home market.

In a world in which foreign trade is greatly harassed by tariffs calculated to encourage home industry, we believe Great Britain cannot be so prosperous as it was during the latter half of the nineteenth century, even with its present population, to say nothing of a larger one. We are entering a new era in world economy, and a country like Great Britain, which has become so completely dependent on manufacturing and foreign trade, is certain to feel very keenly the changes that are taking place.

That the process of adjustment is not to be achieved by internal shift and change, the recent report of the Industrial Transference Board shows. This report is indeed the cry of "three men in despair," as Mr. Ramsay McDonald has said. The conclusion of these men is that Great Britain does not have, and does not seem likely to have in the near future, work for all of its people. It is over-populated and is going to have hard times and the skimped standard of living which goes with hard times until its population has shrunk to a size corresponding to the needs of its industry.

There are some who think that even though what has been said above is true, there is a large possibility of increasing

trade with certain parts of the world which have not in the past participated to any great extent in foreign trade. They are thinking particularly of trade between people in the temperate zone and those who live in the tropics. It is quite commonly believed that the tropics can be made to yield greatly increased amounts of food, as well as many raw materials for industry (rubber, cotton, fats and oils, timber, etc.), which will gladly be traded for the manufactured goods of temperate lands. Thus it is hoped that the growing self-sufficiency of temperate lands will not mean any diminution of foreign trade. Such an increase of trade with the tropics would mean much to Great Britain, since it holds such vast tropical possessions.

When such a development is first mentioned, it sounds plausible. That it should actually seem to be probable, and to the British in particular, is rather surprising when the economic life of the tropics is studied more carefully. It has been mentioned above that Java has become one of the most densely populated areas in the world during the last century. It was also pointed out (chapter v) that the exports from Java are very small when figured on a per capita basis. Of course, if exports are small, imports must necessarily be small. Also the fact is that the Javanese prefer leisure and a small amount of work to the goods Europeans would like to sell them if they would work harder and raise more sugar and quinine and cocoa to trade for them.

There is very good reason to think that the Negroes in tropical Africa and the Indians in tropical America have the same preference. They live in very primitive fashion and have few needs. They are not easily aroused to new needs, and hence it is difficult to find motives that will induce them to work even moderately hard to produce a surplus to trade for the products of other peoples.

The one country in which a people largely tropical is *not* wholly content to live in a most simple manner appears to be India. Here we find some twigs of Western economy being grafted on to the ancient branches of a traditional system. From a Western point of view, the Indians show a lamentable lack of incentive to improve their lot by harder work; but it may come. As we have seen in an earlier chapter (vii), the textile industry is getting under way and there is also some iron- and steel-making. Besides, some of the younger Indians educated in the West are beginning to agitate for a tariff to protect them in new ventures, for their "infant industries."

It begins to appear, however, that if a tropical people is roused from its traditional lethargy (as is beginning to happen in India), some of its more pushing individuals are likely to see the advantages of doing their own manufacturing behind tariff barriers, just as our manufacturers do, and that the tropics no more than other areas can be relied upon to furnish a large and constant market for manufactured goods from the temperate zones.

It is possible that certain parts of the world are so poorly endowed by nature with the raw materials needed for manufacturing that they must always rely on imports for certain of their needs. This does not mean, however, that there will be much trade with such lands. If they lack manufactured goods of their own to trade for foreign goods, they will have only agricultural products to trade for them. But, as matters are going at the present time, it seems likely that most areas which may have to rely on agricultural exports will rather quickly develop such dense populations that they will need most of their products for home consumption and will have little to trade for foreign goods. Dense agricultural populations must necessarily have a very low

purchasing power in world markets because of their low productive power.

It is because of the conditions described above that I believe Great Britain to be over-populated today. I see no reasonable basis for the belief that in a few years with careful planning and increased efficiency Great Britain will take up the slack of unemployment and be able to support its present population and its increase at improving standards of living. If the population of Great Britain had remained stationary at about what it was in 1910 (about 40,500,000), it seems not improbable that economic conditions would be much better there than they are and the prospects for the future would be hopeful. But with more than 44,000,000 people Great Britain is over-populated, and economic hardship is certain to be the lot of several millions of its people.

### 3. Over-population and Emigration

The first remedy always thought of as a cure for unemployment in Great Britain is emigration. For three centuries Great Britain has sent out emigrants in greater or lesser numbers until people of British stock are almost twice as numerous outside of Great Britain as at home. It would seem that a people with this tradition of emigration and with large colonies, dominions, and other dependencies should have no trouble in disposing of a surplus population. The fact is, however, that from 1923-7 the total net emigration from Great Britain has averaged only 160,000 annually. Furthermore, it has shown but little tendency to increase since the Imperial Settlement plan has been in operation. To those who have read the preceding chapters the reasons for this slow movement will be fairly clear. It may not be amiss, however, to sum them up here briefly.

The self-governing dominions of the British Empire exercise complete control over their immigration. Some of the colonies also exercise effective control over immigration. The consequence of this exercise of control is that inhabitants of Great Britain are by no means free to move about within the Empire as they see fit or even as the government of Great Britain may desire. In general, it may be said that the industrial workers (as distinguished from agricultural workers) in all parts of the Empire where white men do manual labour have considerably higher standards of living than in Great Britain. They are just as anxious to maintain their high standards as our own workers and they adopt the same methods, among which the exclusion of competing labourers having lower standards bulks large. The consequence is that British labourers and even skilled workers are not wanted in any considerable numbers in any of the outlying portions of the British Empire. Australia, Canada, and South Africa all say that they cannot use many miners, or carpenters, or masons, or skilled machinists, or common labourers, but can use farm hands (except South Africa) and farmers. This is the one kind of labour of which Great Britain has little to spare, as only about nine per cent of the occupied persons living there are engaged in farm work.

It is easy to see that British workmen who have lived in cities all their lives cannot go to Australia or Canada in very large numbers and settle directly on the land with any reasonable chance of success. Farming is not an occupation that anyone can ply successfully without experience and training. Especially is this true when agricultural conditions are so different as they are in Great Britain and Australia or Canada. Hence the only chance of settling people on the farms in the dominions seems to be through getting them to migrate when relatively young and to provide training that will fit

them to carry on agriculture in their new homes. This is a slow and expensive process, as both Great Britain and the dominions are finding out; and it is small wonder that Great Britain is sending out but about 160,000 emigrants annually of late years, of whom about one-fifth to one-fourth come to the United States.

The dominions seem to lay too much emphasis upon their need for agricultural workers and do not sufficiently appreciate the fact that they are no longer even primarily agricultural lands, when only one-fourth to one-third of their occupied people are engaged in agriculture. It is reasonable to suppose that immigrants could be absorbed into the populations of these countries in the ratio of about three city workers to one farm worker, which is approximately the ratio of the two groups in the native populations. If a little care were taken to see that the city workers among the immigrants were properly distributed, it is unlikely that they would exercise much influence upon the wages of the native workers. But the lack of any such policy in the dominions renders it unlikely that emigration from Great Britain will greatly increase in the near future.

It should be noted, however, that the birth-rate is falling so fast in Great Britain that it may not be long before almost the entire annual natural increase can be cared for abroad, provided emigration does not fall off. This is shown by the fact that while the natural increase averaged about 290,000 per year for 1922-6, it had fallen to about 207,000 in 1927, and for the period 1927-31 it will probably average but little more than emigration during 1922-6—that is, 160,000. If, then, emigration does not decline, the end of another five years may find as many British people leaving the country each year as is necessary to keep the population stationary. Since, however, the number of emigrants in 1927 was only about

104,000, there was still an increase of about 100,000 in the country this year.

Even if emigration should claim all the natural increase each year after about 1931 or 1932, there still remains the question whether emigration can do anything to alleviate the unemployment situation that now exists. As a solution of unemployment in Great Britain emigration does not appear to be adequate. It is becoming clear that when a people has become as highly industrialized as in Great Britain, there is comparatively little adaptability left in it. The peopling of new lands is a task that requires qualities that are killed in the individual in the course of his industrialization in the modern city. The peasant or farmer of an earlier time, or today in the little-industrialized countries, is still fitted to make the adaptation in his modes of living which will enable him to settle on new land and win his way through; but the industrial worker, like the white-collar class, has become so highly specialized in a particular environment that he cannot succeed in a new environment requiring different modes of life and more generalized activities.

It appears, then, that Great Britain, with all its vast resources, has, in many respects, the most difficult population problem of all of the over-populated parts of the world. If the Japanese and the Italians were to be given suitable lands, they could care for their numbers without undue hardship until such time as birth control will result in a slowly increasing or even a stationary population. For these peoples are less specialized in their work and mode of life and are yet adaptable to a variety of environments. There seems to be no clear way out of the present situation for Great Britain. Birth control is rapidly spreading to the entire population — the birth-rate is now only sixteen to seventeen — and it may soon fall to the point where there will be no natural increase or even a

natural decrease, but it will certainly be some time before a natural decrease will roll up a deficit of five millions or more, which appears to be the surplus population today. The disposal of this surplus consisting of the present army of unemployed and their dependents, as well as many of those in receipt of poor-relief, is a problem that seems to us to defy any satisfactory solution. The encouragement of agriculture by breaking up estates into farms and especially through the development of small holdings might help somewhat, but even if the number of people employed in agriculture were doubled, it is extremely doubtful if all the slack could be taken up. Furthermore, there is no likelihood of any such increase in agricultural employment.

The more assiduous development of home markets, discussion of which seems to me to be conspicuously absent in British economic writings of the day, would help in some measure. But since Great Britain must import so many of its raw materials, it must have a large foreign trade to pay for them and cannot afford to devote its attention so exclusively to home markets as we do. In so far as an increase in home markets would assist in the development of the industrial efficiency of the nation through raising the efficiency of the workers and decreasing costs, it would have far-reaching effects on Great Britain's ability to compete in the world's markets. But British industry, like American agriculture, seems able now to produce more goods than it can dispose of with profit, and cannot become entirely healthy until its personnel and its plant are reduced to the size needed to supply its actual markets.

To one looking on from the outside, then, it appears that there is no clear way out of the present situation. It looks as though Great Britain for a generation to come is going to have to carry such a burden of unemployment that great

misery will be the lot of some millions of its people, while the standards of living of all will be seriously imperilled. Until birth control cuts down the numbers of its people to those that can find profitable work in its agriculture and industry, there is, indeed, a black outlook. But even if this judgment is correct, it will be asked how this situation in Great Britain is likely to have any effect on world peace. Surely Great Britain is not likely to go to war for more territory, as Japan and Italy well may.

#### 4. Great Britain's Population Problem and War

It is quite true that Great Britain is not likely to be aggressive in searching a way out for her surplus numbers. But there is a very strong feeling in Great Britain that the resources of the areas which it has been suggested above might be given by Great Britain to needy peoples will be helpful in solving Britain's population problem. The alienation of any resources whatever would be held by many to be the height of folly in view of the great need of British workmen for more trade and for cheap materials with which to work. Even though the trade with many of these areas is small, and though little in the way of raw materials comes from them, yet that little is a serious matter to a country in Great Britain's position today. It seems to me, however, that a world which is growing in numbers, and colonies which are expanding, even though they belong to Japan or Italy or India, are more likely to help Great Britain out of its difficulties than colonies of its own which are stagnant because of lack of men to develop them. Of course, the voluntary alienation of territory is contrary to all the practices of modern governments. But it is a false national pride which prefers great possessions to the possible improvement of the conditions of life

of great masses of people which might come about if the alienation of certain possessions would contribute to the prosperity of the world as a whole. Besides, the more certain avoidance of war should make a great appeal to statesmen of economically harassed countries as well as to the masses of the people.

No doubt the alienation of any part of the Empire would be looked upon by many people in Great Britain as the beginning of its disintegration. It is, of course, a sign of disintegration, but it is by no means the beginning. That was made some time ago. A political body like the British Empire is an anachronism in the modern world. It cannot long endure in a world where the spread of knowledge and education are obliterating traditional race and class distinctions and are thus rendering more and more difficult the exploitation of the people and the resources of a large part of the world by a small favoured class. The time when the rights of the sheer exploiter will be generally recognized and docilely acquiesced in is rapidly passing and Great Britain must either find a new function which will justify its hold on many of its colonies and protectorates or it must be prepared to see them pass from under its control. Such change will not come about in a day, but a generation is no more in the life of a great nation than a year is in that of an individual.

To my mind, then, it is not a question of whether Great Britain will or will not remain the dominant political force in the world. Loss of its predominant economic position necessarily entails the loss of much of its political prestige and power. The real question is whether the statesmen of Great Britain will see that a great change in its position is inevitable and will make such adjustments as are necessary to render the change as nearly painless as possible, or whether they will cling tenaciously to every evidence of

power which imperialistic statesmanship values, until these evidences of power, such as colonies, are forced from their grasp by war. It appears very unwise to cling to them to the bitter end, but history does not encourage us to expect that those who have surplus possessions will voluntarily yield them up to avoid war. If British imperialism runs true to form, it will probably prefer war, with all its hazards and suffering, to voluntary relinquishment of any of the present possessions of the Empire.

## CHAPTER XIII

### NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE PEACE MOTIVE

In what has preceded I have tried to describe, however sketchily, some of the conditions arising from the existence of differential population pressures between certain lands that seem likely to lead to war unless these pressures are somewhat equalized by the voluntary action of those peoples holding lands in excess of their needs. Naturally the burden of any concessions that may be made will fall chiefly upon those peoples who have large excess lands and resources.

#### i. The Peoples Possessing Unused Lands

As the world is parcelled out today, Great Britain controls the greater part of the lands needed by the crowded peoples. Since a large part of these holdings cannot be colonized by the British people, it is going to appear more and more unreasonable to the crowded peoples of the earth that they should be excluded from them. Thus we may expect a growing fund of resentment against Great Britain on the part of these peoples and an increasing insistence that it relinquish what it cannot settle to peoples who can settle it and use it. This appears an inevitable development under the world conditions of today. It can be ignored only at great peril, not only to Great Britain, but to the whole civilized world.

As a colonial power second only to Great Britain, France is certain to incur much the same enmity on the part of peoples who need some of the lands that it holds but who are not

allowed to settle them or exploit them. It is generally known that the French long ago ceased to be a colonizing people and that there is little prospect of their using the land of most of their colonies for a long time to come, if they can ever do so. Not only do the French have no colonists to send out, but they do not have the capital to develop more than a small fraction of the area of their colonies. These facts are well known and it certainly can occasion no surprise if the Italians and Germans, and perhaps some other peoples, manifest resentment at being kept within rather narrow national boundaries while these lands lie idle in the control of the French.

Holland, too, is holding great areas in the tropics which it is quite unable to develop. Of course, the crowded peoples who live near by are not going to feel more kindly disposed towards Holland while it is holding these lands than they do towards Great Britain or France, except as they believe that the maintenance of the present system is due largely to the strength of these two great imperial powers rather than to Holland, for Holland would, without question, have to acquiesce in any reallocation of lands which Great Britain would sanction.

The United States has little in the way of external possessions that could be devoted to the uses of the peoples in need. Some of the Philippine Islands would be useful to Japan and should be opened up to the Japanese. But if the Philippines are given their independence shortly, as is not improbable, the adjustment of land problems between them and Japan will not rest with us. If the responsibility for the Philippines remains with us for any great length of time, then their unused portions should be considered as a part of that body of land the reallocation of which may be employed to prevent war due to growing pressure in crowded areas. Such possessions as Alaska do not seem likely to be coveted strongly by

any people' within the next few generations. Its population is declining steadily. Evidently no one cares to live in such a land unless it is absolutely necessary. It is too far north. Even the Scandinavians prefer milder climates when they migrate. Alaska may, therefore, be left out of account for the present. The question of freely opening our doors to foreign settlement has been decided for the present, and so long as we can enforce that decision, the continental United States may be regarded as willing to receive each year only about 250,000 or fewer people from the outside. This is the maximum of relief we are likely to offer to the more crowded peoples in the next few decades.

Australia also has large areas of unused land which it is not likely to employ to good advantage for a very long time to come under the present conditions determining its settlement. This land is located in both the tropical and the temperate zones. If the land in the temperate zone is fairly rapidly filled with Europeans, Australia's right to hold this part of the continent for white men will probably never be questioned, or at least not for some generations. Its right to hold tropical lands is, however, going to be contested in the same way that the right of other European peoples to such land is beginning to be contested. Ultimately this tropical land must pass into the hands of people who can and will use it. The Australians will do well to recognize this and to confine their efforts to developing the temperate zone.

Russia, too, apparently has great areas of unused land in Siberia and great mineral resources which have not yet been opened up. But Russia cannot be classed with Great Britain and France as a "dog in the manger" because the Russians are still a "swarming" people. Their rate of increase is, under normal conditions very high (about twenty to twenty-two per thousand) and will grow in the next few decades, as modern sanitation becomes common throughout the

country. Even at its present rate of increase its population will double in thirty-one to thirty-three years. The area under Soviet rule contains about ten million more people now than in 1910 in spite of the havoc wrought by war, disease, and famine since then. It is not at all improbable, then, that Russia will need its own waste spaces within the next few decades. If in addition to its own people it gave opportunity for settlement to some of the neighbouring Slavs, as has been suggested above, this is all we can reasonably expect from Russia. Furthermore, the climate of Russia and Siberia is such that many peoples cannot live there until they have learned almost a totally different mode of living. Thus the Japanese cannot successfully settle in Siberia even if they were entirely free to do so. Incidentally, this may be one of the chief reasons why Japan so readily relinquished the hold it gained in eastern Siberia during the Bolshevik troubles. The Japanese were, no doubt, unable to adjust themselves to the Siberian winter. Indeed, they do not appear to be able to utilize their own northern islands to any great degree. As was said above, I believe that the Japanese (chapter ii) are a southern people rather than a northern people and Siberia really offers them no opportunity of which they can avail themselves.

It would be different with the Mongols and the northern Chinese and it is not unlikely that the latter will spread from Manchuria and Mongolia into parts of eastern Siberia. They will not find adaptation to this more rigorous climate very difficult. Their housing, their agriculture, and their general mode of life will not be greatly altered by moving a little farther north.

It should also be noted that the habits of thought of the Russians seem to offer fewer obstacles to sharing their territory with peoples of different race who may care to settle there than those of most other European peoples. They do

not appear to possess the strong racial and national sense so highly developed among the peoples of western and central Europe. Hence Russia and Siberia — the Soviets — may be expected to do their part in caring for the population growth of the world during the next half-century without any great change in their attitude towards national prerogatives.

In South America, even more than in Russia, there appears to be a willingness to share unused land with people not born there. Practically all European peoples are welcomed everywhere in South America, and there are even a number of groups of Japanese and Chinese in different parts of the continent. There is no land available there for annexation as colonies, but there is large opportunity for migration thither from some of the more crowded parts of the world. Consequently, South America, like Russia, seems likely to do its share in caring for the surplus population of the world during the next half-century or so, without altering greatly its present policy.

It is, then, chiefly the nations of western Europe and those deriving from them that find the settlement of their territory by peoples of different race and the alienation of territory — even protectorates and undeveloped colonies — well-nigh unthinkable except as a result of losing a war.

If this judgment of the needs of the crowded nations is fairly accurate, from what has been said in the body of the discussion and summarized briefly above, it is clear that large concessions must be made, particularly by four powers, if war for the settlement and possession of new lands is to be avoided. The situation of these four nations — Great Britain, France, Holland, and Australia — needs to be set forth in more detail if the problem is to be seen in a clear light.

Table X

Birth-rates, Death-rates, and Rates of Natural Increase for Certain Countries in 1908-13, 1920-3, 1924, 1925, 1926, and 1927

Country	1908-13	1920-3	1924	1925	1926	1927
<b>Australia</b>						
Births	27.3	24.8	23.2	22.9	22.0	21.7
Deaths	10.8	9.9	9.5	9.2	9.4	9.5
Natural Increase	16.5	14.9	13.7	13.7	12.6	12.2
<b>Austria</b>						
Births	22.8	21.7	20.6	19.2	17.8	
Deaths	17.2	15.0	14.4	14.9	14.9	
Natural Increase	5.6	6.7	6.2	4.3	2.9	
<b>Belgium</b>						
Births	23.4	21.2	20.1	19.8	19.0	18.2
Deaths	15.7	13.6	13.0	13.1	13.3	13.0
Natural Increase	7.7	7.6	7.1	6.7	5.7	5.2
<b>Canada</b>						
Births	28.4	25.7	25.8	24.8	24.6	
Deaths	11.9	10.8	10.6	11.4	11.1	
Natural Increase	16.5	14.9	15.2	13.4	13.5	
<b>England and Wales</b>						
Births	24.9	22.0	18.8	18.3	17.8	16.7
Deaths	14.1	12.2	12.2	12.2	11.6	12.3
Natural Increase	10.8	9.8	6.6	6.1	6.2	4.4
<b>France</b>						
Births	19.5	20.1	18.7	18.9	18.8	18.1
Deaths	18.6	17.3	16.9	17.5	17.4	16.5
Natural Increase	0.9	2.8	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.6
<b>Germany</b>						
Births	29.5	23.8	20.2	20.4	19.5	18.3
Deaths	16.5	14.3	12.1	11.8	11.7	12.0
Natural Increase	13.0	9.5	8.1	8.6	7.8	6.3

Table X (*Continued*)

Country	1908-13	1920-3	1924	1925	1926	1927
<b>The Netherlands</b>						
Births	29.1	26.9	25.1	24.3	23.8	23.1
Deaths	13.9	11.1	9.8	9.8	9.8	10.3
Natural Increase	15.2	15.8	15.3	14.5	14.0	12.8
<b>New Zealand</b>						
Births	26.2	23.4	21.6	21.2	21.1	20.3
Deaths	9.4	9.2	8.3	8.3	8.7	8.5
Natural Increase	17.0	14.2	13.3	12.9	12.4	11.8
<b>Sweden</b>						
Births	24.4	20.8	18.1	17.5	16.9	16.1
Deaths	14.0	12.5	12.0	11.7	11.8	12.7
Natural Increase	10.4	8.3	6.1	5.8	5.1	3.4
<b>Switzerland</b>						
Births	24.7	20.2	18.8	18.4	18.2	17.9
Deaths	15.2	13.0	12.5	12.2	11.7	12.4
Natural Increase	9.5	7.2	6.3	6.2	6.5	5.5
<b>United States</b>						
Births	24.8	23.2	22.6	21.4	20.6	20.4
Deaths	15.9	12.3	11.8	11.8	12.1	11.4
Natural Increase	8.9	10.9	10.8	9.6	8.5	9.0
<b>Bulgaria</b>						
Births	41.0	39.9	39.7	37.0	37.2	
Deaths	22.4	21.5	20.7	19.2	17.1	
Natural Increase	18.6	18.4	19.0	17.8	20.1	
<b>Czechoslovakia</b>						
Births	31.1	27.7	25.6	25.0	24.4	23.3
Deaths	21.0	17.3	15.2	15.2	15.5	16.0
Natural Increase	10.1	10.4	10.4	9.8	8.9	7.3
<b>Hungary</b>						
Births		29.5	26.8	27.7	26.7	25.2
Deaths		20.2	20.3	16.9	16.5	17.6
Natural Increase		9.3	6.5	10.8	10.2	7.6

Table X (*Continued*)

Country	1908-13	1920-3	1924	1925	1926	1927
<b>Italy</b>						
Births	32.4	30.4	28.2	27.5	27.2	26.4
Deaths	20.4	17.6	16.6	16.6	16.8	15.5
Natural Increase	12.0	12.8	11.6	10.9	10.4	10.9
<b>Poland</b>						
Births		33.9	34.6	35.2	33.0	31.6
Deaths		21.0	17.9	16.7	17.8	17.4
Natural Increase		12.9	16.7	18.5	15.2	14.2
<b>Roumania</b>						
Births	43.1	36.5	36.7	35.2	35.1	34.3
Deaths	24.7	23.5	23.3	21.0	21.5	22.4
Natural Increase	18.4	13.0	13.4	14.2	13.6	11.9
<b>Spain</b>						
Births	32.1	30.4	29.9	29.4	29.9	28.6
Deaths	22.8	21.6	19.8	19.7	19.0	18.9
Natural Increase	9.3	8.8	10.1	9.7	10.9	9.7
<b>India</b>						
Births	38.5	33.0	34.5	33.6	34.8	
Deaths	32.1	27.6	28.5	24.7	26.8	
Natural Increase	6.4	5.4	6.0	8.9	8.0	
<b>Japan</b>						
Births	32.9	35.1	33.8	34.9	34.8	
Deaths	20.5	23.3	21.2	20.3	19.2	
Natural Increase	12.1	11.8	12.6	14.6	15.6	
<b>Russia</b>						
Births	45.6	41.0	42.7	43.6		43.4
Deaths	28.9	22.0	23.2	23.1		23.0
Natural Increase	16.7	19.0	19.5	20.5		20.4

## 2. Sources of the Future Increase of Mankind

Before doing this attention should be called again to the differential rates of population increase which are developing in the world today. In Table X are brought together the latest vital statistics for typical countries. The outstanding fact in this table is the decline in the rate of natural increase among the peoples of northern and western Europe and their replacement, as rapidly expanding peoples, by the Italians and Spaniards in southern Europe, the Slavs in central and eastern Europe, and the Japanese in the Orient. Without going into this matter in any detail here, it is very clear to the student of vital statistics that it will not be long, perhaps only a decade or two, before the northern and western Europeans will have no increase whatever. After a comparatively brief period of a stationary population they will begin to decline in numbers. In France this decline will begin within a decade if there is no immigration, and the other countries will not be more than a decade or two behind her in this matter. The countries outside of Europe, but settled by peoples from northern and western Europe, will not become stationary as soon as these latter, but they will not be far behind them. Birth control is becoming highly effective in this part of the world.

The great increase in the population of the world in the future will, then, come from new quarters, and from peoples who, as has been shown above, have but small resources for their support, except in Russia. This change in the source of future increase in population is a fact of the utmost importance. It is certain to disturb profoundly the quasi-equilibrium that has been established by the expansion of Europe in the past two or three centuries. This seems so obvious that it need not be argued further at this point.

<sup>4</sup> Having thus briefly summarized and called to mind again the main tendencies in present population growth, I shall pass on to a consideration of the reasons why I believe Great Britain, France, Holland, and Australia should be willing to consider the voluntary cession of some of their unused lands to the newly-expanding peoples.

### 3. The Case of Great Britain

In every area and in connexion with the expansion of almost every people Great Britain has possessions that are certain to cause trouble if the customary European attitude towards the alienation of national territory continues to prevail, and if the exploitation of these lands is restricted as at present. This seems so obvious that it scarcely needs proof. I shall try, however, to set forth a few of the reasons why I believe that wars of expansion cannot be avoided in the near future unless certain traditional nationalistic and imperialistic modes of conduct are much modified by the great powers holding lands not in use.

I have shown in the preceding chapter that Great Britain is economically ill and that its recovery of former strength is improbable. This cannot but result in a very marked decline in political influence, because the decline of economic power means the weakening of military power, upon which political prestige is based. But even if an actual decline in Great Britain's economic power should not take place, as I believe it will, Great Britain cannot but decline in relative importance. This will issue in a weakened prestige no less certainly, though more slowly, than an absolute decline in economic power. There cannot be the least doubt that the more rapid growth of other peoples will leave Great Britain in a relatively weaker position than it has enjoyed hitherto.

It is not mere braggadocio to point out that the United States, with almost three times the population of Great Britain and with abundant resources, is going to play a more prominent part in world affairs during the coming century than in the past. We have also given some reasons for believing that Germany will recover much of its lost economic power, and with it will go political power, even though Germany may not have very great military power for some time to come. In the Orient, Japan has already become a great power, and its strength and influence are growing. India and China are also shaking off the lethargy of millenniums and will soon be in a position to make demands on the other powers which cannot safely be ignored. Their first demand, and one which is being grudgingly granted today, is that they be released from the economic and political tutelage in which they have been held by outside powers. The next step will be the demand for active participation in world affairs. This, too, cannot be long denied, for they are developing the force to make good this demand. They are beginning to talk the language which Western nations understand.

In the face of these changes can anyone reasonably doubt that Great Britain will play a lesser rôle in world affairs in the near future than it has been accustomed to play in the past? It is simply folly not to recognize the changes that are taking place and to begin to make the needed adjustments. Indeed, it seems to the outside observer that it will be suicidal for Great Britain not to take account of what is happening and restrict its activities to areas which it can reasonably hope to keep within its sphere of influence for a fairly long future.

Unquestionably one of the urgent motives in Great Britain's participation in the World War was the feeling that her world position would be imperilled if Germany were to come out with greatly enhanced power. In this feeling the British

were certainly right, but they apparently failed to realize that, win or lose, there were changes going forward which would inevitably lead to the diminution of Great Britain's influence in the world. Germany's desire for a place in the sun was only a symptom of a world in which new peoples were growing to manhood and would sooner or later demand to be treated as full-grown. Today the childhood of many peoples is passing and they are now demanding, or soon will demand, the perquisites of manhood, just as Germany demanded a lusty man's share in the world's resources and in the control of world affairs.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that Germany's failure to achieve its desired position at one stroke will long deter some other people from demanding by force a larger share in the goods and the councils of this planet.

The power which more than any other will stand in the way of such an *aggressive* new-comer will be Great Britain unless attitudes as to what constitutes "national honour and interests" are considerably modified in the near future. Therefore Great Britain will have to bear the lion's share of the costs of the wars which will be undertaken for the expansion of crowded peoples. It cannot be otherwise. Great Britain holds a large part of the lands most needed by the crowded peoples and must be ready to defend them against all comers if it is unwilling to consider their voluntary alienation.

There is no use blinking the fact that the British lion's roar is not so terrifying as it was a generation ago. The failure of Great Britain to recover rapidly from the World War is making people ask whether it did not win a Pyrrhic victory in this war and whether another such victory will not be its complete undoing. Will it be worth while to retain some of its more undeveloped possessions at the risk of being drawn

into another prolonged war that will disrupt its economic life for two or more years and leave it weaker than now?

That British prestige is on the wane since the war is certainly beginning to be recognized by the British themselves. Already they are beginning to make gestures in the direction of adaptation to the changed aspect of their world position. Whether this adaptation will be great enough, and will come quickly enough, to avoid conflict over unused and unneeded possessions cannot be told. But one may cite a few evidences of this effort at adaptation to a new world position on the part of the British. Such efforts appear wholly admirable and encourage one to hope that Great Britain may take the lead in inaugurating those changes in attitude towards imperial possessions which are necessary if war for their possession is to be avoided.

As examples of conduct based upon the recognition of the changed position of Great Britain in the world today, the following may be mentioned: The patience displayed in dealing with China during these last troubled years is certainly not typically British. Compare this conduct with that of the British in China throughout the nineteenth century and it is evident that a new spirit is present. Again, the leniency of treatment accorded Gandhi and the non-co-operators in India is also not what one would expect from the past conduct of British officials in India. It shows that some of them believe that affairs in India cannot now be carried with a high hand as of yore. The officials at home, even more than those in India, realize that times are changing and that new tactics must be employed. Without doubt one of the changes they feel, whether they acknowledge it even to themselves, is the weakened position of Great Britain in the world and the need of adjusting their relations to subject peoples to this new position.

The agreement to naval parity (whatever that may mean) with the United States as worked out at the Washington Conference also seems a sacrilege to Tories of the old school. To them Great Britain is and must remain the chief arbiter of human destinies in the world. They are quite right in saying that Great Britain cannot maintain its historic position and policies with a navy of less than the "two-power standard." The only trouble is that the "die-hards" do not realize that Great Britain has already lost its position of pre-eminence and that, instead of naval parity's being a cause of this change, it is only a recognition of it. The furor which the recently published Anglo-French naval pact has caused in Great Britain is further proof that a very considerable body of people recognize the changed position of the country and are most anxious to adjust national conduct to the realities of the situation.

It may be, then, that it is not entirely fatuous to hope that, even in the matter of the territorial integrity of the Empire, a new light will dawn upon the British statesmen before it is too late. It may be recognized that size does not necessarily give strength; that a smaller, more compact area, better governed, more unified, and more fully developed, may actually be more vital and stronger than a larger area with a very tenuous connexion between many of its parts. A far-flung empire may be something to boast of and may inflate one's feeling of personal importance as a citizen of such an empire, but it may be an extremely expensive luxury to the mother country; especially is this true when it requires naval protection at a great distance and many of its parts are but little developed and cannot afford to pay for their own protection. In time this will be realized, no doubt, and when it is, certain economic influences will be exerted in favour of holding only areas that can become an integral part of an empire or a

nation. But at the present time one has to be a real optimist to see any marked tendency towards the deflation of nineteenth-century imperialism.

I have tried, very briefly, to indicate the changed position in which Great Britain finds itself, and the great weight of its influence in the past, because I believe that the chances for a reasonable and pacific settlement of the problems of population pressure discussed above depend in large measure upon how fully Great Britain's position, now and in the past, is understood. The very greatness of its power in the past made it the arbiter of the destinies of many peoples not within the Empire, and its mastery of the seas made it feared by those who would have liked to despoil it. Today Great Britain has all the irritating points of contact with other peoples that it had before the war and in addition has accumulated a number of others. The reasons for this are not hard to find; its enlarged possessions as a result of the Allied victory, its Russian policy since 1917, the keener rivalry for international trade, the growing restiveness of the non-industrialized peoples, and the more general knowledge of the undercurrents in world affairs which all peoples now possess, all these and many others contribute to increased irritation with the chief power in the world devoted to the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Along with this increased irritation goes the belief that Great Britain is not now so dangerous as of yore. Thus the peaceful settlement of the problems of population pressure depends more upon Great Britain's attitude regarding the sanctity of the *status quo* than ever before. It has heavier responsibilities in the maintenance of peace today than in past times, and it is less able to carry them than formerly, if it relies solely on force and the fear of force as in the past.

It is not mere national pride, therefore, when British states-

men say that the peace of the world depends largely upon British policy. It would be hard to exaggerate British responsibility in maintaining peace, but it does not follow that the surest way to maintain peace is to stabilize the *status quo* by rendering the sufferers under this status afraid to attempt to upset it. Much more would be accomplished if the reasons why some nations want to disturb the present equilibrium were thoroughly canvassed and steps were taken to remove the causes of discontent. Just because there is no nation that has the stake in the present game of international politics that Great Britain has, no nation will be willing to go all the way with Great Britain in carrying out British policies.

As was said above, if we are going to speak of responsibility in international relations, we can only say that those men and nations that have the greatest power to alter the course of events must bear the heaviest share of censure if things turn out badly. At present there is no doubt that Great Britain is still playing the leading rôle in world affairs and consequently must bear the greatest responsibility if the present system leads to disastrous results. A nation that has it in its power to do so many gracious things in world affairs as Great Britain has cannot escape responsibility if it fails to do some of them. If it wills that the expansion of the crowded peoples into unused lands shall be accomplished only by war, it must bear the responsibility of the decision inasmuch as its action will determine the action of other peoples that are not in a position to act independently to the same extent. For this reason the attitude of Great Britain in this matter may fairly be called decisive.

There are still other elements in Great Britain's situation which should dictate the careful consideration of any reorganization of the world which might reduce the likelihood of war. No power in the world has ever had so many

provocative contacts with other peoples as Great Britain now has. On a hundred fronts it has potential enemies. If it were assured that these possible enemies would each act independently in its relations to Great Britain, the situation as a whole might not appear altogether hopeless. But Great Britain cannot always divide the peoples who have grievances against it and rule. They are cognizant of the tactics that have been employed heretofore and are, therefore, in a position to frustrate them at times.

As an example of what may happen if some of the growing peoples are kept pent up within narrow boundaries where they have very limited resources, until the hardship of everyday living becomes intolerable, the case of Japan may be cited. If Japan finds it necessary to go to war to secure new lands and resources, it most certainly will not do so when the time is favourable to Great Britain's concentrating its fleet at Singapore. Japan will rather wait until the ferment in India has worked a little more and the British position there becomes more difficult to maintain, or until Russia and Great Britain are at loggerheads in Persia, let us say, or until trade rivalries and naval competition have somewhat estranged Great Britain and ourselves, or until France has found continental alliances more alluring than that with Great Britain, or until Italy has become desperate for an outlet for its starving people and is ready to strike for additional possessions in the Mediterranean area (thus endangering Great Britain's communications through Suez), or until German and Russian relations are such that supplies from the former can be counted upon by the latter if it wishes to take the field in the event of revolt in Mesopotamia or India, or until Egypt is in revolt and thus also imperils Suez. These are only a few of what now appear the major contingencies upon which Japan can afford to wait. There are, no doubt, others which might

easily become even more decisive than any of these — for example, an alliance of Japan and China to dominate the western Pacific. I am not predicting this, but it is not a mere fantasy. Japan can rest assured that before long (within two or three decades) Great Britain will find itself in a number of embarrassing situations. It only remains for Japan to bide its time and be ready to strike when all possible events favour success. The Japanese know this as well as the British, and they can be expected to profit by events when the time is ripe.

Lest I should be misunderstood, I want to repeat something I have said before. I am not attributing what would generally be called nefarious schemes to Japan. Japan's need for greater resources is increasing year by year. It will soon become intolerable. The defence of the *status quo* in the western Pacific, as in most other parts of the world, rests far more heavily on Great Britain than on any other power. Great Britain has given more hostages to fate than all other powers combined, and as soon as it is in trouble over one of these, there will be a natural desire on the part of aggrieved peoples to see if some of the others cannot be abducted with impunity. If Japan plays this game, it will only be doing what every other first-class power would do under similar circumstances. Indeed, Japan learned the game chiefly from Great Britain. If helping to create troubled waters and then fishing in them is villainy, Japan at least has abundant company in villainy. This is the accepted *modus operandi* in international relations and will endure until in some distant future a new attitude arises regarding the right of a nation to hold unused lands and resources for the sole profit of its own citizens.

#### 4. The Situation of France

What has been said above about Great Britain applies in many respects to France also. France has no people to send out as colonists. It even has difficulty in manning the necessary colonial services throughout its empire. It also lacks the money to exploit most of the areas under its control. France holds most of its colonies and protectorates merely as areas of future exploitation for private gain. The proof of this is found in the fact that only in Algeria, of all the French possessions, is there any appreciable number of French settlers. Here they number between 400,000 and 500,000 and constitute about seven per cent of the entire population. But there is practically no emigration from France to this area now and any future increase in the French in north Africa will come from the excess of births over deaths. Indeed, France is a country of immigration rather than of emigration. About 200,000 permanent immigrants entered France each year for five or six years following the war. Once France's war losses are made up there may be some emigration; but it is certain that there is ample room in north Africa for whatever actual expansion of the French is likely to take place during the next century or more. There is also room in north Africa for a considerable number of emigrants from other countries -- for example, Italians. Indeed, Italians are already more numerous in Tunis than people of French origin, in the ratio of about twelve to seven.

In view of these facts, there is certainly no sound reason why France should permanently hold more than a small part of its present possessions. Its foreign holdings comprise almost five million square miles, and, as with Great Britain, a very large part of the territory in the colonies, protectorates, and mandates is held for future exploitation of its

resources for the profit of a small group of adventurers and capitalists. It has been frequently said in what precedes that such tenuous possession does not give a valid title to any country to lands which are needed by other peoples who are hard pressed for resources. It rests on force alone and will be respected only as long as it can be defended. From the point of view of its own needs, there is no reason why France, along with Great Britain, could not contribute land to peoples less fortunately situated. This could be done both by the cession of some of its dependencies which are little developed and by permitting immigration from some of the crowded areas into certain of its possessions where population is scanty.

Permitting immigration from crowded areas into some of the French dependencies should prove a less difficult adjustment than in British dependencies. For the French have not the objection to intermarriage with other races and peoples that the British have. The assimilation of the Italians by the French in north Africa should not prove a very difficult matter. Indeed, it would appear that the working together of these two peoples in this area, even though it remained wholly under French sovereignty, might well lead to their closer co-operation in many other matters which would work to their mutual advantage.

If in addition to easy migration into north Africa the Italians were given Syria — the French mandated territory in Asia Minor — there is not the least doubt that a new era in the relations of France and Italy would be inaugurated which would react beneficially upon both. The irritations that at present disturb their relations would be allayed, at least in part, and they would find co-operation in the Mediterranean easy. This would react favourably upon their economic life, because they could both reduce military and

naval expenditures and turn their energies and wealth into productive channels.

If, in addition to doing its share to make Italy's situation easier, France were to carry the policy of conciliation of her neighbours to the point of ceding some of its tropical African colonies to Germany for a fair consideration, it would accomplish two very desirable ends at one stroke. It would give unquestioned proof of a most sincere desire to be friends with Germany and it would make possible an even closer co-operation between German and French industry. If really friendly relations were once established between France and Germany, the larger part of French military expenditure could be done away with and the energy of the people could be devoted to the development of productive enterprises. Incidentally the purchase of some of the French colonies by the Germans would make available the capital to develop the production of those goods of which France is really in need in the remaining colonies.

I have shown above that the Germans will soon cease to be an expanding people. There is no good reason, therefore, why the French should not be willing to see them take the place in world affairs to which their numbers and abilities entitle them. The Germans will not soon again constitute the threat they did while they were a rapidly expanding people.

It certainly appears to the onlooker that the very best and also the cheapest insurance France could get would be by making friends of Italy and Germany and that this could be done readily by the transfer of certain lands to them — lands which are only an expense to France, but which could be used to good advantage by these other peoples. I do not mean to imply that France alone could or should supply all the needs for land of these other countries, but that doing what could reasonably be expected without injuring itself would

go a considerable distance in solving its great problem — *security* — because it would help to relieve the urgent needs of those countries which now threaten its security and will do so as long as they are crowded and have inadequate resources for their growing populations.

France certainly does not feel that it has obtained security as a result of the last war. The alliance with Great Britain for the carrying out of a strongly imperialistic policy is more likely to add to its insecurity than to give the feeling of freedom from pressure which it so greatly desires. It would seem, then, that the time has come when both Great Britain and France should consider other than traditional means to gain security. They will not be able to maintain the present order for any great length of time in any event, and it would certainly greatly simplify their military problems if they made good friends out of their probable enemies by ceding to them rights in lands and resources of which they stand in need. This easing of the military strain would, I believe, result in increased economic strength.

### 5. The Smaller European Colonial Powers

If Great Britain and France were willing to consider the needs of expanding peoples, there can be no doubt that the other imperial peoples would soon fall into line. Indeed, they could not help themselves, for no other power is capable of defending its external possessions with the support of these countries withdrawn. It is quite clear, for example, that Holland (with large undeveloped tropical possessions in the western Pacific) and Portugal and Belgium (with large African territories) could not hold them if the British and French no longer were interested in maintaining the *status quo* at any price. Besides, there would be certain economic

advantages to these nations in disposing of some of their surplus holdings at a fair consideration. They could thus get capital to develop more rapidly what they retained. It is a well-known fact that these smaller countries, like the larger ones, are doing little or nothing with a large part of their present holdings, particularly in the tropics. Holland, for instance, is letting out huge concessions in Sumatra and some of the other islands to foreigners who have the capital to develop them, apparently hoping to recoup itself for governmental expenses by increased taxes at some future time. If Holland were to sell part or all of its interests in Borneo and New Guinea, and perhaps even Guiana and Curaçao, it would unquestionably be able to develop more rapidly the lands it retained and would probably find that the reduced tropical holdings were considerably more profitable than those it now has. Furthermore, because of their development and denser native population, they would not in the future constitute desirable areas for the expansion of peoples needing more room.

Nor would Australia be able to maintain its present policy as regards the settlement of its lands, particularly its tropical lands, if Great Britain were to withdraw support. There is much truth in the British accusation that Australians want to "eat their cake and have it too." They want the advantages of complete autonomy and yet they want the full protection of British power against any aggression. If Great Britain were to modify its attitude towards Japanese expansion, for example, Australia would also have to modify its present intransigent attitude in this matter or take measures to insure its ability to protect itself in case of need. The only effective measure it could take, so far as I can see, is to settle the temperate lands. Its tropical lands are another matter. I do not believe that there is any way in which they can long be held in the face of the needs of the Japanese and Chinese.

## 6. White Exploitation of the Tropics

The question of whether any white people should hold and exploit a tropical country with native labour as is now being done is going to become one of the burning questions of the world within fifty or a hundred years. For the present, however, the white man is fully able to do it and there is not the least likelihood that he will not keep on doing it until he can no longer do so or until it ceases to be profitable. Recognizing this fact, and also that the products of tropical agriculture are becoming increasingly important to industrialized peoples living in the temperate zones, any scheme for redistributing land to meet the needs of the different peoples should provide for tropical dependencies suited to the needs of the different countries.

Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal might all profit by the cession of some of their unused tropical lands to meet the needs of those countries which want tropical possessions, but do not now possess them or whose possessions are insufficient.

It is not improbable that, the desire for tropical lands being what it is, British and French war debts to this country could be largely reduced by the sale of their possessions in and about the Caribbean to the United States. We should probably be foolish enough to pay handsomely for them, as we did for the Virgin Islands. The question of whether such a transaction would be really profitable to us would hardly be raised under present circumstances. The desire to be independent in the production of tropical goods is strong in certain powerful quarters and would probably prevent any very careful scrutiny of our national economic advantage from such a transaction. Even if it were generally known to be a bad bargain, this would not deter our statesmen from trying to serve their imperially-minded masters by the acquirement

of tropical possessions; and to those of us who believe in a revision or cancellation of war debts, there would be something of poetic justice in our imperialists' making a poor bargain in the settlement of these debts.

It is my contention that if Great Britain and France were to do what is in their power to meet the needs of other countries for additional lands and resources, they would find it possible to limit armaments very greatly and as a consequence they could devote a much larger share of the national energy to constructive enterprises—to works (economic and social) which would minister to the well-being of the entire nation.

It is interesting to note that Germany, without war debts (except reparations) and with a small military establishment, is recovering from the war more rapidly than either France or Great Britain. A large measure of the difference between these countries in this respect is due to the different proportions of the national incomes spent on "national defence." Rich but unused possessions demand expensive defence. It is hard for the common people to realize that imperialism is scarcely profitable to them, however profitable it may be to certain classes in the community whose interests it serves.

Unused lands and resources in the world should be regarded as the means of satisfying human needs rather than as prizes to be kept solely for the profit of the peoples who happen to hold them at the present moment. Only when this comes to be the general attitude of the great powers may we expect that Japan and other sorely pressed nations will cease to have any interest in creating troubled conditions from which they may possibly derive some profit. But until the nations holding excess resources reform, we cannot reasonably expect any considerable change in the

conduct of the nations which are suffering from the lack of resources.

Nor should one be surprised at the Japanese and other Orientals for believing that homilies from Western lands on the infamy of aggression are inspired by the desire of Western powers to keep what they have already secured by aggression, rather than by any sincere belief that such conduct is morally reprehensible. It is no doubt fairly easy to resist the temptation to covet one's neighbour's lands if one already possesses an abundance. But a study of the methods by which such abundance has been acquired is not calculated to induce meekness on the part of Japan or any other nation which came on the scene as a "great power" after "land-grabbing" had ceased to be the chief international pastime, merely because the land had all been grabbed. Such peoples can only hope that there will soon be a shift in the economic and political equilibrium of the world which will enable them to participate successfully in the next game of grab. Furthermore, it is to be expected that they will do what they can to help to bring to pass the unsettled conditions which will render their intervention decisive in bringing about a new alignment of power in the world. Under present conditions they are quite right in assuming that peace is being maintained by the dominant powers only because it is to the advantage of the latter.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE FORCE-SYSTEM AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS MODIFICATION

Little can be said here of the practical difficulties in way of inaugurating a redistribution of the lands of the earth in which the *needs* of peoples would be taken into account. These difficulties are truly enormous, and so long as they are dwelt upon to the exclusion of the advantages that would follow such a redistribution, they will appear insuperable. But if concrete cases are considered and alternatives are clearly envisaged, the obstacles may not seem so insurmountable.

#### i. The Politics of Force and Their Folly

There is no use in minimizing the difficulties Great Britain, for example, would encounter if it were to announce a policy of disposing of its possessions east of Singapore (Australia and New Zealand not being included under this term "possessions"). Such a policy would meet the opposition not only of the Australians and New Zealanders, but of all the imperial-minded people throughout the Empire. Australia and New Zealand in particular would object to any concessions which would allow the Japanese to approach closer to their boundaries. But if it becomes clear that the present status in the western Pacific cannot be long maintained in any event, as has been argued above, then it is a question of

the means by which the inevitable changes will be brought about. Will means calculated to allay national and racial hatreds and distrust be voluntarily employed, or will all adjustments be opposed until another war gives another group of allies power to impose their settlement, for a time, on the rest of the world?

Another world war will undoubtedly be even more destructive of property than the last, and it will also be more costly in human life. Great Britain in particular will suffer heavily in protecting outlying possessions and in the disruption of its economic life during the war. Indeed, to the foreign observer it appears that Great Britain has actually come out of the last war in worse condition than either France or Germany. The reasons for this are many and must not detain us here, as they have been discussed somewhat in chapter xii. But it seems clear that the more complexly and delicately the economic life of any people is organized and the more it is dependent on foreign materials and markets, the more easily it is thrown out of gear and the more difficult it is to restore it to normal functioning again after the disturbance is past. Believing this, it seems sheer folly for nations like Great Britain and France, which are certain to lose power and prestige by another war, even if they come out with enhanced possessions, as from the last one, to allow affairs to drift until another war is inevitable. The very best that they can hope from maintaining the *status quo* at all costs is another war with the nations which are coming into the expansive period of their life, and there is not the least reason to hope that the conclusion of another war will leave things more settled than this one has. The victors will use their advantage for national or imperial aggrandizement just as they did in this one, and since force is never just or considerate, but takes just as much and cedes just as little as

it can, the settlements it concludes are only binding until a realignment of power takes place; and then a new alliance dictates a new settlement of the same order.

It is folly for the present dominant powers to suppose that they can remain at the top for any great length of time in a game of this kind. The very nature of our present force-organization of the world is to provoke alliances to dispute control with the dominant powers. This is an inherent characteristic of the system we are living under, and of course it is an unstable system. It cannot be otherwise. If we want peace, then, we must choose between attempting to stabilize a system that is inherently unstable, and working out a new system that does not require stabilization by force because it is based on just appraisal of the needs of the different nations. Since the former has proved such a lamentable failure all through history, it would seem that the latter might now be given some attention.

But a new system of international relations cannot be brought into existence all at once. If the nations upon whom the maintenance of the present system chiefly depends will but manifest a willingness to experiment in the most tentative way with a new system, they will find little difficulty in securing the co-operation of the peoples who suffer under the present order. For it may be safely assumed that no modern nation *wants* war and that war will be resorted to only when very urgently felt needs stand no chance of being satisfied by peaceful measures, or when "national honour" is grossly insulted. We are just beginning to realize what up-to-date warfare may do to mankind, and the dawning realization is anything but pleasant.

The great difficulty in the way of inaugurating a new system of settlement of the differences between nations which are certain to arise from differential population pressures is

not, then, that men or nations want war. It is rather that in a system where force is dominant, any unforced concession by any nation is interpreted as an acknowledgment of weakness and is calculated to make the receding nation the victim of all the other peoples who feel that they dare to pick on it. This practice of despoiling the weak is common in international relations. Witness the treatment of China by the European powers and Japan, until quite recently. It is, then, a hazardous thing for any country, however strong, to make a move which seems to be a confession that it cannot maintain its present position by force. Even Great Britain, powerful as it is, no doubt feels that it cannot voluntarily withdraw from certain advanced positions without incurring grave danger. With the best intentions in the world, its conduct would be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness and might encourage aggression at some other point.

This is the line of argument one frequently meets, for example, in the discussion of British policy in India. The convinced imperialist is certain that force and force alone is understood by the "inferior" peoples. He has a mind so warped by his experience as administrator, or perhaps by his associations and prepossessions, that he cannot conceive of a changed attitude on the part of the men exercising the dominant power, as indicative of anything but weakness. He cannot understand that the existing attitudes of mind on international relations developed by "the under dogs" are a natural consequence of the attitudes of mind of the dominant peoples, and that a change in the latter will lead to a change in the former. It is, therefore, almost impossible for him to be made to see that the real power to inaugurate a change in the conduct of world affairs lies with the dominant powers. He does not seem to see that just because the dominant powers have the upper hand, they have the larger number of possible

choices as to their conduct in international relations, and they must consequently bear the larger share of responsibility for the development of a new system.

It is perhaps what we have just tried to describe very briefly as imperial-mindedness that is the chief obstacle to getting a new deal in world resources. It is denied by people thus minded, both that there is need for a new deal, and that, even if it were needed, it could be had. In the face of such an intransigent attitude, a new deal is impossible, and even if made by people so minded, it would be no better than the present status. An increasing number of people, however, do not believe that a new deal is impossible and also believe that the spirit to make it work can be developed if it is really desired by those in control.

The desire to settle justly the conflicting claims of different nations must, then, be developed before there is any chance of changing the present force-system. This is so obvious as to be a mere truism and does not get us anywhere if we stop there. Goodwill is important, but without organization to spread it and to make effective its intentions it will never accomplish anything worth while.

## 2. Publicity for the Needs of Nations

In dealing with our own particular problem we may make two or three suggestions of ways in which the force-system of dealing with the economic needs of nations might be undermined.

In the first place, the facts regarding the economic needs of nations must be made known to the world. This is the first step in the direction of the development of an intelligent world opinion on matters of economic controversy between nations. The claims of the nations which feel that they are

being unjustly kept from sharing in the unused resources of the world will never receive consideration until they are made known to the world.

As a first step in getting their case before the world the nations which feel that they are badly in need of larger resources could get together the facts which they deem relevant to their situation and see that they are made readily available to all peoples. This would at least apprise the world of the way they feel regarding the present distribution of resources between the nations and place before it the facts which seem to them to justify their demand for larger resources. The claims of the "under dogs" would thus be brought into the open, and opinion of their reasonableness would begin to form. It is certainly not fantastic to hope that with the presentation of the facts as seen by these different nations the more thoughtful and intelligent people all over the world would begin to think on these matters more carefully than heretofore. The time has passed when the formation of an intelligent opinion on matters of international concern need be confined to a few experts in foreign offices. The issues between nations are not inherently more complicated than those between individuals, and if the facts on which the issues turn were readily available, most of us could form reasonably intelligent opinions on them. Such opinions, of course, would not be *expert*, but they would at least have the advantage of being more human than those of the experts; and we venture to believe that the opinion of the intelligent people of the world would, if translated into action, be far more effective in maintaining peace than all the armies and navies now being supported at such enormous cost.

Naturally a case presented to the world by a nation in need, as has been suggested, would be suspected by other peoples. They would look upon it as a lawyer's brief designed not to

secure justice, but rather to win a case. Hence such a presentation can be only the first step in the process of getting careful consideration of the economic needs of the different nations. The facts must be capable of verification and there must be some reliable authority to vouch for the correctness of the facts. This brings us to the second step.

If the publicity attained by any nation for its case arouses the interest of any considerable body of people, then some international forum or conference could be called where these matters could be discussed. This might be wholly unofficial to begin with, but if the nations with cases to present were to invite this conference to make an investigation of its own to verify or correct their findings, still another step forward would have been taken. There is every reason to believe that in the course of a few years the facts of any one case could be ascertained and made available to everybody interested in them. There would then be an accepted basis of fact available for the discussion of the situation of any country which was claiming that it needed larger resources. Such an attested report would enable us to answer intelligently the questions that would arise in the course of giving careful and honest consideration to the needs of any country. It can best be shown what some of the material in this report would be if we consider a concrete case.

Take, therefore, the case of Japan as an example. I shall indicate what seem to me the chief facts we should know in order to arrive at an intelligent and just opinion of what Japan's needs are: What are the facts of Japan's population growth in the recent past (for several decades at least)? What do these facts indicate regarding its probable growth during the next fifty years? Is there any reasonable expectation of new factors in her population growth (for example, birth control, improved sanitation, etc.) becoming operative

within fifty years? If so, how will they affect her growth? Are the natural resources (agricultural, mineral, hydro-electric, and other) of the country such that the expected growth of population can be cared for in a manner consonant with the standards of living which prevail? — with the changes in these standards which appear inevitable? What will be the effects of Japan's probable growth of population upon the life of the people if additional resources are not made available? What resources, if any, in addition to its own, does Japan need to care for its present population and its probable growth during the next fifty years? Are these resources available now on such terms that there is reasonable expectation of Japan's being able to supply its needs without being given new fields of exploitation? If the Japanese need land for settlement, does land exist near at hand which could be given them without working hardship on other peoples? If such lands exist, what are the difficulties in the way of Japan's securing them by direct political negotiation at a price such that they can reasonably hope to pay for them in the course of time? Are these lands suited to the Japanese from the standpoint of climate, so that they can be expected to thrive in them? Do they contain the resources Japan needs? Assuming that lands suited to the Japanese in all essential respects do exist, is this same land likely to be settled upon and used within the next fifty years by the people now possessing it? If so, in what ways, and to what extent? Or is it being held for profitable private exploitation by cheap labour at some indefinite future time? Do the peoples holding these lands for settlement or future profit have any other areas where they may settle or from which they may draw similar products? Would their economic situation be weakened by the alienation of these lands? If so, in what ways, and to what extent?

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the questions that would need to be answered by such a report as that suggested above. Many others would suggest themselves in the course of preparing a report upon these. Such a report by a neutral fact-finding commission, with proper provision for minority reports and opinions, would certainly be an enlightening document and should contribute notably to the formation of intelligent world opinion upon the need for and the justification of expansion in the particular case reported on.

Furthermore, if the government of any country which believed that it had a good case for claiming more land and resources knew that a report by some international organization would be made after it had presented its case, it would be careful to see that its own brief was accurately and honestly drawn up. It would be also on guard against jingoism in governmental circles and would discourage it in the national press because jingoism would tend to prejudice its case before the world public. When we reflect how jingoism is fostered by governments today, in the hope of bolstering up questionable policies upon which they have embarked, we can readily appreciate that the introduction of candour and honesty in presenting a case to the world would be an enormous gain — a real step forward in international relations. But this appears to be as far as unofficial action can go.

The third step — and it would be the decisive one — would be the actual consideration, by an international body officially constituted, of the claims of the nations needing more territory. The calling together of such a body, or the delegation of this function to the League of Nations, would not necessarily commit any nation to any concession, but it would indicate a willingness on the part of the dominant powers to consider such questions on their merits. It would hold out a

hope to the crowded peoples that they might reasonably expect to improve their positions without resort to war.

At such a conference those countries which feel that they have grievances under the present distribution of resources could present their cases, and they in turn could invite a further investigation of the facts by neutral agents who would report at a later conference, if the unofficial reports available do not appear sufficient. All this would tend to create an atmosphere in which reports on facts would be considered on their merits.

Of course the convening of such a conference would be useless unless there were a definite intention on the part of the possessing powers of making concessions to the crowded peoples if it is clearly shown that such concessions are necessary to ensure justice and maintain peace. Manifestly Great Britain, or France, or Holland, or the United States, or Australia cannot be asked to relinquish certain well-established claims to unused territory merely to turn it over to the same kind of inadequate use by Italy or Japan. Claims must be based upon well-demonstrated need and fairly clear proof of ability to satisfy this need by the acquirement of the resources asked for. Nor can it be expected that France, for example, will abate its extreme nationalism in the face of extreme nationalistic claims by Italy. If Italy is going to claim the allegiance of Italians settling in the French possessions in north Africa or in Brazil and encourage them to remain Italian citizens, we can scarcely expect that these countries will welcome large numbers of Italians with open arms. It should also be clear that in asking larger resources nations are not primarily interested in increase of military power, but rather in securing a better living for a population whose growth is inevitable under present conditions.

### 3. Colonies and Increase of Military Power

It may not be amiss to point out here again that there is an undue amount of concern among the possessing nations over the increase of power which will accrue to the non-possessing nations if they are given room for expansion. It seems to be assumed generally that any increase in numbers of a national group, whether at home or in colonies, means just that large an increase in the power of the mother country. We have pointed out in another connexion, however, that colonies do not long remain subservient to the purposes of the homeland. It is but natural that men who have the energy to take possession of new lands and bring them into use are not men who will readily submit to having their affairs run from a colonial office. In the very nature of things life in a new country is greatly different from life in an older settled country. The settlers of new lands soon develop the feeling that they are not understood back home and resent interference from there with their affairs. There is no good reason to suppose that colonists from any of the crowded countries of today will feel less this way than Anglo-Saxon and Spanish colonists have in the past. The interests of mother countries and colonies can never coincide at more than a few points, and these will not be sufficient to make greater solidarity between Italy and her colonies of the future than now exists between Great Britain and most of her dominions and colonies.

It savours of insincerity, but is perhaps only inability to perceive the essential inconsistency of the position, to hear an Australian oppose the expansion of the Japanese on the ground that Japanese colonists will constitute a great source of strength to Japanese imperialism in the near future, and in the next breath recount the measures which Australia has taken to assure her own independence of action in matters of

vital concern. The Australians are certain that, although they are British colonists, they are not playing the game of British imperialism, and that they are not in any way going to weaken their own position for the benefit of that rather nebulous thing the Empire. It seems as if they should be able to see that the attitude of Japanese colonists towards the home country will in all probability be essentially the same as their own towards Great Britain as soon as the Japanese become well established in new lands. It is unreasonable to assume that it will be otherwise, or that Japanese and Italians and Indians are different from Anglo-Saxons in this respect.

#### 4. Race Prejudice and Racial Expansion

This brings up another matter of very great concern in trying to establish a greater equality of resources on the earth. Race prejudice has been discussed elsewhere, but another word must be said on it here. It has become almost a sacred article of faith among western Europeans (and their colonists), particularly the Anglo-Saxons, that they are the "chosen people." We certainly act as though the world were created for our special benefit, and the other peoples were created to give exercise to our powers of exploitation. This attitude must go by the board if we are ever to do justice to other peoples. So long as we believe in our inherent superiority, we cannot give fair consideration to the claims of peoples of other races to share in the goods of this world.

I have stated elsewhere that I do not take any stock in the idea that there is now conspiracy of the coloured races against the white race. But if the white race continues to exploit the coloured races as it has been doing, and if it denies them a fair share in the resources of the world, then it would be but natural to find an alliance growing up against the present masters

of the world in which the leading challengers would necessarily be certain of the coloured peoples. The jingoistic leaders of such an alliance would of course appeal to the prejudice and the solidarity of the coloured peoples just as some white men now appeal to our race prejudice and to the solidarity of the white race. But if such an alignment should develop in the future, it will be largely the white man's fault. It will arise because he has denied to the coloured peoples any fair share in world resources and because he has refused to treat them as equals. We should recognize these facts and govern ourselves accordingly.

There will no doubt be considerable economic differences between the races for a long time to come; there will also be many differences in social organization; but such differences do not imply anything regarding the superiority or inferiority of peoples. They merely show the different trends of social development in different peoples living under different conditions and different historical backgrounds. Furthermore, it would be a pity if these differences in modes of living should cease to exist, for certainly no people has yet found "the way of life" so completely, so satisfactorily, that we could wish all men to follow in its steps. It is sheer racial conceit to suppose that people who do not do as we do, who do not value the same things in the same way as we do, who do not strive to achieve the same ends that we do, and who do not worship the same gods as ourselves, are "inferior" and may be justly used as tools for our enrichment. Until we recognize this fact, we are not likely to be fair-minded in our appraisement of the needs of these people.

It has been my contention throughout this discussion that the growing differential pressure of population on resources in the different countries was practically certain to lead to war in the not distant future under the present system of

world organization; and consequently that it behooves us to take thought of ways in which this differential pressure can be equalized, or relieved, if we wish to avoid war arising from this cause. It has been shown that there are large areas of unused land in the world, some of which, if allotted to the crowded peoples, would furnish them the necessary relief for the next few decades. Furthermore, the people now in possession of these lands (chiefly tropical) cannot exploit them by their own labour and in many cases not even by the scanty native labour already there. Hence it will certainly impose no considerable hardship on their present possessors to allow their exploitation by other peoples. But it must be recognized that while there is abundant land to furnish relief for some time — perhaps fifty to seventy-five years to come — there is no prospect that the earth can support the present increase in numbers for any great length of time.

### 5. Birth Control the Only Remedy for Overcrowding

It must be made clear to these peoples who seek relief from their present congestion through expansion that this relief can be granted voluntarily only if they will undertake to see that methods of birth control become generally known and that no official obstacles to its practice are raised. The present situation is becoming steadily more dangerous because of the differentials in birth-rates that now exist. Western Europe and its colonies have adopted birth control so widely within the last generation that they no longer need the settlement areas that it appeared probable they would need a generation or two ago. Nor are they exploiting their tropical colonies as rapidly as seemed likely to the empire-builders of the last century. This fact of a rapidly declining birth-rate in the West puts a new face on the matter of holding all their

present possessions. But it is quite clear that the Japanese, the Indians, the Italians, and the Slavs cannot expect to expand at their present rates for any great length of time. The earth will not hold them. On the other hand, since the peoples of low birth-rate do not need all their present holdings, they should not expect that the crowded peoples will sit calmly by and starve while these holdings remain unused.

We have pointed out elsewhere that the decline of the birth-rate seems to be very closely associated with the growth of industry and the growing prosperity of people. Hence concessions to the peoples of high birth-rate which will enable them to industrialize more rapidly and thus to improve their economic status will, if coupled with the spread of the knowledge of the methods of birth control, lead to a rapid decline of the birth-rate among all of them. We have already produced evidence to show that this decline is well under way in Italy and in the industrialized areas of Japan and the Slavic countries in central Europe (Czechoslovakia and Poland). The cities of Soviet Russia have much lower birth-rates than the rural districts, indicating that birth control is gaining a foothold in Russia. There is no doubt that the education of the Russian peasants will soon lead to its increase among them. Nor is there the least reason in the world to suppose that the Chinese and Indians will not come to practise birth control extensively within the next several decades. The personal advantages of birth control are too great not to appeal to the Oriental peoples as well as to those of the Occident. No doubt there are a great many more obstacles to its general practice among some of the Orientals than among ourselves, but they will overcome these obstacles as the growth of industry makes necessary a general modification of the forms of social organization which have prevailed hitherto. Modern industry cannot be carried on under the same forms of so-

cial organization that were suited to a more simple agricultural life. These will be broken up as industry makes necessary a greater mobility of population, and in the process of readjustment birth control will unquestionably become a very widespread practice.

It may not be out of place to say here that I regard birth control (conception control) as one of the great discoveries of mankind. It will have an influence on human affairs as great as the discovery of fire, the invention of printing, or the application of electricity to communication and industry. Its spread can be delayed by various obstacles — for example, laws, customs, and the like — but its onward march cannot be prevented, and in time it will change the entire course of history.

If there should be any people that does not come to see the advantages of birth control, it may be safely assumed that this people will also be immune from the appreciation of the advantages of better standards of living and will be content not to expand, but to live in their present territory with present high birth-rates and death-rates. Our experience in this country with Negroes from the South moving into northern cities makes it appear highly improbable, however, that there is any people on earth which will not appreciate the advantages of birth control when they have had the opportunity to learn of it. The time must come before long when the population of the earth must practically cease to increase and it now appears that birth control is the method by which this will be brought about.

This fact must be clearly realized by all peoples, but it is unreasonable in the extreme for the present peoples of low birth-rate to demand of the peoples of high birth-rate the *immediate* general practice of birth control. It is a demand which cannot possibly be complied with. Great social changes

do not take place by fiat. They must evolve slowly in response to changed conditions of life, as adjustments to an alteration in the status of individuals in the social and economic life of the community. An even more effective way to spread the practice of birth control than by mere propaganda is to aid those changes in social organization and individual status that will demand a new adaptation on the part of every person, an adaptation in which the advantages of smaller families will be obvious. I believe that the relief of the present congestion in certain countries, through access to new lands, and the general improvement of economic conditions which will follow such relief, will be the most effective means of spreading the knowledge and practice of birth control that can possibly be devised.

#### 6. Emigration as a Relief to Population Pressure

It is not true under modern conditions, when the methods of birth control can be easily ascertained by anyone, that emigration may not contribute to a permanent solution of the problem of pressure of population in any given country. This was so in past times when emigration merely resulted in lowering the death-rate back home. But today emigration is an extremely effective way both of spreading the practice of birth control directly and of producing those conditions in which birth control thrives. I believe emigration to be the only way out of the difficulties arising out of differential population pressures during the next few decades. The alternative to voluntarily providing for the expansion of certain of the nationally strong peoples of high birth-rate into the unused areas of the world is war. Since it is difficult to see how, in the present unstable world situation, a war arising from this cause can be localized, the matter of meeting the

real needs of the crowded peoples is a concern of all of us, not merely an affair to be settled between the countries directly involved. I believe that the sacrifice of national wealth and prestige required of any nation to forestall war arising from this differential pressure of population will be negligible as compared with the costs of a war to defend unused possessions needed by another nation. I further believe that a readjustment of resources voluntarily arrived at will be far more stable than any settlement imposed by victors in a war. It seems to me, then, that it will be worth while to try to develop a plan for the settlement of claims to larger resources and new lands which is based upon a fair consideration of the needs of peoples. We could thus remove one of the most probable causes of war in the near future, and might help to lay the foundation for a new and better system of international relations.

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